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A network consists of a set of nodes and edges with the edges representing
pairwise connections between nodes. Examples of real-world networks include the
Internet, the World Wide Web, social networks and transportation networks often
modeled as random graphs. In the first half of this thesis, we explore the degree
distributions of such random graphs. In homogeneous networks or graphs, the be-
havior of the (generic) degree of a single node is often thought to reflect the degree
distribution of the graph defined as the usual fractions of nodes with given degree.
To study this preconceived notion, we introduce a general framework to discuss the
conditions under which these two degree distributions coincide asymptotically in
large random networks. Although Erdős-Rényi graphs along with other well known
random graph models satisfy the aforementioned conditions, we show that there
might be homogeneous random graphs for which such a conclusion may fail to hold.
A counterexample to this common notion is found in the class of random threshold
graphs. An implication of this finding is that random threshold graphs cannot be
used as a substitute to the Barabási-Albert model for scale-free network modeling,
as proposed in some works.
Since the Barabási-Albert model was proposed, other network growth models
were introduced that were shown to generate scale-free networks. We study one such
basic network growth model, called the fitness model, which captures the inherent
attributes of individual nodes through fitness values (drawn from a fitness distribu-
tion) that influence network growth. We characterize the tail of the network-wide
degree distribution through the fitness distribution and demonstrate that the fit-
ness model is indeed richer than the Barabási-Albert model, in that it is capable of
producing power-law degree distributions with varying parameters along with other
non-Poisson degree distributions.
In the second half of the thesis, we look at the interactions between nodes in
a game-theoretic setting. As an example, these nodes could represent interacting
agents making decisions over time while the edges represent the dependence of their
payoffs on the decisions taken by other nodes. We study learning rules that could
be adopted by the agents so that the entire system of agents reaches a desired oper-
ating point in various scenarios motivated by practical concerns facing engineering
systems. For our analysis, we abstract out the network and represent the problem
in the strategic-form repeated game setting.
We consider two classes of learning rules – a class of better-reply rules and
a new class of rules, which we call, the class of monitoring rules. Motivated by
practical concerns, we first consider a scenario in which agents revise their actions
asynchronously based on delayed payoff information. We prove that, under the
better-reply rules (when certain mild assumptions hold), the action profiles played
by the agents converge almost surely to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
with finite expected convergence time in a large class of games called generalized
weakly acyclic games (GWAGs). A similar result is shown to hold for the monitoring
rules in GWAGs and also in games satisfying a payoff interdependency structure.
Secondly, we investigate a scenario in which the payoff information is unreliable,
causing agents to make erroneous decisions occasionally. When the agents follow
the better-reply rules and the payoff information becomes more accurate over time,
we demonstrate the agents will play a PSNE with probability tending to one in
GWAGs. Under a similar setting, when the agents follow the monitoring rule, we
show that the action profile weakly converges to certain characterizable PSNE(s).
Finally, we study a scenario where an agent might erroneously execute an intended
action from time to time. Under such a setting, we show that the monitoring
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Part I
Study of Degrees on Networks
1
Chapter 1: Networks & Degrees
In the past three decades considerable efforts have been devoted to understand-
ing the rich structure and functions of complex networks, be they technologically
engineered, found in nature or generated through social interactions. A popular
research direction has been the design of “good” random graph models in the sense
of exhibiting key properties found in observed networks – Historically attention was
given to the simplest of network properties, namely the degrees of nodes and their
distributions.
The discussion invariably starts with the work of Erdős and Rényi [17]: With
n nodes and link probability p, the (binomial) Erdős-Rényi graph Gpn; pq postulates
that the npn´1q
2
potential undirected links between these n nodes are each created
with probability p, independently of each other. The degree distribution of a node in
Erdős-Rényi graphs is then announced to be “Poisson”-like, the justification going
roughly as follows: (i) WithDn,kppq denoting the degree random variable (rv) of node
k in Gpn; pq, the rvs Dn,1ppq, . . . , Dn,nppq are identically distributed, each distributed




for some λ ą 0, then Poisson Convergence ensures the distributional
2
convergence
Dn,1ppnq ùñn D (1.1)
where the rv D is a Poisson rv with parameter λ.
A rich asymptotic theory has been developed for Erdős-Rényi graphs in the
many node regime; see the monographs [7,13,27]. However, as more networks have
come under investigation, in many cases the data suggest that the degree distribution
is not Poisson but displays instead a power-law behavior in the following sense: If
the network comprises a large number n of nodes and Nnpdq is the number of nodes




for some α in the range r2, 3s and C ą 0 – Such statements are usually left somewhat
vague as the range of d is never carefully specified in relation to n; networks where
(1.2) was observed are often called scale-free networks. On the basis of this obser-
vation, it was concluded that Erdős-Rényi graphs cannot model scale-free networks,
and new random graph models were sought. The Barabási-Albert model came to
prominence as the first random graph model to formally “explain” via the mecha-
nism of preferential attachment the possibility of power law degree distributions in
large networks [2].
The statement (1.2) concerns a degree distribution which is computed network-
wide, whereas the convergence (1.1) addresses the behavior of the (generic) degree
of a single node, its distribution being identical across nodes. A natural question
is then whether this discrepancy can be resolved, at least asymptotically, in large
3
networks and if so, under what conditions.
Our first contribution lies in exploring this issue in some detail. First we in-
troduce a general framework to investigate this discrepancy in Chapter 2 through
a sequence of random graphs tGn, n “ 1, 2, . . .u with increasingly large and un-
bounded vertex sets. The discussion is carried out under a set of three assumptions,
namely
(i) Weak Homogeneity: For each n “ 1, 2, . . ., the degree rvs in Gn are pairwise
equidistributed across nodes – Let Dn denote the generic degree rv in Gn;
(ii) Existence of an asymptotic (nodal) degree distribution: There exists an N-
valued rv D such that
Dn ùñn D. (1.3)
Let p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q denote the pmf of D; and
(iii) Asymptotic uncorrelatedness: The degree rvs display a weak form of asymp-
totic “pairwise independence.”
Under the aforementioned assumptions, we show the following result: If ppnpdq, d “
0, 1, . . .q is the empirical degree distribution in Gn (with pnpdq denoting the fraction
of nodes in Gn with degree d), then
pnpdq
P
ÝÑn ppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (1.4)
where the pmf p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q on N is as in (ii) above. Essentially this
result gives us a set of necessary conditions for the (empirical) degree distribution
to converge in the usual sense (1.4). As we discuss the underlying assumptions
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in Chapter 2, we see that Erdős-Rényi graphs (under the scaling yielding (1.1))
are readily subsumed in this framework, as are several well-known homogeneous
networks of interest in applications. This resolves the discrepancy mentioned earlier
in that the appropriate version of (1.4) does hold for both Erdős-Rényi graphs and
the Barabási-Albert model.
Next we turn our attention to the belief, mostly unsubstantiated, that in ho-
mogeneous graphs the convergence (1.3) of the generic degree distribution might
automatically imply the convergence (1.4) of the empirical degree distribution. In
Chapter 2 we show in homogeneous graphs that weak asymptotic uncorrelatedness
(assumption (iii)) is necessary to ensure convergence of the empirical degree dis-
tribution in the usual sense even when the (nodal) degree distribution converges
according to (1.3). This brings us to the question – Are there counterexamples in
the class of homogeneous random graphs of any significant interest for which conver-
gence (1.3) of the generic degree distribution take place while the usual convergence
of the empirical degree distribution (1.4) does not hold ? A counterexample described
in Chapter 3 is found in the class of random threshold graphs.
We motivate the counterexample by going back to the Barabási-Albert network
model. After the Barabási-Albert network model was proposed, researchers began
to wonder whether there were mechanisms other than preferential attachment which
could also lead to power law degree distribution. Caldarelli et al. [9] proposed a
homogeneous random graph model called the random threshold model based on
the “good-get-richer” mechanism. They argued that in many scenarios, the degree
information about every node might not be readily available (as assumed in the
5
Barabási-Albert network model). Instead, two nodes might form a connection if they
are mutually beneficial to each other depending on their intrinsic properties (maybe
friendship, interaction strength, attractiveness, etc.). The intrisic property of a node
is modeled as a fitness value drawn from a fitness distribution – A connection is said
to form between any two nodes if the sum of their individual fitnesses exceeds a
certain threshold. With an exponential fitness distribution, when the threshold is
scaled appropriately, they argued that the empirical degree distribution is power-law
in the limit of large graph size.
For the setting just described, although (1.3) is known to take place [22] with
the power tail behavior
ppdq „ d´2 pdÑ 8q,
we show that (1.4) fails to hold [Proposition 3.3]. One implication of this finding
is that random threshold graphs cannot be used as an alternative scale-free model
to the Barabási-Albert model (see below) as claimed by the authors [9,37]. Indeed,
only the convergence (1.4) has meaning in the preferential attachment model while
(1.3) is meaningless, with the situation being reversed for random threshold graphs.
In other words, the two models cannot be compared in terms of their degree dis-
tributions! This also highlights the fact that even in homogeneous graphs, there
are noteworthy situations when the network-wide degree distribution and the nodal
degree distribution may capture vastly different information. We take the discus-
sion one step further by showing in Chapter 4 that the empirical degree distribution
actually converges in a weaker sense.
6
Echoing the modeling concern in the Barabási-Albert network model posed
by Caldarelli et al. [9], Ghadge et al. [23] argued that often degree information
might not be readily available, and that the inherent quality of each node captured
through a fitness variable (drawn from a fitness distribution in an i.i.d. fashion)
should instead be the primary driver of network growth. Through simulations, the
authors were able to show a wide range of achievable degree distributions including
power-law for fitness lognormally distributed. In Chapter 5, we study this model,
often called the fitness model, in great detail. We investigate convergence of the






ÝÑn ppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (1.5)
where the pmf pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q on N is the empirical degree distribution in the
limit of large graph size. The convergence (1.5) is a weaker form of convergence
than (1.4). However, if the convergence (1.4) were to hold, then (1.5) must also
hold with the same limiting pmf. Our results indicate that if the fitness distribution
is bounded, the tail of the (limiting) empirical degree distribution shows geometric
decay, i.e., roughly speaking
ppd` 1q » Ce´βd, d “ 0, 1, . . . (1.6)
for some β ą 0 and C ą 0. Thus, if the fitness distribution is bounded, we cannot
have a power-law behavior. Conversely, for fitness distribution with infinite support,
we prove that the tail of the (limiting) empirical degree distribution cannot have a ge-
ometric decay. We consider two special cases – (i) When fitness is pareto distributed
we show that the asymptotic empirical degree distribution tppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .u is
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indeed power-law with a parameter depending on the fitness distribution. By ap-
propriately choosing the fitness distribution, any power-law degree distribution of
parameter greater than two is shown to be achievable. (ii) On the other hand,
with exponentially distributed fitness we show that a power-law behavior does not
emerge, implying that unbounded fitness distribution would not necessarily lead to a
power-law behavior. The fitness model is therefore richer than the Barabási-Albert
model in the sense that it is capable of producing a variety of tail behavior along
with power-law distributions of different parameters.
This portion of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we introduce
a general framework for studying the degree distributions of networks modeled as
random graphs. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for homogeneous graphs
under which the empirical degree distribution will converge and be identical to the
asymptotic nodal degree distribution. We also consider well known examples of
random graph models that satisfy these conditions. In Chapter 3 we investigate
a specific counterexample in the class of random threshold graphs, where the con-
vergence (1.4) of the empirical degree distribution does not hold. In Chapter 4 we
study the degree distribution of random threshold graphs in further detail and show
that the empirical degree distribution actually converges in a weaker sense. Finally
in Chapter 5 we investigate the degree distribution of the fitness model and study
its tail behavior.
8
Chapter 2: Degree Distribution of Networks
In this chapter we first introduce a general framework for studying various
degree distributions of networks modeled as random graphs, namely the degree dis-
tribution of a particular node and the (empirical) degree distribution of the graph
defined as the fraction of nodes with given degree. We obtain necessary and suf-
ficient conditions in the large graph regime under which the network-wide degree
distribution exists and is identical to the nodal degree distribution. In the later
part of this chapter, we consider well known examples of random graph models that
satisfy these conditions.
2.1 A general framework
We are given a sequence of random graphs tGn, n “ 2, 3, . . .u defined on the
probability triple pΩ,F ,Pq with the following structure: Fix n “ 2, 3, . . .. With Vn
a finite and non-empty set, the random graph Gn is an ordered pair pVn,Enq defined
on the set of nodes Vn with random edge set En Ď Vn ˆ Vn. The edge set En is
equivalently determined by a set of t0, 1u-valued edge variables tχnpk, `q, k, ` P Vnu
– Thus, χnpk, `q “ 1 (resp. χnpk, `q “ 0) if there is an edge (resp. no edge) from
9
node k to node `, so that
En “ tpk, `q P Vn ˆ Vn : χnpk, `q “ 1u.
There is no loss in generality in taking Vn “ t1, . . . , knu for some positive integer
kn. In most cases of interest Vn “ t1, . . . , nu so that kn “ n.
We assume Gn to be an undirected graph with no self-loops. This amounts to
χnpk, kq “ 0 and χnpk, `q “ χnp`, kq, k, ` P Vn.
Under these conditions the edge set En is a symmetric subset of Vn ˆ Vn because
there is an edge from node k to node ` (i.e., χnpk, `q “ 1) if and only if there is an
edge from node ` to node k (i.e., χnp`, kq “ 1).









1 rDn,k “ ds
counts the number of nodes in Vn which have degree d in Gn. The fraction of nodes








1 rDn,k “ ds .




, d “ 0, 1, . . .
˙
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which takes its values in the space of pmfs on N with support contained in VnYt0u.
As we focus on limiting results for n large, we assume the sets tVn, n “ 1, 2, . . .u
to grow unboundedly large with n, namely limnÑ8 |Vn| “ 8. Concretely, we assume
the sequence nÑ kn to be monotone increasing with limnÑ8 kn “ 8.
2.2 The main result




ÝÑn ppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (2.2)
for some pmf p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q on N. A set of assumptions to that effect is
presented next.
Assumption 2.1. (Weak Homogeneity) For each n “ 2, 3, . . ., the degree rvs in Gn
are pairwise equidistributed in the sense that
pDn,k, Dn,`q “st pDn,1, Dn,2q
k ‰ `
k, ` P Vn.
(2.3)
Note that (2.3) necessarily implies that the degree rvs in Gn are equidistributed
with
Dn,k “st Dn,1, k P Vn. (2.4)
Assumption 2.2. (Existence of an asymptotic (nodal) degree distribution) Under
Assumption 2.1, there exists an N-valued rv D such that
Dn,1 ùñn D. (2.5)
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Let p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q denote the pmf of the limiting rv D.
Assumption 2.2 can be rephrased as
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1 “ ds “ ppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (2.6)
Assumption 2.3. (Asymptotic uncorrelatedness) Under Assumption 2.1, for each
d “ 0, 1, . . ., the rvs 1 rDn,1 “ ds and 1 rDn,2 “ ds are asymptotically uncorrelated
in the sense that
lim
nÑ8
Covr1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss “ 0. (2.7)
Assumption 2.3 amounts to the convergence statement
lim
nÑ8
pP rDn,1 “ d,Dn,2 “ ds ´ P rDn,1 “ dsP rDn,2 “ dsq “ 0 (2.8)
for each d “ 0, 1, . . .. As will become apparent shortly, Assumption 2.2 and As-
sumption 2.3 will always be used in combination with Assumption 2.1. The main
result of this chapter can now be given.




ÝÑn ppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (2.9)
where the pmf p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is postulated in Assumption 2.2.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 mimics the classical proof of the Weak Law of
Large Numbers, and is provided in Section 2.8. A careful inspection of the arguments
given there shows that the following partial converse also holds; see Section 2.8 for
details.
12






for some constant Lpdq in R, then we necessarily have Lpdq “ ppdq where the pmf
p “ pppdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the one postulated in Assumption 2.2, and the limit
Cpdq ” lim
nÑ8
Covr1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss (2.11)
must exist with Cpdq “ 0.
This converse has the following consequence to be used later: Under Assump-
tions 2.1-2.2, whenever we have
lim
nÑ8
Covr1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss ą 0, (2.12)
then the conclusion (2.9) cannot hold.





for some d “ 0, 1, . . . with some constant Lpdq in R necessarily implies
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1 “ ds “ Lpdq
by bounded convergence. This shows the necessity of Assumption 2.2 for (2.9) to
hold.
2.3 Concerning Assumption 2.3
Assumption 2.3 is implied by the following assumption which is easier to check
in some cases; see Section 2.5 for some examples in a commonly occurring setting.
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Assumption 2.4. (Pairwise asymptotic independence) Under Assumptions 2.1 and
2.2, the degree rvs Dn,1 and Dn,2 are asymptotically independent in the sense that
pDn,1, Dn,2q ùñn pD1, D2q (2.13)
where D1 and D2 are independent N-valued rvs, each distributed according to the
pmf p postulated in Assumption 2.2.
Assumption 2.4 can be rephrased as
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1 “ d,Dn,2 “ d1s “ ppdqppd1q, d, d1 “ 0, 1, . . . (2.14)
Assumption 2.3 does not require the joint convergence (2.13) to hold. However, if
(2.13) is known to hold (with no further characterization of the limit), then under
Assumption 2.2 it is easy to check that (2.8) is equivalent to the independence of
the binary rvs 1 rD1 “ ds and 1 rD2 “ ds for each d “ 0, 1, . . .: Indeed, the existence
of the limit (2.13) implies
lim
nÑ8




P rDn,j “ ds “ P rDj “ ds , j “ 1, 2.
The condition (2.8) is now equivalent to
P rD1 “ d,D2 “ ds “ ppdqppdq “ P rD1 “ dsP rD2 “ ds , (2.15)
and states the independence of the binary rvs 1 rD1 “ ds and 1 rD2 “ ds. It should
be pointed out that the lack of independence of the rvs D1 and D2 does not preclude
14
the possibility that the rvs 1 rD1 “ ds and 1 rD2 “ ds are independent – Indeed it is
possible for (2.15) to hold even for all d “ 0, 1, . . . without the rvs D1 and D2 being
independent.
2.4 Erdős-Rényi Graphs
We first consider the popular Erdős-Rényi random graph model, and examine
whether Assumptions 2.1-2.3 are satisfied.
Consider an undirected graph of n nodes with link probability p – The Erdős-
Rényi graph Gpn; pq on the vertex set Vn :“ t1, 2, . . . , nu postulates that the npn´1q2
potential undirected links between these n nodes are each created with probability
p, independently of each other.
The links can be modelled by a collection of i.i.d. Bernoulli rvs tBijppq, i, j “
1, 2, . . . , nu with parameter p; with the restriction that Bijppq “ Bjippq for distinct
i, j “ 1, 2, . . . , n and Biippq “ 0 for i “ 1, 2, . . . , n. For i “ 1, 2, . . . , n and 0 ă p ă 1,






and Assumption 2.1 is satisfied given the homogeneity of the model. It is well known










e´λ, d “ 0, 1, . . . . (2.17)
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Hence Assumption 2.2 is also satisfied with p “ pλ. It is also relatively straightfor-
ward to show that the degree rvs become pairwise asymptotically independent. For
fixed n “ 1, 2, . . ., `, k “ 0, 1, . . . , n´ 1 and 0 ă p ă 1, we have
































B2jppq “ `´ 1, B12ppq “ 1
ff
. (2.18)










B2jppq “ `´ 1, B12ppq “ 1
ff
ď P rB12ppq “ 1s .
However under the scaling (2.16), we have
lim
nÑ8



























Bijppq, i “ 1, 2.
For the first term in (2.18), using the fact that the Bernoulli rvs are assumed
16



































P rB12ppq “ 0s . (2.21)
The following reduction step will simplify calculations.
Lemma 2.3. Fix n “ 2, 3, . . . and 0 ď p ď 1. For each d “ 0, 1, . . . , n´ 1, we have




| ď 2P rB12ppq “ 1s , i “ 1, 2. (2.22)
Proof. Fix n “ 2, 3, . . . and 0 ď p ď 1. For i “ 1, 2, we observe that
P rDn,ippq “ 0s “ P
“












D˚n,ippq “ 0, B12ppq “ 1
‰
(2.23)
and the bound (2.22) follows for d “ 0.
For each d “ 1, 2, . . . , n´ 1, and i “ 1, 2, we observe that
P rDn,ippq “ ds
“ P
“




















D˚n,ippq “ d´ 1, B12ppq “ 1
‰
and the bound (2.22) follows. 
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Under the scaling (2.16), using Lemma 2.3 and (2.19), we conclude that
D˚n,jpp
˚














d “ 0, 1, . . .
j “ 1, 2.
(2.24)






























P rB12ppq “ 0s
“ pλpkqpλp`q (2.25)
where pλ “ ppλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the Poisson pmf with parameter λ as defined in
(2.17). Putting together (2.20) and (2.25) in (2.18), we obtain the desired result
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pp˚nq “ k,Dn,2pp˚nq “ `s “ pλpkqpλp`q.
This shows that the stronger Assumption 2.4 holds. Thus, we have a setting where
the Assumptions described in Section 2.2 hold and the empirical degree distribution
converges as announced in Proposition 2.1.
2.5 The generic setting
In many situations of interest the sequence of random graphs tGn, n “
1, 2, . . .u arises in the following natural manner: Given is an underlying parametric
family of random graphs, say
tGpn;αq, n “ 2, 3, . . .u, α P A Ď Rp (2.26)
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where A is some parameter set and p is the dimension of the parameter space. With
α in A, for each n “ 2, 3, . . ., the random graph Gpn;αq is a random graph on Vn
whose statistics depend on the parameter α.
For α in A, we define a set of t0, 1u-valued edge variables tχnpk, `;αq, k, ` P Vnu
corresponding to the graph Gpn;αq. Thus, χnpk, `;αq “ 1 (resp. χnpk, `;αq “ 0)
if there is an edge (resp. no edge) between node k and node `. Since the graph
Gpn;αq is an undirected graph with no self-loops, we must have
χnpk, k;αq “ 0 and χnpk, `;αq “ χnp`, k;αq, k, ` P Vn.
For each k in Vn, let Dn,kpαq denote the degree of node k in Gpn;αq. For each





1 rDn,kpαq “ ds
counts the number of nodes in t1, . . . , nu which have degree d in Gpn;αq. The





The next assumption imposes a probabilistic structure on the edge rvs.


















constitutes an exchangeable family.
Property 2.1 implies that the rvs tDn,kpαq, k P Vnu also constitute an ex-
changeable family. Therefore in Gpn;αq there is no ambiguity as to what is the
(nodal) degree distribution because all nodes have the same degree distribution,
19
namely that of the rv Dn,1pαq. Further, Property 2.1 guarantees that for each α in A,
and all k, ` in Vn with k ‰ `, it holds that pDn,kpαq, Dn,`pαqq “st pDn,1pαq, Dn,2pαqq.
We construct the collection tGn, n “ 2, 3, . . .u by setting
Gn “ Gpn;α˚nq, n “ 2, 3, . . . (2.27)




nq ùñn D (2.28)
for some non-degenerate N-valued rv D. This scaling is often the critical scaling
associated with the emergence of a maximal component. Under these circumstances,
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are automatically satisfied, and only Assumption 2.3 needs
to be verified.
The example of Erdős-Rényi graphs was given earlier. In the following sections
we consider additional examples of random graph models routinely discussed in the
literature. The setting outlined above is used as it applies to these examples : With
λ ą 0,









2. Geometric random graphs Gpn;αq on a unit square (α ą 0) with scaling
α˚ : N0 Ñ R` given by πpα˚nq2 „ λn [34].
In each case, it is a simple matter to check that D in (2.28) is a Poisson rv
with parameter λ. We show that the stronger Assumption 2.4 actually holds in both
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cases, as was the case for Erdős-Rényi graphs.
We continue the discussion by imposing additional structure on the generic
setting in order to find conditions under which the stronger Assumption 2.4 might
hold. Fix integers k, ` “ 0, 1, . . . and α in A. For each n “ 2, 3, . . ., such that
maxpk, `q ` 2 ď n, we have the decomposition
P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `s “ P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 0s
` P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 1s .
(2.29)
The second term in (2.29) satisfies the following bound
P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 1s ď P rχnp1, 2;αq “ 1s . (2.30)
Together (2.29) and (2.30) suggest the following assumption, namely
Property 2.2. Under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ A satisfying (2.9), it holds that
lim
nÑ8
P rχnp1, 2;α˚nq “ 1s “ 0.
If the above-mentioned property is satisfied, then the second term in (2.29)
can be disregarded in the limit of large n under the appropriate scaling. Let Nn,ipαq
denote the neighbor set of node i in Vn in the graph Gpn;αq, i.e.,
Nn,ipαq “ tj P Vn : χnpi, j;αq “ 1u, i P Vn.
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We can further decompose the first term in (2.29) as
P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 0s
“ P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 0,Nn,1pαq XNn,2pαq “ Hs
` P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 0,Nn,1pαq XNn,2pαq ‰ Hs . (2.31)
Under Property 2.1, we bound the second term in (2.31) as
P rDn,1pαq “ k,Dn,2pαq “ `, χnp1, 2;αq “ 0,Nn,1pαq XNn,2pαq ‰ Hs
ď P rNn,1pαq XNn,2pαq ‰ Hs





P rχnp1, j;αq “ 1, χnp2, j;αq “ 1s
“ pn´ 2qP rχnp1, 3;αq “ 1, χnp2, 3;αq “ 1s (2.32)
with the help of a simple union bound. This leads naturally to the next assumption,
namely
Property 2.3. Under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ A satisfying (2.9), it holds that
lim
nÑ8
nP rχnp1, 3;α˚nq “ 1, χnp2, 3;α˚nq “ 1s “ 0.




P rDn,1pα˚nq “ k,Dn,2pα˚nq “ `s (2.33)
“ lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pα˚nq “ k,Dn,2pα˚nq “ `, χnp1, 2;α˚nq “ 0,Nn,1pα˚nq XNn,2pα˚nq ‰ Hs
22
with the understanding that if one of the limits exists, so does the other, and the
limiting values coincide.
As we will see, the presence of the events rχnp1, 2;αq “ 0s and rNn,1pαq X
Nn,2pαq ‰ Hs simplifies the calculations that follow. With integers k, ` “ 0, 1, . . .





ˇ S, T Ď Vnzt1, 2u, S X T “ H, |S| “ k, |T | “ `
(
.
Under Property 2.1, for each α in A, we have













P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0s (2.34)
where we have set S0 “ t3, . . . , k ` 2u and T0 “ tk ` 3, . . . , k ` `` 2u.
Note that














χnp1, 2;αq “ 0
χnp1, s;αq “ 1, χnp2, s;αq “ 0, s P S0
χnp1, t;αq “ 0, χnp2, t;αq “ 1, t P T0















It is easy to see that we cannot proceed further without imposing additional struc-
ture on the underlying random graph model Gpn;αq. Therefore, we shall instead
consider specific examples of random graph models.
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2.6 Random Key Graphs
In this section we introduce a class of random graphs that belong to the class
of random intersection graphs; it is naturally associated with the random key pre-
distribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor [19] in the context of wireless sensor
networks. These random graphs have also appeared recently in application areas like
clustering analysis [24, 25] and collaborative filtering in recommender systems [29].
Consider n nodes and a pool of P keys. Each node is assigned a set of K
distinct keys which are selected at random from the pool of P keys (with K ă P ).
Two nodes form a connection if their key rings have at least one key in common. The
resulting notion of adjacency defines the random key graph Kpn;αq on the vertex set
Vn :“ t1, 2, . . . , nu, with the parameter α ” pK,P q. Clearly the parameter space A
is here given by
A ” tpK,P q : K,P P N0, K ă P u.
Conditions on n, K and P have been sought under which the random key graph
Kpn;αq exhibits a non-trivial degree distribution. In [38], the authors show that if








the asymptotic nodal degree distribution is the Poisson pmf pλ “ tpλpdq, d “
0, 1, . . .u with parameter λ. Under this scaling we shall show that weak asymptotic
independence in the sense of (2.8) holds for the random key graphs. In fact, we shall
prove something stronger – the pairwise asymptotic independence of the degree rvs
24
in the usual sense.
Throughout it is convenient to assume that the keys are labeled 1, . . . , P . For
each node i “ 1, . . . , n, let Kn,ipαq denote the random set of K distinct keys assigned
to node i. Let PK denote the collection of all subsets of t1, . . . , P u which contain
exactly K elements. The rvs Kn,1pαq, . . . , Kn,npαq are assumed to be i.i.d. rvs, each
of which is distributed uniformly over PK according to





, S P PK .
With this notation, distinct nodes i, j “ 1, 2, . . . , n are seen to be adjacent if,
Kn,ipαq XKn,jpαq ‰ H.
It is easy to check that










0 if P ă 2K
pP´KK q
pPKq
if 2K ď P.
(2.37)
Expression (2.37) is a simple consequence of the fact that








0 if |S| ą P ´K
pP´|S|K q
pPKq
if |S| ď P ´K
for any subset S of t1, . . . , P u. Thus, with
χnpi, j;αq “ 1 rKn,ipαq XKn,jpαq ‰ Hs
under the generic setting, the probability of edge occurrence in Kpn;αq is given by
P rχnpi, j;αq “ 1s “ 1´ qpαq. (2.38)
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1 rKn,ipαq XKn,jpαq ‰ Hs .





n q such that (2.36) is satisfied.
Theorem 2.4. For the class of random key graphs, under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ A
satisfying (2.36), we have
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pα˚nq “ k,Dn,2pα˚nq “ `s “ pλpkqpλp`q, k, ` “ 0, 1, . . . (2.39)
where the pmf pλ “ ppλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the Poisson pmf on N with parameter
λ.
Theorem 2.4 is established in Section 2.9, and yields a stronger form of inde-
pendence compared to what is required for Assumption 2.3. Assumptions 2.1-2.3
therefore hold for the random key graphs under the aforementioned scaling. This
leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. For the class of random key graphs, under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ A






ÝÑn pλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (2.40)
where the pmf pλ “ ppλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the Poisson pmf on N with parameter
λ.
26
2.7 Random Geometric Graphs
Next, we introduce a class of random graphs which is often considered to be
a relevant model for (ad-hoc) wireless sensor networks [20, 35]: Consider n nodes
which are assumed to be placed uniformly at random on the square r0, 1s2. With set
of nodes Vn “ t1, . . . , nu, let the position of node i in Vn be denoted as Zi “ pXi, Yiq.
Distinct nodes i, j “ 1, 2, . . . , n are said to be adjacent if the distance between them
is less than some α ą 0. If d : R2 ˆ R2 Ñ R denotes the (Euclidean) distance on
R2, distinct nodes i and j are then adjacent if
dpZi,Zjq ď α.
According to the notation developed in Section 2.5, with distinct nodes i, j “
1, . . . , n, we have
χnpi, j;αq “ 1 rdpZi,Zjq ď αs .
This defines the random geometric graph Gpn;αq on the vertex set Vn. This time,




1 rdpZi,Zjq ď αs .







the asymptotic nodal degree distribution can be shown to be the Poisson pmf pλ “
tpλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .u on N with parameter λ. Under this scaling we will show that
weak asymptotic independence holds in the sense of (2.8). As was done for random
27
key graphs, we prove the stronger pairwise asymptotic independence of the degree
rvs in the usual sense.
Theorem 2.6. For the class of random geometric graphs, under the scaling α˚ :
N0 Ñ R` satisfying (2.41), we have
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pα˚nq “ k,Dn,2pα˚nq “ `s “ pλpkqpλp`q, k, ` P N, (2.42)
where the pmf pλ “ ppλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the Poisson pmf on N with parameter
λ.
We prove Theorem 2.6 in Section 2.10. This result is analogous to Theorem
2.4 for random key graphs, and here as well, implies convergence of the empirical
degree distribution.
Corollary 2.7. For the class of random geometric graphs, under the scaling α˚ :






ÝÑn pλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (2.43)
where the pmf pλ “ ppλpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q is the Poisson pmf on N with parameter
λ.
2.8 Proofs of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2
We begin with a preliminary technical lemma.




















Covr1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss (2.44)
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for each d “ 0, 1, . . ., with the understanding that if one of the limits exists, so does
the other and the limiting values coincide.






















































Var r1 rDn,k “ dss `
ÿ
k,`PVn: k‰`
Cov r1 rDn,k “ ds ,1 rDn,` “ dss










“ P rDn,1 “ ds (2.46)
and
Var rNnpdqs “ |Vn|Var r1 rDn,1 “ dss ` |Vn|p|Vn| ´ 1q ¨ Cov r1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss ,
















“ pP rDn,1 “ ds ´ ppdqq2 `





¨ Cov r1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss .(2.47)
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Let n go to infinity in (2.47): Assumption 2.2 implies
lim
nÑ8




Var r1 rDn,1 “ dss
|Vn|
“ 0
always holds, and the equivalence of the limits at (2.44) immediately follows. 
It is worth pointing out that under Assumptions 2.1-2.2, the arguments just
given also show that
lim inf
nÑ8
Cov r1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss ě 0. (2.49)
2.8.1 A proof of Proposition 2.1


































, n “ 2, 3, . . . (2.50)



















By virtue of Lemma 2.8 this is equivalent to having
lim
nÑ8
Cov r1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss “ 0,
and the proof of Proposition 2.1 is now complete since this limiting condition coin-
cides with the enforced Assumption 2.3. 
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2.8.2 A proof of Proposition 2.2














by the Bounded Convergence Theorem. The relation (2.46) (seen earlier to hold










P rDn,1 “ ds “ ppdq. (2.53)
Comparing (2.52) and (2.53) yields Lpdq “ ppdq.
Note that (2.51) (necessarily with Lpdq “ ppdq under the assumed conditions)




Ñ n ppdq. (2.54)
This is because convergence in probability and L2-convergence are equivalent for






















Cov r1 rDn,1 “ ds ,1 rDn,2 “ dss “ 0
by a final appeal to Lemma 2.8. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.2. 
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2.9 A proof of Theorem 2.4
Before commencing the proof we state a few preliminary results.
2.9.1 Some well known results
We state two lemmas which present simple bounds. The details of the first
lemma can be found in [38].





















This lemma directly leads to the following bounds.


















































It is worth mentioning that the proof given above is based on a proof given
in [38, p. 2988].
Corollary 2.11. For any scaling P,K : N0 Ñ N0 and any sequence L : N0 Ñ N0

































, n “ 1, 2, . . . (2.59)
provided Kn ` Ln ą Pn. Multiply (2.59) by
Pn
LnKn
and let n go to infinity in the




























by virtue of (2.58) (as it implies limnÑ8
Kn
Pn




Fix a positive integer c. Under the scaling (2.36), there exists n0pcq such that,
pc` 1qK˚n ă P
˚
n


















Previously in Section 2.5, we examined a generic method for establishing the
asymptotic independence of degree rvs required by Assumption 2.4. Before we can
proceed further, we first need to show that Properties 2.1-2.3 are satisfied for random
key graphs.
It is clear that Property 2.1 holds for the model. For n “ 2, 3, . . . and P,K ą 0
such that 2K ď P , we have from (2.38),






where α ” pK,P q. Under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ A satisfying (2.36), we have
lim
nÑ8
P rχnp1, 2;α˚nq “ 1s “ lim
nÑ8
P rKn,1pα˚nq XKn,2pα˚nq ‰ Hs “ 0 (2.62)
as we use (2.60) (with c “ 1). This implies that Property 2.2 is satisfied under
this scaling. Next, we show that Property 2.3 also holds under the aforementioned
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scaling. For α ” pK,P q in A such that 2K ď P , and n “ 3, 4, . . ., we find
nP rχnp1, 3;αq “ 1, χnp2, 3;αq “ 1s





















Under the scaling satisfying (2.36), by setting c “ 1 in (2.60) we conclude that
Property 2.3 is indeed satisfied.
Since Properties 2.1-2.3 hold for random key graphs, the equivalence (2.33)
holds. Therefore, continuing from (2.35), for α in A, all k, ` “ 0, 1, . . . and n “
2, 3, . . . such that n ą k ` `` 2, we find














χnp1, 2;αq “ 0
χnp1, s;αq “ 1, χnp2, s;αq “ 0, s P S0
χnp1, t;αq “ 0, χnp2, t;αq “ 1, t P T0



























Kn,1pαq XKn,2pαq “ H
Kn,1pαq XKn,spαq ‰ H, Kn,2pαq XKn,spαq “ H, s P S0
Kn,1pαq XKn,tpαq “ H, Kn,2pαq XKn,tpαq ‰ H, t P T0















with S0 “ t3, . . . , k ` 2u and T0 “ tk ` 3, . . . , k ` `` 2u.
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To help deal with (2.63), with R and S given in PK , we define the events
E1,npR, S;αq “ rR XKn,spαq ‰ H, S XKn,spαq “ H, s P S0s ,
E2,npR, S;αq “ rR XKn,tpαq “ H, S XKn,tpαq ‰ H, t P T0s ,
and
E3,npR, S;αq “ rR XKn,rpαq “ H, S XKn,rpαq “ H, r P Vnz pt1, 2u Y S0 Y T0qs .
Expressing (2.63) in terms of the events defined above, we see that
P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0s
“ E
“
1 rKn,1pαq XKn,2pαq “ Hs
ˆ P
“








1 rKn,1pαq XKn,2pαq “ Hs




For R and S in PK such that RX S “ H, and α ” pK,P q in A such that 3K ď P ,
we obtain
P rE1,npR, S;αqs “ P rR XKn,jpαq ‰ H, S XKn,jpαq “ H, j P S0s
“ P rR XKn,3pαq ‰ H, S XKn,3pαq “ Hsk
















































































Substituting (2.65), (2.66) and (2.67) into (2.64) yields





























P rKn,1pαq XKn,2pαq “ Hs .
(2.68)
Next, we study the asymptotics of the individual terms in (2.68) under the

















































































































n , Kn “ K
˚
n in (2.60) and
using the fact that limnÑ8
K˚n
P˚n

































Next, we state a simple result to be used later.












, b P R.
































































with the help of (2.73). Applying the asymptotic results (2.62), (2.72) and (2.74),
we get from (2.68) that
lim
nÑ8
nk``P rNn,1pα˚nq “ S0,Nn,2pα˚nq “ T0s “ λk``e´2λ.
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This last relation readily leads to
lim
nÑ8











upon using (2.33) and (2.34). 
2.10 A proof of Theorem 2.6
First, we define a number of events to be used in the proof of Theorem 2.6,
and compute their asymptotic probabilities under the appropriate scaling α˚.
2.10.1 Preliminaries
Fix n “ 2, 3, . . . and 0 ă α ă 1
2
. We find it useful to define the set of points
Anpαq “ tpX, Y q | α ă X ă 1´ α, α ă Y ă 1´ αu.
For each i in Vn, we find it useful to define the event
En,ipαq “ rpXi, Yiq P Anpαqs .
It is easy to see that
P rEn,ipαqs “ p1´ 2αq2. (2.75)
On this event a particular node is at least distance α away from the borders of the
square r0, 1s2. Next we define the event where a pair of nodes (say nodes 1 and 2)
are at least distance 2α apart from each other, namely
Ẽnpαq “ rdpZ1,Z2q ą 2αs .
39














ě 1´ 4πα2. (2.76)
For 0 ă α ă 1
2
, define the event Enpαq “ En,1pαq X En,2pαq X Ẽnpαq. Under the
scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ R` satisfying (2.41), we obtain
lim
nÑ8















First, we note that random geometric graphs satisfy Property 2.1. For 0 ă
α ă 1
2
and n “ 2, 3, . . ., it is plain that
P rχnp1, 2;αq “ 1s “ P r|Z1 ´Z2| ď αs ď πα2
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and Property 2.2 is therefore satisfied under the scaling specified in (2.41). Again,
for α in A and n “ 2, 3, . . ., we have
nP rχnp1, 3;αq “ 1, χnp2, 3;αq “ 1s “ nP r|Z1 ´Z3| ď α, |Z2 ´Z3| ď αs
“ nE
”




pP r|Z1 ´ x| ď αs2qx“Z3
ı
ď n ¨ pπα2q2
and Property 2.3 is satisfied under the scaling α˚. Properties 2.1-2.3 being satisfied,
the equivalence (2.33) is valid for random geometric graphs. Continuing from (2.35),
for 0 ă α ă 1
2
, all k, ` “ 0, 1, . . . and n “ 2, 3, . . . such that n ą k ` `` 2, we get














χnp1, 2;αq “ 0
χnp1, s;αq “ 1, χnp2, s;αq “ 0, s P S0
χnp1, t;αq “ 0, χnp2, t;αq “ 1, t P T0



























|Z1 ´Z2| ą α
|Z1 ´Zs| ď α, |Z2 ´Zs| ą α, s P S0
|Z1 ´Zt| ą α, |Z2 ´Zt| ď α, t P T0















with S0 “ t3, . . . , k ` 2u and T0 “ tk ` 3, . . . , k ` `` 2u as before.
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To help deal with (2.78), we define the events
E 11,npx,y;αq “ r|x´Zs| ď α, |y ´Zs| ą α, s P S0s ,
E 12,npx,y;αq “ r|x´Zt| ą α, |y ´Zt| ď α, t P T0s ,
and
E 13,npx,y;αq “ r|y ´Zr| ą α, |y ´Zr| ą α, r P pS0 Y T0 Y t1, 2uq
c
s (2.79)
for x,y in p0, 1q2. We decompose (2.78) further by writing
P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0s (2.80)
“ P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0, Enpαqs ` P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0, Enpαqcs .
Writing the first term in (2.80) in terms of the events defined above, we obtain





















Observe that under the event En,1pαq, we can draw a circle of radius α centered at
node 1 which is completely contained within the square r0, 1s2, implying that the
probability of an edge forming between node 1 and any node s in S0 is πα
2. Also,
under the event Ẽnpαq any node connected to node 1 cannot be connected to node





“ P r|x´Zs| ď α, |y ´Zs| ą α, s P S0s

















Under the event Enpαq, circles of radius α centred at x and y do not intersect.
Therefore the probability that a particular node does not connect to either node 1






“ P r|y ´Zr| ą α, |y ´Zr| ą α, r P pS0 Y T0 Y t1, 2uqcs
“ P r|y ´Zk```3| ą α, |y ´Zk```3| ą αsn´2´k´`
“ p1´ 2πα2qn´2´k´`. (2.84)





“ P r|x´Zs| ď α, |y ´Zs| ą α, s P S0s
















Using (2.82),(2.83) and (2.84) on (2.81), we obtain
P rNn,1pαq “ S0,Nn,2pαq “ T0, Enpαqs “ pπα2qk``p1´ 2πα2qn´2´k´`P rEnpαqs .
(2.87)
Under the scaling α˚ satisfying (2.41), we obtain
lim
nÑ8
nk``P rNn,1pα˚nq “ S0,Nn,2pα˚nq “ T0, Enpα˚nqs “ λk``e´2λ (2.88)
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upon using Lemma 2.12 and (2.77). The bounds (2.85) and (2.86) allow us to bound
the second term in (2.80) as









































nk``P rNn,1pα˚nq “ S0,Nn,2pα˚nq “ T0, Enpα˚nqcs “ 0 (2.89)
by virtue of (2.77). Returning to (2.80) and using (2.88) and (2.89), we obtain
lim
nÑ8
nk``P rNn,1pα˚nq “ S0,Nn,2pα˚nq “ T0s “ λk``e´2λ. (2.90)
Substituting into (2.34) and using the equivalence step (2.33), we obtain
lim
nÑ8













Chapter 3: A Counterexample: Random Threshold Graphs
In the previous chapter, we introduced a generic framework for studying the
degree distributions of random graphs. We identified a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the network-wide (empirical) degree distribution coincides
with the nodal degree distribution in the large graph limit. We also demonstrated
three instances of homogeneous graphs where these conditions are satisfied, namely
Erdős-Rényi graphs, random key graphs and random geometric graphs.
In the present chapter, we give a counterexample to show that even in homo-
geneous graphs, the empirical degree distribution and the nodal degree distribution
may capture vastly different information. This counterexample is found in the class
of random threshold graphs, where the empirical degree distribution does not con-
verge in the usual sense even though the asymptotic nodal degree distribution exists.
3.1 The model
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, Caldarelli et al. [9] proposed the class of ran-
dom threshold graphs as capable of achieving scale-free degree distribution without
the notion of preferential attachment [2]. It belongs to the broader class of hid-
den variable models where connections are formed on the basis of fitness variables
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associated with individual nodes. The random threshold graph model is based on
the notion that connections between nodes are driven by mutual benefit based on
intrinsic attributes, and is realized as follows – Two nodes form a connection if the
sum of their fitness variables exceeds a certain threshold.
We now formally introduce the model: Let tξ, ξk, k “ 1, 2, . . .u denote a
collection of i.i.d. R`-valued rvs defined on the probability triple pΩ,F ,Pq, each
distributed according to a given (probability) distribution function F : R Ñ r0, 1s.
1 With ξ acting as a generic representative for this sequence of i.i.d. rvs, we have
P rξ ď xs “ F pxq, x P R.
At minimum we assume that F is a continuous function on R with
F pxq “ 0, x ď 0.
Once F is specified, random thresholds graphs are characterized by two pa-
rameters, namely a positive integer n and a threshold value α ą 0. Specifically, the
network comprises n nodes, labelled k “ 1, . . . , n, and to each node k we assign a
fitness variable (or weight) ξk which measures its importance or rank. For distinct
i, j “ 1, . . . , n, nodes i and j are declared to be adjacent if
ξi ` ξj ą α, (3.1)
i.e.,
χnpi, j;αq “ 1 rξi ` ξj ą αs
1What we call here a probability distribution function is also called a cumulative distribution
function in other literatures.
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according to the notation developed in Section 2.1. The adjacency notion (3.1)
defines the random threshold graph Tpn;αq on the set of vertices Vn “ t1, . . . , nu.





1 rξk ` ξ` ą αs , k “ 1, . . . , n
so that Dn,kpαq is the degree of node k in Tpn;αq. Under the enforced assump-
tions, the rvs Dn,1pαq, . . . , Dn,npαq are exchangeable, thus equidistributed. Further-


















constitute an exchangeable family,
i.e., Property 2.1 is satisfied.
3.1.1 Applying Proposition 2.1 under exponential fitness
From now on we focus on the special case when ξ is exponentially distributed
with parameter λ ą 0, written ξ „ Exppλq, that is
P rξ ď xs “ 1´ e´λx` , x P R. (3.2)
Here we use the standard notation x` “ maxpx, 0q for x in R. Other distributions
could be considered to develop counterexamples to Proposition 2.1. However, the
exponential distribution was selected for two main reasons: This case was considered
in [9, 22, 37] to show that scale-free networks can be generated through the fitness-
based mechanism used in random threshold graphs; more on that later. Moreover,
calculations are greatly simplified in the exponential case.
Fujihara et al. [22, Example 1, p. 366] showed that under the scaling α‹ :
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N0 Ñ R` given by
α‹n “ λ
´1 log n, n “ 2, 3, . . . . (3.3)
with the understanding that
Gn “ Tpn;α˚nq, n “ 2, 3, . . .
we have the following distributional convergence Dn,1pα
˚
nq ùñn D where the N-
valued rv D is a conditionally Poisson rv with pmf pFuj “ ppFujpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .q
given by







, d “ 0, 1, . . . (3.4)
Therefore, Assumption 2.2 holds with
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pα˚nq “ ds “ pFujpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . . (3.5)
Hence, we are in the generic setting of Section 2.5. One way to prove Assump-
tion 2.4 would be to first show that Properties 2.1-2.3 hold. While we have already
argued that Property 2.1 is satisfied, the following result states that in the present
context Property 2.2 holds whereas Property 2.3 does not.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the class of random threshold graphs with ξ „ Exppλq
for some λ ą 0. Under the scaling α˚ : N0 Ñ R` given by (3.3), Property 2.2 holds
whereas Property 2.3 does not.
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Proof. For a fixed α ą 0, and n “ 2, 3, . . ., we get
P rξ1 ` ξ2 ą αs “ E
”
pP rξ2 ą α ´ tsqt“ξ1
ı
“ E r1 rξ1 ą αss ` E
”
1 rξ1 ď αs pP rξ2 ą α ´ tsqt“ξ1
ı
“ P rξ1 ą αs ` E
“







1 rξ1 ď αs e
λξ1
‰‰
“ e´λα p1` αλq
by easy calculation, and Property 2.2 clearly holds under the scaling α˚ satisfying
(3.3).
For a fixed α ą 0, and n “ 3, 4, . . ., we now see that
P rξ1 ` ξ3 ą α, ξ2 ` ξ3 ą αs
“ E r1 rξ3 ą αss ` E
”
1 rξ3 ď αs
`




“ P rξ3 ą αs ` E
“
1 rξ3 ď αs e
´2λpα´ξ3q
‰
“ e´λα ` e´2λα ¨ E
“
1 rξ3 ď αs e
2λξ3
‰









Under the scaling α˚ given by (3.3), we conclude
lim
nÑ8
nP rξ1 ` ξ3 ą α˚n, ξ2 ` ξ3 ą α˚ns “ 2,
so that Property 2.3 does not hold. 
Therefore the approach formulated in Section 2.5 using the step (2.33) is not
applicable here. Hence, we are left with no choice but to directly test the validity
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of the weaker Assumption 2.3. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to showing
that the weaker Assumption 2.3 actually fails.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the class of random threshold graphs with ξ „ Exppλq





nq “ ds ,1 rDn,2pα
‹
nq “ dss (3.6)
exists with Cpdq ą 0 for each d “ 0, 1, . . ..
The specific values for (3.6) are omitted here but are computed during the













The expression of Cpdq for arbitrary d ‰ 0 is rather cumbersome and is not shown at
this time. However, the fact that Cpdq ą 0 on the entire range suffices to establish
the desired counterexample via the observation following Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the class of random threshold graphs with ξ „ Exppλq










nq “ ds , n “ 2, 3, . . .
+
, d “ 0, 1, . . . (3.7)
does not converge in probability to a constant.
The fact that the convergence (2.43) fails to occur in the context of random
threshold graphs is significant for the following reason: Caldarelli et al. [9, 37] have
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proposed this subclass of hidden variable models as an alternative scale-free model to
the preferential attachment model of Barabási and Albert [2]. The evidence behind




However, a meaningful comparison between the two models would have required at










ÝÑn pFujpdq, d “ 0, 1, . . .
As we now know through Proposition 3.3, this fails to happen, and the two models
cannot be meaningfully compared as already explained in the introductory section.
3.2 A proof of Proposition 3.2 – Part I
We begin with an easy observation.
3.2.1 A reduction step
For every n “ 2, 3, . . . and α ą 0, note the decomposition
Dn,jpαq “ 1 rξ1 ` ξ2 ą αs `D
‹
n,jpαq, j “ 1, 2 (3.9)





1 rξj ` ξk ą αs .
Evaluating the limit (3.6) can be simplified through an easy reduction step which
we now develop.
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Lemma 3.4. Fix n “ 2, 3, . . . and α ą 0. For each d “ 0, 1, . . . , n´ 2, we have
ˇ





ˇ ď 2P rξ1 ` ξ2 ą αs , j “ 1, 2 (3.10)
and
ˇ







ˇ ď 2P rξ1 ` ξ2 ą αs .
(3.11)
Proof. The first part of the Lemma can be proved similarly to that of Lemma 2.3.
To prove the second part, fix n “ 2, 3, . . . and α ą 0. Firstly for d “ 0, using the
decomposition (3.9) we find
P rDn,1pαq “ 0, Dn,2pαq “ 0s
“ P
“
D˚n,1pαq “ 0, D
˚










D˚n,1pαq “ 0, D
˚




and the bound (3.11) holds. For each d “ 1, 2, . . . , n´ 2, we have
P rDn,1pαq “ d,Dn,2pαq “ ds
“ P
“
1 rξ1 ` ξ2 ą αs `D
‹














ξ1 ` ξ2 ą α,D
‹
n,1pαq “ d´ 1, D
‹




ξ1 ` ξ2 ą α,D
‹
n,1pαq “ d´ 1, D
‹

















and the bound (3.11) follows by combining (3.12) and (3.13). 
This simple fact leads to the following reduction step when evaluating the
limit at (3.6): With d “ 0, 1, . . . held fixed, for each n “ 2, 3, . . . we substitute α by
α‹n in the bound (3.11) according to (3.3), and let n go to infinity in the resulting
inequality. Since limnÑ8 α
‹












































“ pFujpdq, j “ 1, 2 (3.15)
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provided the limits at (3.14) exist.
3.2.2 Order statistics to the rescue
When evaluating (3.16), it will be convenient to introduce a second collection
of R`-valued rvs tη`, ` “ 1, 2, . . .u. We assume that the rvs tη`, ` “ 1, 2, . . .u are
also i.i.d. rvs, each of which is exponentially distributed with parameter λ ą 0.
The two collections tξ, ξk, k “ 1, 2, . . .u and tη`, ` “ 1, 2, . . .u are assumed to be
mutually independent. For each integer p “ 2, 3, . . ., let ηp,1, . . . , ηp,p denote the
values of the rvs η1, . . . , ηp arranged in increasing order, namely ηp,1 ď . . . ď ηp,p,
with a lexicographic tiebreaker when needed. The rvs ηp,1, . . . , ηp,p are known as the
order statistics associated with the collection η1, . . . , ηp, and the rvs ηp,1 and ηp,p are
the minimum and maximum of the rvs η1, . . . , ηp, respectively [11,16].
To evaluate (3.16), we start with the following observation: Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .
and take n “ 2, 3, . . . such that d ă n ´ 2. Under the enforced i.i.d. assumptions,






































































1 rξ2 ` ηn´2,` ą αs “ d
ff
. (3.19)










1 rξ1 ` ηn´2,` ą αs “ 0
ff
“ P rξ1 ` η` ď α, ` “ 1, . . . , n´ 2s

















1 rξ2 ` ηn´2,` ą αs “ 0
ff
“ P rξ1 ` η` ď α, ξ2 ` η` ď α, ` “ 1, . . . , n´ 2s
“ P rξ1 ` ηn´2,n´2 ď α, ξ2 ` ηn´2,n´2 ď αs
“ P rmaxpξ1, ξ2q ` ηn´2,n´2 ď αs . (3.21)
For the case d “ 1, 2, . . ., we introduce the index
tnpdq “ n´ 2´ d. (3.22)
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We need to evaluate the quantities (3.20), (3.21), (3.23) and (3.24), and explore
their asymptotic behavior for large n when α is replaced by α‹n in these expressions.
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3.3 Asymptotic results for order statistics
In order to carry the program outlined above we need to develop some simple
facts concerning the asymptotic theory of order statistics. The notation and def-
initions are the ones introduced in Section 3.2.2. In carrying out this asymptotic
























“ a ą 0. (3.28)
3.3.1 A result in one dimension
Fix p “ 1, 2, . . . and t “ 1, . . . , p ´ 1. It is well known [11, p. 9] that the
probability distribution function of the rv ηp,t is given by




















e´λpp´rqx, x ě 0. (3.29)









G0pxsq, xs P R (3.30)
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where G0 : RÑ R` is the well-known Gumbel distribution given by
G0px0q “ e
´e´x0 , x0 P R. (3.31)
Using well-known stochastic monotonicity properties of Poisson rvs (with respect to
their mean parameter), it is easy to check that Gs : RÑ R` is indeed a probability
distribution function. Let Λs denote any R-valued rv which is distributed according
to Gs, i.e.,
P rΛs ď xss “ Gspxsq, xs P R. (3.32)
In fact one could interpret (3.30) as




, xs P R
where Poipλq is a generic Poisson rv with parameter λ ą 0.








Some comments before giving a proof:
With s “ 0, Lemma 3.5 gives the distributional convergence λpηp,p ´ α
‹
pq ùñp
Λ0 which expresses the well-known membership of exponential distributions in the
maximal domain of attraction of the Gumbel distribution [16]. For future use note













“ Gspxsq, xs P R (3.34)
since every point in R is a point of continuity for Gs.
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Proof. Pick s “ 0, 1, . . . and xs arbitrary in R. With p ą s and t “ p´ s such that




























































































“ G0pxsq, xs P R
as we make use of (3.26) and (3.27)-(3.28), respectively. Therefore, (3.34) holds,
and this completes the proof. 
It is easy to see that Gs ďst Gs´1, or equivalently, Λs ďst Λs´1 for all s “
1, 2, . . . where ďst denotes the usual stochastic ordering [36, Chap. 8] – It suffices
to note that for all s “ 1, 2, . . ., we have ηp,p´s ďst ηp,p´ps´1q for all p ą s. This can
also be checked analytically through the expression (3.30).
3.3.2 A result in two dimensions
To state the key asymptotic result we introduce some additional notation: For




vte´vdv, a ě 0.
59















´minpxs,xs´1qq ´ e´sxs´1 ¨ e´e
´minpxs,xs´1q
¯
, xs, xs´1 P R.
(3.36)











“ Jspxs, xs´1q, xs, xs´1 P R (3.37)
where the mapping Js : R2 Ñ R` is given by (3.36).
Some comments concerning this result before giving a proof in Section 3.5:
First, given the convergence (3.37) it is easy to check that R2 Ñ r0, 1s : pxs, xs´1q Ñ
Jspxs, xs´1q is a bona fide probability distribution on R2 with limxs,xs´1Ñ8 Jspxs, xs´1q “
1,
limxsÑ´8 Jspxs, xs´1q “ 0 (with xs´1 held fixed) and limxs´1Ñ´8 Jspxs, xs´1q “ 0
(with xs held fixed).
Next, we turn to extracting the marginal distributions from (3.37): Upon





























´xs´1q ´ e´sxs´1 ¨ e´e
´xs´1
¯
, xs´1 P R. (3.39)
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As we return to Lemma 3.5, e.g., see (3.34), it is natural to wonder whether the
marginalization of the two-dimensional result can be reconciled analytically with
the one-dimensional convergence obtained earlier. In other words, is it indeed the












´xs´1q ´ e´sxs´1 ¨ e´e
´xs´1
¯
, xs´1 P R (3.41)
hold.
We argue as follows: For t “ 1, 2, . . ., integration by parts yields
Htpaq “ a
te´a ` tHt´1paq, a ě 0 (3.42)
with boundary value H0paq “ e











t “ 0, 1, . . .
(3.43)




´xsq “ Gspxsq, xs P R
as we recall (3.30), and this shows that (3.40) indeed holds. Next, as we turn to






















´xs´1q “ Gs´1pxs´1q, xs´1 P R (3.44)
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where we again relied on (3.43). This shows that (3.41) holds.
Therefore, as we combine Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, the following con-
clusion emerges.
















with pΛs,Λs´1q jointly distributed according to Js, and Λs and Λs´1, each distributed
according to Gs and Gs´1, respectively.
In other words,
P rΛs ď xs,Λs´1 ď xs´1s “ Jspxs, xs´1q, xs, xs´1 P R
with marginals
P rΛs ď xss “ Gspxsq and P rΛs´1 ď xs´1s “ Gs´1pxs´1q, xs, xs´1 P R.
3.4 A proof of Proposition 3.2 – Part II
The notation is that of Section 3.2.2 as we return to the expressions (3.20),
(3.21), (3.23) and (3.24) obtained there. With d “ 0, 1, . . . held fixed, for each
n “ 2, 3, . . . we substitute α by α‹n in these expressions according to (3.3), and let n
go to infinity in the resulting inequality.
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3.4.1 The case d “ 0




















“ P rmaxpξ1, ξ2q ` ηn´2,n´2 ď α‹ns
“ P rλpηn´2,n´2 ´ α‹nq ď ´λmaxpξ1, ξ2qs .

































respectively, where Λ0 is any rv which is distributed according to the Gumbel dis-
tribution (3.31). Collecting these facts and using the reduction step discussed in
































































since maxpeλξ1 , eλξ2q ă eλξ1 ` eλξ2 a.s. 
3.4.2 The case d “ 1, 2, . . .
Pick n “ 3, 4, . . . such that d ă n´ 2. Under the aforementioned substitution,

















































































































Let n go to infinity in (3.46) and (3.47): Making use of the convergence (3.51)





















, a “ 1, 2. (3.52)















ď 1, n “ 3, 4, . . .





















































































































P rΛd ą 0, 0 ă ´ log ts dt`
ż 1
0














P rlog t ă Λd´1s dt (3.56)





































as it should be in view of (3.15) when combined with (3.5).















, d “ 0, 1, . . .
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3.5 A proof of Proposition 3.6
3.5.1 Preliminaries
Fix p “ 2, 3, . . . and t “ 1, . . . , p´ 1. It is also well known [11, p. 11] that the
joint probability distribution function of the pair pηp,t, ηp,t`1q admits a probability

























e´λpp´pt`1qqxt`1λe´λxtλe´λxt`1 if 0 ď xt ď xt`1
0 otherwise.
Therefore, since ηp,t ď ηp,t`1, with arbitrary xt and xt`1 in R`, elementary calcula-
tions yield
P rηp,t ď xt, ηp,t`1 ď xt`1s
































































Itpλminpxt, xt`1q; p´ tq ´ e













r “ 0, 1, . . .
t “ 1, 2, . . .
We begin with an intermediary result that will help us in investigating the
asymptotics of the relevant pair of order statistics.












Proof. Throughout the proof the integer r “ 0, 1, . . . is held fixed. For a ě 0 and






























du ru “ ezs. (3.60)
Now pick s “ 0, 1, . . . and x arbitrary in R, and take p sufficiently large so that
p ą s and x ` log p ą 0. Then, with t “ p ´ s and a “ x ` log p, the last relation
(3.60) becomes
























vrdv rv “ e´xus. (3.61)
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“ e´v, v ě 0
as we again make use of (3.27)-(3.28). Using the Bounded Convergence Theorem,














since the rth moment of Expp1q is finite and given by
ş8
0
vre´vdv “ r!. This completes
the proof of (3.59). 
3.5.2 Proving Proposition 3.6
Fix positive integers p and t such that t ă p, and pick xt and xt`1 arbitrary
in R. Take p large enough so that such minpxt, xt`1q ` log p ą 0. Under such












xt ` log p
λ
, ηp,t`1 ď









Itpminpxt, xt`1q ` log p; p´ tq ´ e







Itpminpxt, xt`1q ` log p; p´ tq ´
e´pp´tqxt`1
pp´t
¨ Itpminpxt, xt`1q ` log p; 0q
˙
.
Now pick s “ 1, 2, . . ., and xs and xs´1 arbitrary in R. With positive integer p
sufficiently large so that p ą s and minpxs, xs´1q` log p ą 0, we use the last relation
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Ip´spminpxs, xs´1q ` log p; sq ´
e´sxs´1
ps
¨ Ip´spminpxs, xs´1q ` log p; 0q
˙
.























































































Collecting these last two convergence statements we readily obtain the convergence
(3.37) with (3.36). 
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Chapter 4: More on Random Threshold Graphs: Weak Convergence
In Chapter 3, we considered a specific counterexample in the class of homo-
geneous random graphs: Let tξ, ξk, k “ 1, 2, . . .u represent an i.i.d. collection of
R`-valued rvs with ξk being a fitness rv associated with node k denoting its impor-
tance or rank. With n nodes and threshold α, the random threshold graph Tpn, αq
postulates that two distinct nodes i and j form a connection iff ξi` ξj ą α. With ξ




log n, n “ 1, 2, . . . (4.1)
the following distributional convergence in the sequence of graphs tTpn;α˚nq, n “ 1, 2, . . .u
[22] is known to take place
Dn,1pα
˚
nq ùñn D, (4.2)
where the rv D has a power-tail. However, in Chapter 3 we concluded that when
ξ is exponentially distributed, the usual convergence (2.9) of the empirical degree
distribution fails to take place. Following the discussions in the previous chapter 3,
two questions naturally emerge:
1. While in the previous chapter we considered the special case of ξ exponen-
tially distributed, there are other regimes under which interesting asymptotic
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behaviour of the degree distribution occurs in the sense of (4.2). An obvi-
ous question is whether the assertions made in the previous chapter can be
extended to these more general fitness distributions.
2. Under the regime where the empirical degree distribution does not converge
in the usual sense (which we now know includes the case of ξ exponentially
distributed), are there weaker forms of convergence that could be shown to
hold?
In what follows, we show that under certain conditions the empirical degree
distribution actually converges weakly: For each d “ 0, 1, . . ., there exists a non-






where the scaling α‹ : N0 Ñ R` is the one yielding a non-trivial degree distribution




is the fraction of nodes with degree d in Tpn;α‹nq.
The non-degeneracy of the rv Πpdq for each d “ 0, 1, . . ., ascertains that the empirical
degree distribution cannot converge in the sense of (2.9).
4.1 Degree distribution – Generic fitness distribution
The setting is that of Section 3.1: Let tξ, ξk, k “ 1, 2, . . .u denote a collection
of i.i.d. R`-valued rvs defined on the probability triple pΩ,F ,Pq, each distributed
according to a given (probability) distribution function F : R Ñ r0, 1s. With ξ
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acting as a generic representative for this sequence of i.i.d. rvs, we have
P rξ ď xs “ F pxq, x P R.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we assume that F is a continuous function
on R with
F pxq “ 0, x ď 0. (4.4)
Recall that with n number of nodes and threshold α ą 0, distinct nodes i, j “
1, 2, . . . , n are said to be adjacent if ξi ` ξj ą α. For each k “ 1, 2, . . . , n, and





1 rξk ` ξ` ą αs .
Under the enforced assumptions on the rvs ξ1, . . . , ξn, the rv Dn,kpαq is a Binomial
rv Binpn´ 1; 1´ F pα´ ξkqq conditioned on ξk. Throughout we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 4.1. There exists a scaling α‹ : N0 Ñ R` with the property
lim
nÑ8




n p1´ F pα‹n ´ xqq “ λpxq, x ě 0 (4.6)
for some non-identically zero mapping λ : R` Ñ R`.
The mapping λ : R` Ñ R` is necessarily non-decreasing. The following result
overlaps with a similar result by Fujihara et al. [22, Thm. 2, p. 362]:
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Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption 4.1, there exists an N-valued rv D such that
Dnpα
‹
nq ùñn D. (4.7)
The rv D is conditionally Poisson with pmf given by






, d “ 0, 1, . . . (4.8)




























“ P rx` ξ ď αs ` P rx` ξ ą αs z
“ 1´ p1´ zqP rx` ξ ą αs
“ 1´ p1´ zq p1´ F pα ´ xqq , x P R. (4.9)







p1´ p1´ zq p1´ F pα ´ ξqqqn´1
‰
“ P rξ ą αs zn´1 ` E
“
1 rξ ď αs p1´ p1´ zq p1´ F pα ´ ξqqqn´1
‰
.(4.10)
For each n “ 1, 2, . . ., replace α by α‹n in (4.10) according to the scaling
α‹ : N0 Ñ R`. Let n go to infinity in the resulting equality when |z| ď 1: It is plain
that limnÑ8 P rξ ą α‹ns zn´1 “ 0, while
lim
nÑ8




by standard arguments as we note that
lim
nÑ8
np1´ zq p1´ F pα‹n ´ ξqq “ p1´ zqλpξq














, |z| ď 1
and the desired conclusion follows upon noting that the right-hand side is the pgf
of the pmf (4.8). 
In what follows we use the standard notation x` “ maxpx, 0q for x in R.
Assumption 4.1 holds in a number of interesting cases: Consider the case discussed
in the previous chapter where ξ is exponentially distributed with parameter λ ą 0,
i.e.,
P rξ ą xs “ e´λx` , x P R.
Assumption 4.1 holds with
λpxq “ eλx, x ě 0
upon taking
α‹n “ λ
´1 log n, n “ 1, 2, . . .
The rv ξ is said to be a Pareto rv with parameters ν ą 0 and a ą 0, if





, x P R.
Assumption 4.1 holds if we take
α‹n “ an
1
ν , n “ 1, 2, . . .
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in which case
λpxq “ 1, x ě 0.
4.2 The main result





1 rDn,kpαq “ ds
counts the number of nodes in t1, . . . , nu which have degree d in Tpn;αq. The





We now state the main result of the chapter.
Theorem 4.2. Assume Assumption 4.1 to hold. Then, for each d “ 0, 1, . . ., there






where the scaling α‹ : N0 Ñ R` is the one postulated in Assumption 4.1
In the process of proving Theorem 4.2 we will show that for each d “ 0, 1, . . .,
E rΠpdqs “ P rD “ ds with VarrΠpdqs ą 0. (4.12)
In other words, the rv Πpdq is never a degenerate rv with the following consequence.







, n “ 1, 2, . . .
*
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Proposition 3.3 is a special case of the corollary stated above.
4.3 A roadmap to a proof of Theorem 4.2
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with a proof of Theorem 4.2. The
technical approach is rooted in the method of moments, and articulated through sev-
eral intermediary results, the first one being a multi-dimensional version of Propo-
sition 4.1.
Proposition 4.4. Assume Assumption 4.1 to hold. For each r “ 1, 2, . . ., there
exists an Nr-valued rv pD1, . . . , Drq such that
pDn,1pα
‹
nq, . . . , Dn,rpα
‹
nqq ùñn pD1, . . . , Drq. (4.14)
The limiting rvs D1, . . . , Dr are exchangeable, but not independent, each being dis-
tributed according to the limiting rv D whose existence is established in Proposition
4.1.
Proposition 4.4 is a simple consequence of Proposition 4.5 discussed next, but
first some notation: For each r “ 1, 2, . . ., let ξr,1, . . . , ξr,r denote the values of the
fitness rvs ξ1, . . . , ξr arranged in increasing order, namely ξr,1 ď . . . ď ξr,r, with
a lexicographic tiebreaker when needed. Thus, the rvs ξr,1, . . . , ξr,r are the order
statistics associated with the collection ξ1, . . . , ξr; the rvs ξr,1 and ξr,r are simply
the minimum and maximum of the rvs ξ1, . . . , ξr, respectively [11]. In what follows,
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the random permutation β : t1, . . . , ru Ñ t1, . . . , ru arranges the rvs ξ1, . . . , ξr in
increasing order, i.e.,
ξr,s “ ξβpsq, s “ 1, . . . , r
(under the lexicographic tiebreaker) – Note that β is determined by the rvs ξ1, . . . , ξr
and is uniformly distributed over the group of permutations of t1, . . . , ru. Finally,
with the notation introduced so far, write









0 ď zs ď 1,
s “ 1, . . . , r.
(4.15)













“ Grpz1, . . . , zrq (4.16)
for all z1, . . . , zr in R satisfying
0 ď zs ď 1, s “ 1, . . . , r. (4.17)
This result is established in several steps which are presented across Section
4.5, Section 4.6 and Section 4.7. However, Proposition 4.5 does imply Proposition
4.4 by the usual arguments: Indeed, by the Bounded Convergence Theorem we get
lim
zsÒ1, s“1,...,r
Grpz1, . . . , zrq “ 1
where the convergence is taken from inside r0, 1qr, and the mapping Gr : r0, 1s
r Ñ R
is therefore continuous at the point p1, . . . , 1q. This fact, coupled with the conver-
gence (4.16), suffices to reach the conclusion that Gr is an r-dimensional pgf. Thus,
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“ Grpz1, . . . , zrq,
0 ď zs ď 1,
s “ 1, . . . , r.
(4.18)
and the convergence (4.14) follows; see details in [21, p. 431] . This completes the
proof of Proposition 4.4. It is also plain that the rvs D1, . . . , Dr are not independent;
see below.
The next step establishes the requisite convergence of the moments; its proof
is available in Section 4.8.










“ P rD1 “ d, . . . , Dr “ ds , d “ 0, 1, . . . (4.19)
where the Nr-valued rv pD1, . . . , Drq is the limiting rv shown to exist in Proposition
4.4.
The following information is easily obtained by combining (4.15) and (4.18):












, 0 ď z1, z2 ď 1. (4.20)
By bounded convergence it follows from Proposition 4.6 that the first half of (4.12)
holds with
VarrΠpdqs “ P rD1 “ d,D2 “ ds ´ P rD1 “ dsP rD2 “ ds .
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2 from (4.21), we
obtain the lower bound











for each d “ 0, 1, . . .. Therefore for each d “ 0, 1, . . ., using (4.22) and (4.8), we
obtain the desired lower bound















where the last step follows from Assumption 4.1.
4.4 A proof of Theorem 4.2
Equipped with Propositions 4.4 and 4.6 we can now provide a proof of Theorem
4.2: Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. Proposition 4.6 suggests that we consider the mapping φd :







P rD1 “ d, . . . , Dr “ ds , t P R.
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“ e|t|, t P R.
In particular, the mapping φd : RÑ C is analytic on R, hence continuous at t “ 0.
Now, for each n “ 2, 3, . . ., let φd,n : RÑ C denote the characteristic function




















ď 1, n “ 2, 3, . . . (4.23)














, t P R




















“ e|t|, t P R.
In view of these remarks, for each n “ 2, 3, . . . and t in R, we can write














´ P rD1 “ d, . . . , Dr “ ds
˙
.






































ď ε, R ě R‹pε, tq,





























upon invoking Proposition 4.6. Since ε ą 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that limnÑ8 φd,nptq “
φdptq.
The mapping φd : R Ñ C being continuous at t “ 0, it follows by a standard
result on weak convergence due to Lévy [21, p. 431] that the distributional conver-
gence (4.11) takes place. The distribution of the limiting rv Πpdq is determined in





, t P R.

4.5 A proof of Proposition 4.5 – A reduction step
Throughout this section the integer r “ 1, 2, . . . and the parameter α ą 0 are
















1 rξk ` ξ` ą αs .








1 rξk ` ξ` ą α
‹
ns , k “ 1, . . . , r
¸
“ 0 a.s.





nq, . . . ,
rDprqn,rpα
‹
nqq ùñn pD1, . . . , Drq. (4.25)
The remainder of the proof consists in establishing that (4.25) holds. This will be
done by showing that the joint pgfs converge to the joint pgf of an Nr-valued rv over
a suitable range.
To do so, our first step is to evaluate the pgfs. Pick z1, . . . , zr in R. Under the































































































“ Frpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq
n´r
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where we have set












p1 rxs ` ξ ą αs zs ` 1 rxs ` ξ ď αsq
ff
(4.27)























Frpα; z1, . . . , zr; ξ1, . . . , ξrq
n´r
‰
“ Grpz1, . . . , zrq (4.29)
for all z1, . . . , zr in R which satisfy (4.17).
4.6 A proof of Proposition 4.5 – A decomposition
To further analyze this last expression, with x1, . . . , xr in R`, we introduce
the index set
Spα;x1, . . . , xrq “ ts “ 1, . . . , r : xs ą αu .
There are two possibilities which we now explore in turn: Either Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is
empty or it is not, leading to a natural decomposition expressed through Lemmas
4.7 and 4.8.
Lemma 4.7. With x1, . . . , xr in R, whenever Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is non-empty, we have














p1´ p1´ zsq1 rxs ` ξ ą αsq
fi
fl (4.30)
for all z1, . . . , zr in R.
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Proof. Pick arbitrary x1, . . . , xr in R` with non-empty Spα;x1, . . . , xrq. For all
z1, . . . , zr in R, it is easy to check by direct inspection from the expression (4.27)
that (4.30) holds since
1´ p1´ zsq1 rxs ` ξ ą αs “ zs
whenever s belongs to Spα;x1, . . . , xrq. 
As an immediate consequence of (4.30) we have the inequality
0 ď Frpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq ď 1,
x1, . . . , xr P R`
with
|Spα;x1, . . . , xrq| ą 0
(4.31)
for all z1, . . . , zr in R in the range
|zs| ď 1, s “ 1, . . . , r. (4.32)
This is because, it is always the case that
|1´ p1´ zsq1 rxs ` ξ ą αs| ď 1 if |zs| ď 1.
We now turn to the case when the index set Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is empty, a fact
characterized by the conditions
xs ď α, s “ 1, . . . , r. (4.33)
It will be convenient to arrange the values x1, . . . , xr in increasing order, say xp1q ď
xp2q ď . . . ď xprq, say with a lexicographic tiebreaker. Let β be any permutation of
t1, . . . , ru such that xpsq “ xβpsq for all s “ 1, . . . , r – Obviously this permutation
depends on x1, . . . , xr. In what follows we shall use the convention xp0q “ ´8 and
xpr`1q “ 8.
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Lemma 4.8. With x1, . . . , xr in R, whenever Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is empty, we have












F pα ´ xptqq ´ F pα ´ xpt`1qq
˘
(4.34)
for all z1, . . . , zr in R. In this expression the product of an empty number of factors
is set to unity by convention.
Proof. In what follows, the values z1, . . . , zr in R are held fixed. Fix x1, . . . , xr in
R and α ą 0. We define the events
Ar|tpx1, . . . , xr;αq “
“
xptq ` ξ ď α ă xpt`1q ` ξ
‰
, t “ 0, 1, , . . . , r.
Under the enforced conventions, we have
Ar|0px1, . . . , xr;αq “ rα ă xp1q ` ξs and Ar|rpx1, . . . , xr;αq “ rxprq ` ξ ď αs.
When Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is empty, these r`1 eventsAr|0px1, . . . , xr;αq, . . . , Ar|rpx1, . . . , xr;αq
are mutually exclusive and form a partition of the sample space, so that














p1 rxs ` ξ ą αs zs ` 1 rxs ` ξ ď αsq
ff
.(4.35)
(i) On the event Ar|0px1, . . . , xr;αq, we have α ă xp1q ` ξ, thus α ă xs ` ξ for










































1´ F pα ´ xp1qq
˘
. (4.36)
(ii) With t “ 1, . . . , r´1, on the event Ar|tpx1, . . . , xr;αq it holds that xp1q`ξ ď












































F pα ´ xptqq ´ F pα ´ xpt`1qq
˘
. (4.37)
(iii) Finally, on the event Ar|rpx1, . . . , xr;αq, xprq ` ξ ď α, thus xs ` ξ ď α for



















xprq ` ξ ď α
‰
“ F pα ´ xprqq.(4.38)
To complete the proof we substitute (4.36), (4.37) and (4.38) into (4.35), and
recall that F pα´xp0qq “ 1 and F pα´xpr`1qq “ 0 under the enforced conventions. 
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4.7 A proof of Proposition 4.5 – Taking the limit
In order to establish the convergence (4.25) we return to the expression (4.28)
for the joint pgf of the relevant rvs. Fix n “ 2, 3, . . . with r ă n, and replace α by
α‹n according to the scaling α
‹ : N0 Ñ R` appearing in Assumption 4.1.
4.7.1 A useful intermediary fact
For arbitrary α ą 0, consider x1, . . . , xr in R and z1, . . . , zr in R. In what
follows it will be convenient to define
Λrpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq “ 1´ Frpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq
so that
Frpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq “ 1´ Λrpα; z1, . . . , zr;x1, . . . , xrq. (4.39)
Whenever Spα;x1, . . . , xrq is empty, Lemma 4.8 gives































1´ F pα ´ xprqq
˘
.(4.40)
Now fix n “ 2, 3, . . . with r ă n, and replace α by α‹n in (4.40) according to












































λpxp1qq if t “ 0
λpxpt`1qq ´ λpxptqq if t “ 1, . . . , r ´ 1.
(4.41)





































































follows by standard arguments.
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4.7.2 In the limit















1 r|Spα‹n; ξ1, . . . , ξrq| “ 0sFrpα‹n; z1, . . . , zr; ξ1, . . . , ξrqn´r
‰
(4.44)
holds. Because limnÑ8 α
‹
n “ 8, it follows that
lim
nÑ8
P r|Spα‹n; ξ1, . . . , ξrq| “ 0s “ lim
nÑ8
P rξ1 ď α‹n, . . . , ξr ď α‹ns “ 1,





1 r|Spα‹n; ξ1, . . . , ξrq| ą 0sFrpα‹n; z1, . . . , zr; ξ1, . . . , ξrqn´r
‰
“ 0 (4.45)















n; z1, . . . , zr; ξ1, . . . , ξrq










¨ pF pα‹n ´ ξr,tq ´ F pα
‹
n ´ ξr,t`1q .(4.47)
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Here the order statistics ξr,1, . . . , ξr,r associated with ξ1, . . . , ξr were introduced in the
statement of Proposition 4.5, together with the random permutation β : t1, . . . , ru Ñ
t1, . . . , ru.








ď 1, t “ 0, . . . , r ´ 1
under the condition (4.17), and direct inspection gives
0 ď Λrpα
‹


































“ Grpz1, . . . , zrq (4.49)
Collecting (4.45) and (4.49), and using (4.44) we conclude that (4.29) holds on the
range (4.17). 
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4.8 A proof of Proposition 4.6
Fix α ą 0, d “ 0, 1, . . . and r “ 1, 2, . . .. With n “ r, r ` 1, . . ., let Pn,r
denote the collection of all ordered arrangements of r distinct elements drawn from
the set t1, . . . , nu. Any such arrangement can be viewed as a one-to-one mapping
π : t1, . . . , ru Ñ t1, . . . , nu.






















where the correction term Rn,rpd;αq is a sum comprising t0, 1u-valued rvs. Since
the correction term Rn,rpd;αq is a sum of exactly n
r ´ |Pn,r| terms, with each term
bounded by 1, we have the upper bound
Rn,rpd;αq ď n
r
´ |Pn,r| . (4.51)
















“ |Pn,r| ¨ P rDn,1pαq “ d, . . . , Dn,rpαq “ ds ` E rRn,rpd;αqs (4.52)




























|Pn,r| “ npn´ 1q . . . pn´ r ` 1q.
Now consider the scaling α‹ : N0 Ñ R` whose existence is assumed in As-
sumption 4.1. For each n “ r, r ` 1, . . . replace α by α‹n in (4.53) according to this





























P rDn,1pα‹nq “ d, . . . , Dn,rpα‹nq “ ds
with the understanding that if one of the limits exists, so does the other and their
value coincide. The latter exists since by Proposition 4.4 we have
lim
nÑ8
P rDn,1pα‹nq “ d, . . . , Dn,rpα‹nq “ ds “ P rD1 “ d, . . . , Dr “ ds
where the rvs D1, . . . , Dr are the limiting rvs appearing in the convergence (4.14).
It is now plain that (4.19) holds and the proof of Proposition 4.6 is now complete.

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Chapter 5: Degree Distribution in Growth Models
As indicated in Chapter 1, we are interested in growth models that can explain
power-law behavior in real-world networks. There we mentioned a number of exist-
ing models that implement preferential attachment on the basis of degree and fitness
information combined in various ways. Existing works consider special cases where
power-law behavior is observed under these models, but do not give a satisfactory
account of what conditions are required (e.g., on the fitness distribution) to obtain
power-law behavior. We consider arguably the simplest of these models, called the
fitness model and analyze its degree distribution. Our main motivation is to explore
how the fitness distribution affects the empirical degree distribution, if at all, and
under what conditions power-law behavior could be obtained.
5.1 The model
A word on notation: Here we consider the sequence of graphs indexed by t
instead of n (as was done in the previous chapters). This notation is natural when
considering growth models where there is a notion of adding nodes and edges over
time.
The fitness-based random graph model is defined by means of two collections
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of rvs, namely tU,Ut, t “ 0, 1, . . .u and tξ, ξt, t “ 0, 1, . . .u, defined on some prob-
ability triple pΩ,F ,Pq – All probabilistic statements are made with respect to the
probability measure P, whose expectation operator is denoted by E.
The discussion is carried out under the following set of assumptions:
(i) The rvs tU,Ut, t “ 0, 1, . . .u and tξ, ξt, t “ 0, 1, . . .u are mutually independent;
(ii) The rvs tU,Ut, t “ 0, 1, . . .u are i.i.d. rvs, each of which is uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval p0, 1q; and
(iii) The rvs tξ, ξt, t “ 0, 1, . . .u are i.i.d. R`-valued rvs. Throughout we assume
the non-degeneracy condition
P rξ “ 0s “ 0, (5.1)
as well as the finite mean condition
0 ă E rξs ă 8. (5.2)
Under these assumptions we can always select (as we do from now on) the
probability triple pΩ,F ,Pq, and the rvs tU,Ut, t “ 0, 1, . . .u and tξ, ξt, t “ 0, 1, . . .u
defined on it as mappings Ω Ñ R which simultaneously satisfy the conditions
ξ ą 0, ξt ą 0 and 0 ă U,Ut ă 1, t “ 0, 1, . . .
We shall find it convenient to write




ξs, t “ 0, 1, . . . (5.3)
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and
ξt “ pξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξtq, t “ 0, 1, . . . (5.4)
We shall also make use of the filtration tFt, t “ 0, 1, . . .u on Ω given by
Ft “ σ pUs, ξs, s “ 0, 1, . . . , tq , t “ 0, 1, . . . .
We now formally define the sequence of (undirected) random graphs tGt, t “
0, 1, . . .u studied in this chapter: For each t “ 0, 1, . . ., the random graph Gt has
vertex set Vt “ t0, 1, . . . , tu and random edge set Et Ď Vt ˆ Vt. As this is a growth
model, imagine there being an initial node, labelled node 0, present in the system at
time t “ 0, with new nodes, labelled t “ 1, 2, . . ., arriving one at a time, say at times
t “ 1, 2, . . .. The definition is a recursive one, starting with the initial random graph
G0 “ pV0,E0q where V0 “ t0u and E0 “ H. With t “ 0, 1, . . ., once the random
graphs G0, . . . ,Gt have been defined, we can generate Gt`1 from Gt by introducing
a new vertex not in Vt (which we label t ` 1), and connecting it to the node St`1
randomly selected in Vt according to






, s P Vt. (5.5)
Only the fitness levels of the nodes already present in Vt matter in determining
the likelihood of the node to which node t ` 1 will attach. The newly created link
between nodes t` 1 and St`1 is interpreted as an undirected link, so that
Et`1 “ Et Y tpt` 1, St`1q, pSt`1, t` 1qu .
Although the rvs S1, . . . , St are not mutually independent, they are condition-
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ally mutually independent given ξt. It is a simple matter to check that




P rSτ “ rτ |Fts (5.6)
with arbitrary r1 in V1, . . ., rt`1 in Vt`1, where
P rSτ “ rτ |Fts “
ξrτ
Ξτ´1
, τ “ 1, . . . , t` 1 (5.7)
Fix t “ 1, 2, . . .. For each s “ 0, 1, . . . , t, let the rv Dtpsq denote the degree of





1 rSr “ ss (5.8)
with possible values 1, . . . , t ´ s ` 1. With d “ 1, 2, . . ., the number Ntpdq of nodes















1 rDtpsq “ ds
is the fraction of nodes in Gt whose degree is d.
5.2 The convergence results
Before stating the main result of the chapter, we introduce the pmf pξ “
ppξpdq, d “ 1, 2, . . .q on N0 defined by






, d “ 0, 1, . . . (5.10)
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The pmf pξ can be interpreted as the pmf of the rv 1`Zpξq where the rv Zpξq is a
conditionally Poisson rv with random parameter Λpξq, namely






, d “ 0, 1, . . .
5.2.1 The main result
With this notation we have the following result.








“ pξpdq, d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.12)
A proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Sections 5.5-5.9. The pmf pξ depends on ξ








pξpdq “ p ξ
Erξs
pdq, d “ 1, 2, . . .
as should be expected from the form (7.4) of the link creation probabilities.
For each t “ 0, 1, . . ., let νt denote a rv which is uniformly distributed over the






“ P rDtpνtq “ ds , d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.13)
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holds, and Theorem 5.1 can be given the following probabilistic form.
Theorem 5.2. Under the foregoing assumptions, we have the convergence
lim
tÑ8
P rDtpνtq “ ds “ pξpdq, d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.14)
More compactly,
Dtpνtq ùñt Dpξq (5.15)
where Dpξq is an N0-valued rv distributed according to the pmf pξ.
5.2.2 An alternate expression for the limiting pmf pξ
The pmf pξ admits an alternate expression which will yield insights into its
tail behavior.








E rξs ` ξ
˙d´1
ff
, d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.16)
In other words, the pmf pξ can also be viewed as the pmf of a conditionally
geometric rv on N0 with random parameter Rpξq given by
Rpξq “
ξ
E rξs ` ξ
(5.17)





, d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.18)
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Proof. In view of the expressions (5.10)-(5.11) and (5.16)-(5.17), there is no loss of
generality in assuming E rξs “ 1 (as we do from now on in this proof) – Just replace
ξ by ξErξs , in which case the quantities Λpξq and Rpξq become









respectively. Thus, e´Λpξq “ U ξ and for each d “ 0, 1, . . ., we use (5.10) to obtain








































xtplog xqddx “ p´1qd
d!
p1` tqd`1
, t ą 0.
This last fact follows by repeated integration by parts; details are left to the inter-
ested reader. Substituting into (5.19) we get

















The tail behavior of the pmf pξ depends on the distributional properties of
the rv ξ, with a key role being played by the quantity ξ‹ given by
ξ‹ “ inf px ě 0 : P rξ ď xs “ 1q (5.20)
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with the customary understanding that ξ‹ “ 8 if the defining set in (5.20) is empty.
Under (5.2) we necessarily have ξ‹ ą 0 (possibly infinite).
The next result provides some important information regarding the tail behav-
ior of the pmf pξ. Of particular interest in the discussion is the bounded mapping


















Erξs`x if x P R`
1 if x “ 8,
the value at x “ 8 being determined by continuity.




























Erξs`ξ‹ if 0 ă ξ
‹ ă 8
1 if ξ‹ “ 8.
The proof of Lemma 5.4 is given in Section 5.10. When ξ‹ is finite, then
gξpξ





log pξpdq “ log
ˆ
ξ‹
E rξs ` ξ‹
˙
ă 0. (5.22)
This indicates a geometric decay for pξ in the following sense: For ε in p0, 1q suf-
ficiently small so that p1 ` δqgξpξ






log pξpdq ´ log gpξ
˚































for all d “ 1, 2, . . ..
5.4 Special cases when ξ‹ “ 8
When ξ‹ is infinite, geometric decay is not possible anymore, and many types
of tail behavior are possible for the pmf pξ as we now illustrate with two special cases.
The probability distribution function of the rv ξ is assumed to admit a probability
density function fξ : R` Ñ R`. For each d “ 0, 1, . . ., the expression (5.16) becomes































ds [s “ 1
1`t





We say that the rv ξ has a power law if





, t ě 0 (5.26)
for some a ą 0 and α ą 0. Its probability density function is given by
fξptq “ αa
α
pa` tq´pα`1q, t ě 0 (5.27)





The requirement that E rξs be finite is equivalent to α ą 1, in which case E rξs “
a pα ´ 1q´1. Thus, E rξs “ 1 amounts to α ą 1 and a “ α ´ 1.
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. If we insert (5.27) into (5.25) we obtain by elementary
calculations that



















dy [s “ y
d
].(5.28)









and the following result follows.
Lemma 5.5. When ξ is distributed according to (5.26) with α ą 1 and a “ α´ 1,
then the asymptotic equivalence
pξpd` 1q „ Cpαqαa






Note that Cpαq is finite for all α ě 1.
5.4.2 Exponential distribution
The rv ξ is an exponentially distributed rv with unit mean if
P rξ ď ts “ 1´ e´t, t ě 0, (5.29)
in which case its probability density function is given by
fξptq “ e
´t, t ě 0.
































A discussion of Lemma 5.6 can be found in Section 5.11.
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5.5 A proof of Theorem 5.1 – Preliminaries









P rDtpsq “ d` 1s .
Fix t “ 1, 2, . . . and s “ 0, . . . , t. As we recall the definition (5.8) of the degree
rv Dtpsq, we start by asking how can the rv Dtpsq achieve the value d` 1. To avoid
trivial situations of limited interest we assume that t´ s` 1 ą d` 1 or equivalently,
t´ s ą d. Note that













1 rSr “ ss “ d
ff
. (5.31)
Thus, the event Dtpsq “ d` 1 corresponds to the following situation: Amongst the
t´ s nodes arriving at time s`1, . . . , t, exactly d arrivals attach themselves to node
s, while the remaining t´s´d arrivals attach themselves to a node other than node
s. This observation naturally leads to considering the set Pdrs ` 1, ts of partitions
of ts` 1, . . . , tu into two sets of size d and t´ s´ d, respectively. Thus, Pdrs` 1, ts
is given by








pA,Bq : A,B Ď ts` 1, . . . , tu,





















P rSr “ s, s P A, Sr ‰ s, s P Bs . (5.32)
For a given pair pA,Bq in Pdrs ` 1, ts, a standard preconditioning argument
yields












































with the following justifications: The relation (5.33) is a consequence of the fact that
the rvs S1, . . . , St are conditionally mutually independent given ξ
t. The equality
(5.34) takes advantage of the fact that
pξs,Ξr´1, r “ s` 1, . . . , tq “st pξ, ξ ` Ξr´2, r “ s` 1, . . . , tq
under the enforced i.i.d. assumptions on the fitness variables.



































































since |A| “ d.























































In the next section we present some useful preliminary results that will be used in
the main proof.
5.6 Useful technical facts
Before giving a proof of Theorem 5.1 we present three useful technical facts to
be used in the course of the discussion.
5.6.1 A consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers
We begin with an easy consequence of the Strong Law of Large Numbers.




P rBtpα, εqs “ 1 (5.37)
where
















, t “ 0, 1, . . . (5.38)
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and for every ε in p0, 1q note the inclusion





























































by the usual monotonicity argument. By the Strong Law of Large Numbers we have































































Ď Btpα, εq, t “ 0, 1, . . .

5.6.2 Uniform selection
Consider α in the unit interval p0, 1q. For each t “ 1, 2, . . ., let να,t denote a
rv which is uniformly distributed over the set trαts, rαts ` 1, . . . , tu. The following
fact is elementary and given here for easy reference.
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where the rv Uα is uniformly distributed over the interval pα, 1q.












































“ p1´ αq´1 ,













The desired conclusion (5.39) follows by standard arguments upon noting that the
right handside of (5.40) is the Laplace transform of Uα. 
5.6.3 Limits of certain expectations
Pick α in the unit interval p0, 1q, and take λ, γ ą 0. To simplify the presenta-
tion here and elsewhere, we write










1 rξ ď γs , d “ 0, 1, . . .
with the rv Uα being uniformly distributed on the open interval pα, 1q and indepen-
dent of ξ. The expected values
T pd;α, λ, γq “ E rJpd;α, λ, γqs , d “ 0, 1, . . . (5.41)
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will play a crucial role in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. Note that Jpd;α, λ, γq ě 0 so that the expected value at


















1 rξ ď γs ď
γd
d!
1 rξ ď γs . (5.43)
Combining these bounds we conclude that







and T pd;α, λ, γq is in fact finite with











T pd;α, λ, γq “ T pd;α, 1, γq, (5.46)
lim
γÑ8




























“ pξpd` 1q. (5.48)
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Proof. Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. The deterministic bound (5.44) being uniform in λ, the
conclusion (5.46) is immediate by the Bounded Convergence Theorem. For each α in
p0, 1q the validity of (5.47) follows by the Monotone Convergence Theorem because
T pd;α, λ, γq is non-negative for each γ ě 0 and is non-decreasing as γ Ñ 8.






















q ď 1 (5.49)




























The convergence (5.48) is now a consequence of the Bounded Convergence Theorem
by virtue of the bound (5.49) (which is uniform in α). 


































“ pξpd` 1q, d “ 0, 1, . . . (5.50)
5.7 A proof of Theorem 5.1
We shall establish Theorem 5.1 in the equivalent form given in Theorem 5.2.
To do so, fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.1 we shall now show
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that the convergence statements
lim sup
tÑ8
P rDtpνtq “ d` 1s ď pξpd` 1q (5.51)
and
pξpd` 1q ď lim inf
tÑ8
P rDtpνtq “ d` 1s (5.52)
hold where for each t “ 0, 1, . . ., the rv νt is uniformly distributed over the edge set
Vt and independent of Ft, thus of Gt.
Pick α and ε in the unit interval p0, 1q, and γ ą 0. With t “ 1, 2, . . . sufficiently
large so that t´ rαts ě d, consider the event
Btpα, ε; γq “ Btpα, εq X rξ ď γs .
with Btpα, εq defined at (5.38).
Keeping (5.13) in mind, consider the decomposition

























P rrDtpsq “ d` 1s XBtpα, ε; γqcs (5.53)
where we have set




P rrDtpsq “ d` 1s XBtpα, ε; γqs (5.54)
for notational convenience
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5.7.1 Establishing the upper bound (5.52)










P rrDtpsq “ d` 1s XBtpα, ε; γqcs ď pt´ rαts` 1qP rBtpα, ε; γqcs
ď pt´ rαts` 1q pP rBtpα, εqcs ` P rγ ă ξsq























P rrDtpsq “ d` 1s XBtpα, ε; γqcs
˛
‚
ď P rγ ă ξs ` lim sup
tÑ8
P rBtpα, εqcs
“ P rγ ă ξs (5.57)
as we invoke Lemma 5.7. We readily conclude from (5.13) that
lim sup
tÑ8






` P rγ ă ξs . (5.58)
Most of the technical work that remains consists in identifying the limiting
term in this last inequality; a proof can be found in Section 5.8.
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ď p1´ εq´d ¨ T
`
d;α, p1` εq´1, γ
˘
(5.59)
Collecting (5.58) and (5.59) we find that
lim sup
tÑ8
P rDtpνtq “ d` 1s
ď α ` p1´ αqp1´ εq´d ¨ T
`
d;α, p1` εq´1, γ
˘
` P rγ ă ξs (5.60)
The left handside does not depend on either of the parameters α, ε or γ. Therefore,
in (5.60) let ε go to zero, γ go to infinity and α go to zero in that order, and Lemma
5.9 leads to (5.51). 
5.7.2 Establishing the lower bound (5.51)










P rDtpνtq “ d` 1s (5.61)
by arguments similar to those used earlier for deriving the upper bound. This time
we need to show the following analog of Proposition 5.10; a proof is available in
Section 5.9.







ě p1` εq´d ¨ T
`




It now follows from (5.61) and (5.62) that
p1´ αqp1` εq´d ¨ T
`




P rDtpνtq “ d` 1s (5.63)
Here as well the left handside does not depend on either of the parameters α, ε or
γ. Therefore, in (5.63) let ε go to zero, γ go to infinity and α go to zero in that
order. The validity of (5.52) is now a straightforward consequence of Lemma 5.9. 
5.8 A proof of Proposition 5.10
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. Fix α and ε in the unit interval p0, 1q and γ ą 0. For ease of
exposition we recollect some notation: For each d “ 0, 1, . . ., t “ 1, 2, . . ., α and ε in
p0, 1q and γ ą 0, recall that we had set




P rrDtpsq “ d` 1s XBtpα, ε; γqs
where the event
Btpα, ε; γq “ Btpα, εq X rξ ď γs
with


















Fix t “ 1, 2, . . . and s “ rαts, . . . , t. From (5.36), we have

























































































































































































Substituting the upper bounds (5.66) and (5.67) in (5.64), we obtain






















1 rξ ă γs
fi
fl . (5.68)
For c0 ą 1, t ą
c0
α
















































Substituting (5.68) in the expression for Ttpd;α, ε, γq, we obtain


























Allowing t to go to infinity in (5.70), we get the desired result using the Bounded
Convergence theorem (by virtue of the upper bound (5.69)) and Lemma 5.8.
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5.9 A proof of Proposition 5.11
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. Fix α and ε in the unit interval p0, 1q and γ ą 0. For each
t “ 1, 2, . . . and s “ rαts, . . . , t, we have


















































































dt, 0 ď x ă 1.



























In view of the above fact for sufficiently large t we would like to uniformly bound























is monotonically increasing in ξ and decreasing in r, on the set
rξ ă γs it is sufficient to ensure γ
γ`p1´εqpαt´1q
is strictly less than one for all t being














































































































where the last step follows by noting that s ě αt. The bounds (5.73) and (5.76)
















































































where Rps, tq is an error term that we would like to bound. Observe that the
number of terms in Rps, tq is
`







where each term is at most
1
sd
. Therefore for s “ rαts, . . . , t, we have the upper bound
Rps, tq ď
„













































































using the expression (5.79) on the set Btpα, ε; γq.
The lower bounds (5.77) and (5.82) when substituted in (5.71) yields





































1 rξ ă γs
ff
(5.83)
Substituting the bound (5.83) in the expression of Ttpd;α, ε, γq and using Lemma










ÝÑt 0, d “ 0, 1, . . . .
we get the desired result by virtue of the Bounded Convergence theorem. 
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5.10 A proof of Lemma 5.4
Let µ denote the probability measure on pR`,BpR`qq induced by the rv ξ, i.e.,
µpBq “ P rξ P Bs , B P BpR`q.
With µ we associate another measure ν on pR`,BpR`qq which is absolutely contin-





E rξs ` x
, x ě 0.
The measure ν is finite with





E rξs ` x
˙
dµpxq ď 1.
Thus, while µ is a probability measure, the positive measure ν will be a sub-
probability measure on pR`,BpR`qq. The measures µ and ν are mutually absolutely
continuous, so that with B in BpR`q we have µpBq “ 0 if and only if νpBq “ 0.
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. We note that




















We can now rewrite (5.84) more compactly as
ppξpd` 1qq
1
d “ }gξ}LdpR`;νq (5.85)
where } ¨ }LdpR`;νq denotes the usual prenorm on the linear space L
dpν,R`q of all
Borel measurable functions R` Ñ R which are d-integrable with respect to ν.
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Standard arguments based on Hölder’s inequality can be used to show the
convexity of the mapping





























































Because νpR`q ď 1, the mapping

































}gξ}L8pR`;νq “ ν ´ Ess sup p|gξpxq| : x ě 0q
“ inf pa P R` : νtx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ 0q
“ inf pa P R` : µtx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ 0q (5.86)
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where the last step follows from the fact noted earlier that the measures µ and ν
are mutually absolutely continuous (in which case νtx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ 0 if and
only if µtx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ 0. From the definition of gξ it is plain that
tx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ tx ě 0 :
x
E rξs ` x
ą au




















¨ E rξs ,8
˘
if 0 ď a ă 1
H if 1 ď a,
(5.87)
whence






















if 0 ď a ă 1
0 if 1 ď a.
(5.88)
Next, note that the mapping gξ : r0,8s Ñ r0, 1s admits an inverse mapping



















E rξs if 0 ď a ă 1
8 if a “ 1.








“ 0, if a “ 1,
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we readily conclude
inf pa P R` : µtx ě 0 : |gξpxq| ą au “ 0q
“ inf
ˆ











a P r0, 1s : P
“




“ gξ pinf px P r0,8s : P rξ ą xs “ 0qq “ gξpξ‹q (5.89)
as we make use of the definition (5.20) of ξ‹. The desired conclusion (5.21) readily
follows. 
5.11 A proof of Lemma 5.6
Fix d “ 0, 1, . . .. From (5.30) we have









We shall find it helpful to write





, s ě 0
with the understanding that Idp0q “ 0 by the usual continuity argument since
limsÓ0 e
´ 1
s “ 0 much faster than s. With
Jdpsq “ log Idpsq “ d logp1´ sq ´ log s´
1
s
, 0 ă s ă 1,
we have
Idpsq “ e










, 0 ă s ă 1.
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Therefore, Jdpsq














It is easy to check that sÑ Jdpsq is increasing on the interval p0, s
‹pdqq and decreas-
ing on the interval ps‹pdq, 1q.
For future reference we note that





















It is plain that s‹pdqmaximizes Jdpsq, hence Idpsq, on the interval r0, 1s, namely
Idpsq ď Idps
‹





























































































Jdpsq “ ´pk ´ 1q!dp1´ sq
´k
` p´1qkpk ´ 1q!s´k ´ p´1qkk!s´pk`1q, 0 ă s ă 1.







“ ´pk ´ 1q!dp1´ s‹pdqq´k ` p´1qkpk ´ 1q!s‹pdq´k ´ p´1qkk!s‹pdq´pk`1q


































































































a condition equivalent to
´d1´
k







When k is even, say k “ 2p for p “ 1, 2, . . ., this condition becomes







and is clearly satisfied.










and is never satisfied. The discussion can be summarized as follows.
Fact 5.12. For k ě 2, we always have p´1qkakpdq ă 0.






is convergent on the interval p0, 1q.
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´s‹pdq ă s´ s‹pdq ă s‹pdq.
In other words, the condition becomes






In particular, the interval p0, 2s‹pdqq where Jdpsq admits a Taylor series representa-
tion shrinks with increasing d.






























































































































































































































































































































































“ α ` β ´ Cpα, βq
“ pp1´ αqp1` βq ´ 1qCpα, βq








d „ pβp1´ αq ´ αqCpα, βq
?
d,
and the following conclusion follows.





































„ Kpα, βq ¨ e´pβp1´αq´α`op1qqCpα,βq
?
d
We exploit this fact as follows: With α and β in p0, 1s such that α ă p1 ´ αqβ,
Lemma 5.13 ensures that for all d sufficiently large, the inequality
5Idpp1` βqs
‹
pdqq ă Idpp1´ αqs
‹
pdqq
holds. However, recall that the mapping s Ñ Idpsq is monotone increasing on
p0, s‹pdqq and monotone decreasing on ps‹pdq, 1q, with a maximum at s “ s‹pdq.
Therefore, with d sufficiently large, there exists tpdq to the right of s‹pdq in the
interval ps‹pdq, p1` βqs‹pdqq which depends on α, β and d such that
Idptpdqq “ Idpp1´ αqs
‹
pdqq.
It is now plain that
ż 1
p1`βqs‹pdq
Idpsqds ď p1´ p1` βqs
‹


























As we note that
tpdq ´ p1´ αqs‹pdq ą s‹pdq ´ p1´ αqs‹pdq “ αs‹pdq









































Pick d “ 1, 2, . . .. Pick α and β in p0, 1q. Recall that for s in the interval









































































































dqx2p1´hdps‹pdqxqqdx ry “ s‹pdqxs(5.107)




























































































































, d “ 1, 2, . . . (5.110)
Hence, with γ “ maxpα, βq, we get
sup p|hdps
‹




uniformly in d. It follows then for each λ in p0, 1q,
sup p|hdps
‹
pdqxq|, ´α ď x ď βq ď λ





with γ‹pλq in the unit interval p0, 1q.























We will make use of these bounds together with the following asymptotics.










as θ goes to infinity.



































































































































































































































































Chapter 6: Learning in Games
There has been a growing interest in game theory as a tool to solve complex
engineering problems that involve interactions among (many) distributed agents or
subsystems. As these agents are expected to interact many times over time, re-
searchers proposed a variety of learning rules with desired properties, that helped
the agents to determine their future strategies on the basis of the past information
available to them. One example of such a desired property is convergence to some
form of equilibrium that might be thought of as an approximation of a desired oper-
ating point for the entire system. Many researchers have worked on this interesting
problem, and as a result many different types of learning rules have been already
proposed in the literature, e.g., [74, 75,78,78,79].
However, when casting an engineering problem in a game-theoretic frame-
work there are a few important practical considerations that need to be taken into
account. For instance, controllers in engineering systems are not necessarily syn-
chronized; instead, they are often event driven and update their (control) actions as
new measurements or observations become available. For this reason, guaranteeing
acceptable performance under asynchronous operations is crucial in many engineer-
ing systems. Moreover, in settings where the system consists of many individual
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subsystems with their own individual controllers, the measurements available to a
particular subsystem or a controller could reflect the past decisions taken by the in-
dividual controllers. For example, consider the setting of a wind farm composed of
a number of wind turbines 1. The sensor data available at a particular wind turbine
could reflect past decisions taken by other wind turbines because the actions taken
by the other wind turbines could affect the former with varying time delays.
Unfortunately, most of the existing studies on learning in games do not con-
sider either delays experienced by payoff information or asynchronous updates of
strategies by players. In our work we propose two classes of learning rules which
could be thought as a first step towards bridging this gap between the current liter-
ature and the sound design of engineering systems on a game-theoretic framework.
First, we consider the better-reply rule [85] in which the players aim to improve
their immediate payoffs. This learning rule has been studied extensively due to its
simplicity [73, 74, 95]. More precisely, the proposed rule requires the following: (i)
if there is no strictly better reply (SBR), the agent stays with the same action, and
(ii) if there exists at least one SBR, it switches to each SBR with positive probabil-
ity and also sticks with the previous actions with positive probability (often called
inertia). This inertia may, for instance, model the scenario where an agent waits
at least one more period and tries the same action before switching/commiting to
an SBR. Clearly, the learning rule is computationally inexpensive in that only a
number of simple comparisons need to be made.
1A wind turbine can control how much power it draws from the wind by varying its axial
induction factor [77]
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In Chapter 7 we introduce a general framework for modelling asynchronous
updates of strategies by the players, possibly based on delayed or even outdated
payoff information. Assuming that the payoff information available to the players
is accurate, we prove that if all the agents update in accordance to the better-reply
rule, under a set of mild technical conditions, the action profiles 2 played by the
agents converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) almost surely [58]
in a class of games, which we call generalized weakly acyclic games (GWAGs). We
note that this almost sure convergence of action profiles takes place even when the
players update their strategies in an asynchronous manner on the basis of delayed
payoff information. Finally, we demonstrate that if the game is not generalized
weakly acyclic, the better-reply rule in general cannot guarantee the almost sure
convergence of action profiles even when the strategies are updated synchronously
using current payoff information.
In many practical scenarios, erroneous decision-making by the individual agents
(possibly controllers in an engineering system) is also a major concern along with
delayed payoff information and asynchronous operations. Such erroneous decision-
making could stem from faulty available payoff information and that is what we
consider in Section 7.6. We show in fact that as the payoff information becomes
more reliable, the probability that the agents play a PSNE under the better-reply
rule tends to one over time. When the probability of error is sufficiently small, the
set of action profiles that are played by the system most of the time are called the
stochastically stable states [95]. Thus for the GBRR rules the set of stochastically
2An action profile specifies the actions played by all the agents in the system
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stable states are a subset of the set of PSNE(s). However there are two shortcom-
ings of the better reply rules – (i) a somewhat undesirable property is that under
the exact payoff information setting the system converges almost surely to a PSNE
depending on the system’s initial conditions, and (ii) under the faulty payoff infor-
mation setting the set of stochastically stable states are not easily characterisable.
This gives us the reason to devise a learning rule which is not only robust with
respect to delayed payoff information and asynchrony but also addresses the above-
mentioned shortcomings. This leads us to our next piece of work where we have
proposed a new class of rules, which we call the class of monitoring rules.
In Chapter 8, we discuss a simplified representative version in the class of
monitoring rules called the reduced simple experimentation with monitoring (RSEM)
rule [86]. Under the RSEM rule, the agents can either be in an explore state or in
a converged state – where the state dictates how actions are chosen at a particular
time. While at the explore state the agent tries out every action with a positive
probability in an effort to play the action which cannot be improved any further.
Once such an action is played the agent switches to the converged state with a
positive probability. At the converged state, the agent simply keeps playing the
previous action as long as ‘playing conditions remain unchanged’, i.e., the payoff
remains the same and no better reply exists. As promised earlier, in Chapter 8,
we show convergence of the action profile to a PSNE under asynchronous updates
and payoff information delays, firstly, in the class of GWAGs, and also in games
satisfying a ‘payoff interdependence assumption’ [79, 86, 87, 96]. When the game
satisfies the ‘payoff interdependence assumption’, the RSEM rule ensures almost sure
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convergence to the set of PSNE(s) independent of the initial conditions. Also, under
the setting of erroneous determination of the SBRs, i.e., erroneous estimation of the
set of better replies, the set of stochastically stable states are well characterisable.
In particular, they are those PSNE(s) such that when it is in effect in the system,
it is least likely that any of the agents see a better reply. It is worth pointing out
that the results for the RSEM rule have been shown for erroneous determination of
the SBRs but an accurate received payoff for the played action. Future work is in
order to consider the situation of erroneous payoff for the played action as well.
Until now, we argued erroneous decision-making by the agents to be a result
of faulty available payoff information. However there might be practical situations
where the agents receive correct payoff information yet implement non-equilibrium
actions either by mistake or maybe because its system has been compromised. Con-
sider the model described earlier where the agents correspond to controllers driving
their own (sub)-systems which in turn are a part of a much bigger system. There is
a possibility that the controller decides on a certain action but its own (sub)-system
cannot implement it either due to mistakes or maybe because its system has been
compromised and the controller has lost command on its (sub)-system.
Such a scenario could be potentially detrimental to a system which is already
at an equilibrium. A moment of thought suggests that the algorithm should allow
brief changes in the received payoff information and instead be responsive to long
term changes. A simple implementation of this idea leads to a generalization of the
RSEM rule where the agents at the converged state allow at most a fixed number of
successive changes in its payoff information before permanently moving away from
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an equilibrium action. This rule is formally introduced in Chapter 9 as the simple
experimentation with monitoring (SEM) rule. We show that when the agents follow
the SEM rule, the action profiles selectively converge to resilient PSNE(s) that can
tolerate deviations by potentially multiple agents. By controlling the number of
successive changes in the payoff information that can be allowed by the agents as a
tunable parameter, either (i) PSNEs with certain desired resilience or (ii) the most
resilient PSNE(s) could be reached.
This portion of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 7, we first intro-
duce the framework for considering asynchronous updates and delayed payoff infor-
mation, and also present the results under better-reply rules. In the same chapter
we also introduce a setting for considering faulty payoff information and investigate
convergence under the better-reply rules. In the next chapter, we introduce the
RSEM rule and present convergence results under delays and asynchrony. We also
distinguish our findings from that obtained under the better-reply rules under faulty
payoff information. In Chapter 9, we generalize the RSEM rule to ensure selective
convergence to resilient PSNEs under erroneous decision-making due to faulty im-
plementation of intended actions. But first, in the following section we present an
outline of our main contributions before doing a brief literature review.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose a general framework for considering delayed payoff information
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and asynchronous updates by agents. To the best of our knowledge, this
work is the first one that introduces a general game-theoretic framework for
modeling more realistic engineering systems with delays and asynchrony.
2. We demonstrate that a simple and intuitive rule such as the better-reply rule
can ensure almost sure convergence to the set of PSNEs even under asyn-
chronous updates and delays in a class of games, which we call the generalized
weakly acyclic games. Not only that, we also show the probability that the
players have not converged to a PSNE decays geometrically with time, thereby
proving that the expected convergence time is finite.
3. Motivated by practical scenarios, we model erroneous decision-making by
agents due to faulty payoff information. Under the better-reply rule, we show
that as the payoff information becomes more reliable, the probability that the
players play a PSNE tends to one over time.
4. For the better reply rules, under the setting where there are no errors, the
system converges to a PSNE which could depend on its initial conditions.
Also, under the aforementioned setting of faulty available payoff information,
we are unable to characterise the set of stochastically stable equilibria. To
resolve these issues, we propose the RSEM rule:
(a) Firstly, the RSEM rule is shown to ensure almost sure convergence of
the action profiles to a PSNE under delays and asynchrony for GWAGs
and also in games that satisfy a ‘payoff interdependence assumption’.
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Moreover, under both the settings we show that the probability that the
agents have not converged to a PSNE decays geometrically with time.
When the game satisfies the payoff interdependence assumption the sys-
tem converges to any PSNE independently of the initial conditions.
(b) Under the setting of faulty determination of SBRs, the stochastically
stable states under the RSEM rule are those PSNE(s) which make it
least likely for any of the agents to see a better reply when it is in effect.
5. While erroneous decision-making could occur due to faulty available payoff
information, it could also be a result of faulty implementation of an intended
action. Firstly, we consider a model to account for such a scenario. Next, we
show that the RSEM rule can be generalized to ensure that the system reaches
PSNE(s) which are resilient to deviations by potentially multiple agents.
6.2 Related Literature
There is already a large volume of literature on learning in games with findings
of varying nature, e.g., [39,43,52,56,63,69,95,96]. For this reason, we only provide
a very brief summary of a limited number of studies, and refer an interested reader
to the references therein for additional studies. First, a popular early learning
procedure is fictitious play [45, 55, 56, 82, 83]; players form beliefs regarding the
opponents’ players, for instance, based on the empirical frequencies of their plays,
and pick optimal strategies with respect to their beliefs. The convergence of strategy
profile to equilibria is proven only in somewhat restrictive settings, such as zero-sum
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games and potential games.
Bayesian learning has drawn attention of many researchers for quite some time:
In [66], Jordan studied the Bayesian learning processes for normal form games and
convergence to a Nash equilibrium under mild assumptions on the prior distribution
over payoff functions. In [67], he also studied far-sighted Bayesian learning and
its convergence to a Nash equilibrium in repeated game settings. Another related
work by Kalai and Lehrer [68] showed that, if players in a repeated game start with
subjective beliefs about their opponents’ strategies and their beliefs are “compatible”
with their true strategies, i.e., the players’ prior beliefs assign positive probability
to all strategy profiles that will be chosen with positive probability according to the
true strategies, Bayesian learning leads to accurate prediction of future play of the
game. Moreover, they illustrated that if the players know their payoff functions, the
convergence to a Nash equilibrium occurs.
Researchers also considered non-Bayesian learning. For instance, Foster and
Vohra [50] studied the problem of forecasting and pointed out the benefits of ran-
domized forecasting against an oblivious or adaptive adversary. In their follow-up
study [49], they demonstrated that when the players in a normal form game use
a learning rule with calibrated forecast of the other players’ plays and each player
plays myopically with respect to the forecast distribution, the limit points of the
sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. This was put forth as an alternative to
Aumann’s proof that the common prior assumption and rationality imply a corre-
lated equilibrium. Interestingly, they also showed the converse of the finding also
holds in the sense that, for every correlated equilibrium, there exists some calibrated
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learning rule that would result in the equilibrium being played in the limit.
Another class of learning rules is based on regrets. Regrets capture the addi-
tional payoff a player could have received by playing a different action. There are
several regret-based learning rules, e.g., [57,59,62], which guarantee convergence to
Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria or Hannan set in an appropriate sense. Hart
and Mas-Colell in [59] introduced a simple adaptive procedure called the regret
matching where players switch from their current plays to others with probabilities
proportional to their regrets. They showed that the empirical distribution of plays
converges to a correlated equilibrium if all the players follow the procedure. In a
slightly different informational setting, Hart and Mas-Colell proposed a reinforce-
ment learning-based technique to estimate regrets, which they called the modified
regret matching, with a similar convergence property. A summary of existing conver-
gence results for generalized regret matching can be found in [61]. Regret testing is
another regret-based uncoupled learning rule, which was first introduced by Foster
and Young [51]. Germano and Lugosi [57] showed that when all players adopt this
scheme, the (mixed) strategy profile of the players converges to a Nash equilibrium
of the stage game almost surely.
Oftentimes, real world problems exhibit special structures which could be
leveraged while designing learning rules. In this context many of the existing learn-
ing rules target games with special structures, such as identical interest games,
potential games (PGs), and weakly acyclic games (WAGs). Although an arbitrary
game is not guaranteed to possess a PSNE, one exists for PGs because a maximizer
of the potential function is a PSNE [88]. This led to further research with problems
148
being formulated as PGs. For example, Arslan et al. [41] model the autonomous
vehicle-target assignment problem as a PG. They present two learning rules and
demonstrate their convergence to PSNEs. Marden et al. [76] study large-scale games
with many players with large strategy spaces. They generalize the notion of PGs
and propose a learning rule that guarantees convergence to a PSNE in the class
of games they consider, with applications to congestion games. The WAGs were
first studied in a systemic manner in [95]. Since then, there has been considerable
interest in WAGs. For instance, Marden et al. [73] establish the relations between
cooperative control problems (e.g., consensus problem) and game theoretic models.
In addition, they propose the better reply with inertia dynamics and apply it to a
class of games, which they call sometimes weakly acyclic games, to address time-
varying objective functions and action sets. In another related study [74], Marden
et al. proposed regret-based dynamics that achieve almost sure convergence to a
strict Nash equilibrium in weakly acyclic games.
More recently, researchers aimed to design so-called payoff-based learning rules
(also known as ‘completely uncoupled dynamics’) with provable convergence to ef-
ficient Nash equilibria (in an appropriate sense) in potential games [78] and weakly
acyclic games [75]. Pradelski and Young extended the result to general games satis-
fying what they called an interdependence assumption, a weaker form of which has
been actually used in our work. Related to these studies, Marden et al. [79] pro-
posed learning rules that seek Pareto optimal strategy profile, i.e., a maximizer of
aggregate payoff. This result was sharpened by Menon and Baras [80] to show that,
under some conditions, the probability that the strategy profile lies in the set of
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aggregate payoff maximizers converges to one over time. Marden and Shamma [78]
studied the effects of asynchrony in log-linear learning using independent revision
processes and showed that, in potential games with sufficiently small probability of
players revising their strategies at each time t P N, only the maximizers of potential
functions can be stochastically stable. We also point out an interesting study by
Hart and Mansour [64] on the communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium
procedures. Not surprisingly, they showed that any pure Nash equilibrium proce-
dure has communication complexity that grows exponentially with the number of
players.
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Chapter 7: Class of Better reply rules
In this chapter, we consider a simple and intuitive class of learning rules called
the better-reply rules. Along with identifying a new class of games – generalized
weakly acyclic games which contains well known classes of games such as weakly
acyclic games, potential games and identical interest games (see Section 6.2 for prac-
tical significance of these classes of games), we also show convergence results of the
action profiles under the better-reply rules in the context of these games. We draw
connections between the better-reply rules and the GWAGs, and argue that the
GWAGs is a class of games naturally associated with the better-reply rules. Keep-
ing in mind our original motivation to better model practical engineering concerns
in a game-theoretic setting, we outline a framework for considering asynchronous
updates of strategies by the agents based on payoff information with potentially
time-varying delays. We demonstrate that when all agents update their strategies
according to the better-reply rules, the action profile converges to a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium with probability 1 (or almost surely) if the game is a GWAG. As
discussed in Chapter 6, we take our attempt at modelling practical scenarios one
step further, and consider the setting of erroneous decision-making by the agents
due to faulty payoff information.
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7.1 Stage and Repeated Games
In this section, we first describe the strategic-form stage game and the infinitely
repeated game we adopt for analysis. A word on notation: An inequality between
two action profiles is an element-wise inequality.
Finite stage game: Let P :“ t1, 2, . . . , nu be the finite set of agents. The
pure action or strategy space of agent i P P and the joint strategy space of all agents
are denoted by Ai “ t1, 2, . . . , Aiu and A :“
ś
iPP Ai, respectively. We assume that
the strategy spaces Ai are finite for all i P P . The payoff function of agent i is given
by Ui : A Ñ R :“ p´8,8q. Hence, the strategic-form finite (stage) game is given
by G :“ pP , tAi, i P Pu, tUi, i P Puq.
A mixed strategy of agent i P P is a probability distribution pi “ ppipaiq,
ai P Aiq P ∆pAiq, where ∆pAiq denotes the probability simplex over Ai; agent i P P
chooses action ai P Ai with probability pipaiq. A pure strategy is a special case
where the probability distribution is concentrated on a single action.
A strategy profile is a collection of strategies, one strategy for each agent.
Throughout the remainder of the thesis, a strategy profile refers to a pure strategy
profile unless stated otherwise. Furthermore, we find it convenient to differentiate
the (mixed) strategy profile from the actions played by the agents (according to the
mixed strategy profile). For this reason, we refer to the set of actions played by the
agents as an action profile.
Given a strategy profile a “ pa1, a2, . . . , anq P A, a´i denotes the strategy
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profile of all the agents other than agent i, i.e., a´i “ pa1, . . . , ai´1, ai`1, . . . , anq.
Similarly, given a subset of agents I Ĺ P , aI is the strategy profile comprising
strategies picked by the agents in I. We say that a‹ P A is a pure-strategy Nash





´iq ě Uipai, a
‹
´iq for all ai P Aizta‹i u. (7.1)
The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is strict if the inequality in (7.1) is strict for
all agents i P P . Hereafter a Nash equilibrium refers to a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. We denote the set of Nash equilibria of G by ANE.
Repeated game: We employ a repeated game setting to model the repeated
interactions among agents. In an (infinitely) repeated game, the above stage game
G is repeated at each time t P N :“ t1, 2, . . .u. At time t, agent i P P chooses its
action aiptq according to some mixed strategy piptq P ∆pAiq. We denote the action
profile played by the agents at time t by aptq “ paiptq, i P Pq. However, unlike in
a traditional repeated game, we do not necessarily assume that the payoffs agents
receive at time t depend on aptq.
The agents are allowed to revise their strategies based on (the history of)
payoffs in a repeated game. In this chapter we describe two simple better-reply
rules (that were first studied in [85]) which ensures almost sure convergence under
asynchronous updates of strategies by agents based on their delayed payoff informa-
tion in a class of games we call generalized weakly acyclic games described in the
following section.
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7.2 Generalized weakly acyclic games
In order to define the GWAGs [85], we first need to introduce the notion of
generalized better reply paths (GBRPs). A GBRP is a sequence of action profiles
(a1, a2, . . . , aL) such that, for every 1 ď ` ď L´1, there exists a set of agents I` Ď P
that satisfies







´iq for all i P I`, and
ii. a`i “ a
``1
i for all i P PzI`.
These conditions mean that a GBRP consists of transitions from one action profile to
another action profile, in each of which a set of agents that can achieve a higher payoff
via unilateral deviation switch their actions simultaneously, while the remaining
agents stay with their previous actions. A better reply path (BRP) used to define
WAGs [73,74] is a special case of GBRPs with |I`| “ 1 for all ` “ 1, 2, . . . , L´ 1.
Definition 7.1. A game is a GWAG if (i) the set of PSNEs is nonempty and (ii)
for every action profile a˚ P AzANE, there exists a GBRP pa1, a2, . . . , aLq such that
a1 “ a˚ and aL P ANE.
It is clear from the definition that WAGs are special cases of GWAGs where
only BRPs are allowed, i.e., only a single agent is allowed to switch or deviate at
a time. Due to this constraint, we suspect that there is a large class of games that
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Figure 7.1: An example of a GWAG that is not a WAG. (a) Game in normal form,
(b) all possible unilateral deviations and simultaneous deviations
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˛ Example of a GWAG that is not a WAG: Consider a three-agents game
shown in Fig 7.1 in normal form. All three agents have the identical action space
{0, 1}. The unique PSNE of the game is aNE “ p1, 1, 1q. The solid red arrows in
Fig. 7.1(b) indicate all possible unilateral deviations that would improve the payoff
of the agent that deviates. From the figure, we can verify that there does not exist
a BRP from any action profile that is not the PSNE or a: “ p0, 1, 1q; the PSNE is
reachable only from a:, and it is not possible to reach either the PSNE or a: from
any other action profile. For this reason, this game is not a WAG.
On the other hand, this game is a GWAG. To see this, note that both agents
2 and 3 have an incentive to deviate at a˚ “ p0, 0, 0q. Therefore, from action profile
a˚, we can find a GBRP given by pa1, a2, a3q “ pa˚, a:, aNEq with I1 “ t2, 3u and
I2 “ t1u. Since it is possible to reach a
˚ from other remaining action profiles, we
can construct a GBRP from them as well. Therefore, this example illustrates that
the GWAGs give rise to a strictly larger class of games than WAGs.
In Section 7.4, we draw a relationship between a class of better reply algorithms
and the class of GWAGs. However, next we state the following lemma which provides
an alternate definition of a GWAG.
Lemma 7.1. A game G is a GWAG if and only if there exists a potential function
φ : A Ñ R such that, for every a R ANE, there exists a subset of agents Ipaq Ď P
and a1i ‰ ai for all i P Ipaq such that Uipa
1
i, a´iq ą Uipaq and φpa
1
Ipaq, a´Ipaqq ą φpaq.
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Proof. Sufficiency (‘if ’): Pick a0 R ANE. Then, there exists some subset Ipa0q Ď
P with action profile a1Ipa0q ‰ a0Ipa0q1 such that Uipa1i, a0´iq ą Uipa0q for all i P Ipa0q
and φpa1q ą φpa0q, where a1 “ pa1Ipa0q, a
0
´Ipa0qq.
If a1 R ANE, we can repeat this process and construct a sequence a0, a1, . . .,
until we have an action profile that belongs to ANE. Since φpa`q ă φpa``1q for all
` “ 0, 1, . . . and there are finitely many action profiles, this process will terminate
after a finite number of iterations and the final action profile, say aM , must be
a PSNE. It is an easy exercise to verify that pa0, a1, . . . , aMq is a GBRP from its
construction. Since we can find a GBRP that leads to a PSNE for any non-PSNE
action profile a0, the game is a GWAG.
Necessity (‘only if ’): Define the length of a GBRP to be the number of action
profiles in the sequence. For each a R ANE, find a shortest GBRP to a PSNE. If we
represent all PSNEs in ANE using a single node aNE, then these shortest GBRPs
from all non-PSNE action profiles to aNE give rise to a spanning tree rooted at aNE,
which we denote by T .
Suppose that we assign a value φ0 to all PSNEs (represented by a
NE in T ).
Let φ : AÑ R be a potential function, where φpaq “ φ0 ´ dpaq and dpaq is the hop
distance of a to aNE in T . Then, from the construction of the spanning tree T , it is
clear that, for any action profile a R ANE, there exists a subset I Ď P and a1I ‰ aI
such that Uipa
1
i, a´iq ą Uipaq for all i P I and φpa
1
I , a´Iq ą φpaq. 
1The inequality between two action profiles is an element-wise inequality throughout the thesis.
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7.3 Proposed Update Rules - Generalized Better Reply Rules
Payoff information for updates – Let S “ tB, I,W u and, for each agent



















i, a´iq ą Uipaq,
I if Uipa
1
i, a´iq “ Uipaq,
W otherwise.
The payoff information on which agent i bases its decision lies in Ii “ SAi . The
interpretation is that, if the strategy profile generating the payoff information is
a P A, the payoff information agent i has available is pCipa1i, aq, a1i P Aiq. To simplify
notation, for fixed a P A, we denote the payoff information vector pCipa1i, aq, a1i P Aiq
by Cipaq.





i P Aiq assumed in [57, 59], but is more stringent than
that of the completely uncoupled payoff-based learning rules, e.g., [79, 80, 87]. We
argue that in some scenarios, even though agents cannot determine the exact payoffs
for the strategies not played, they might be able to determine which strategies could
have yielded higher (or smaller) payoffs than the previously chosen strategy.
For example, consider an interdependent security game in which each agent
chooses a combination of security measures from a set of available security measures
for its own protection [72], e.g., cybersecurity measures including incoming-traffic
monitoring and intrusion detection systems. In this case, based on the number of
successful attacks a agent suffers, the resulting losses, as well as the costs of various
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security measures, it might be able to determine if another combination of security
measures would have achieved a lower overall cost.
We find it convenient to define following mappings we use in the subsequent
sections: For each agent i P P , let BRi : AÑ 2Ai and IRi : AÑ 2Ai , where
BRipaq “ ta
1
i P Ai | Cipa1i, aq “ Bu and
IRipaq “ ta
1
i P Ai | Cipa1i, aq “ Iu.
Clearly, BRipaq is the set of better replies for agent i given the strategy profile of
the other agents a´i.
In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, we assume that the payoff information available to the
agents, i.e., Cipãiptqq, is accurate. In other words, the agents can correctly determine
BRipã
iptqq and IRipã
iptqq. In Section 7.6, we relax this assumption and consider the
scenario where agents cannot perfectly determine these sets and, as a result, make
mistakes.
In this section, we describe the better-reply rules we study. Recall that T i “
tT ik, k P Nu Ď N is the update time sequence of agent i.
At time t “ 1, the agents choose their initial action profile ap1q according to
some distribution G over A. Subsequently, agents revise their strategies according
to the following rule: Fix ε ą 0 and βi : SAi Ñ ∆pAiq, i P P . The mappings
βipciq “ pβipai; ciq, ai P Aiq are used to determine the mixed strategy to be em-
ployed when there is a better reply.
GBRR-I Rule
159
• if BRipãiptqq “ H
– choose aiptq “ aipt´ 1q ;
• else (i.e., BRipãiptqq ‰ H)
– choose aiptq “ ai with probability βipai; Cipãiptqqq ě ε for each ai P
BRipã
iptqq, and aiptq “ aipt´ 1q with the remaining probability;
Note that when there is no better reply, i.e., BRipã
iptqq “ H, agent i plays
the same action aipt ´ 1q at time t. On the other hand, if there exists at least
one better reply, agent i (a) picks each of the better replies with probability at
least ε or (b) continues to play the same action aipt ´ 1q with probability 1 ´
ř
aiPBRipãiptqq
βpai; Cipãiptqqq. Thus, it plays a mixed strategy.












“: µ ă 1.
This guarantees that, even when the set of better replies is nonempty, the agent
continues to play the same action aipt´ 1q with strictly positive probability.
In the GBRR-I rule, the same action aipt ´ 1q is chosen at time t when-
ever BRipã
iptqq “ H. In the following slightly modified rule, which we call the
GBRR-II rule, we relax this constraint and allow additional exploration among best
responses. Assume ε‹ ą 0 and let ϑi : SAi Ñ ∆pAiq, i P P . The role of the map-
pings ϑipciq “ pϑipai; ciq, ai P Aiq, i P P , is similar to that of βi, i P P , and they
determine the mixed strategies to be played by the agents when there are multiple
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best responses.
GBRR-II Rule: Set θi “ TRUE at time t “ 1.
• if BRipãiptqq “ H
– if |IRipã
iptqq| “ 1 (i.e., IRipã
iptqq “ taipt´ 1qu)
∗ choose aiptq “ aipt´ 1q ;
– else (i.e., |IRipã
iptqq| ą 1)
∗ if θi “ TRUE
˛ choose each action ai P IRipã




ϑpai; Cipãiptqqq “ 1); (*)
˛ set θi “ FALSE;
∗ else (i.e., θi “ FALSE)
˛ choose aiptq “ aipt´ 1q ;
• else (i.e., BRipãiptqq ‰ H)
– choose aiptq “ ai with probability βpai; Cipãiptqqq ě ε for each ai P
BRipã
iptqq, and aiptq “ aipt´ 1q with the remaining probability;
– set θi “ TRUE;
The key difference between the two update rules is that GBRR-II permits the
agent to explore among the best responses in some cases even when there is no
better reply (case (*)).
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These rules are quite intuitive; an agent picks every better reply with positive
probability (without knowing the exact payoffs achieved by those better replies).
But, if no better reply is found, the agent either keeps playing the same action
(GBRR-I) or selects one of the best responses (GBRR-II).
Modeling mixed strategies in GBRRs – For the completeness of ex-
position and analysis, we describe how we model mixed strategies exercised by the
agents in GBRRs: For every i P P , define ui :“ puit, t P N`q and vi :“ pvit, t P N`q to
be two sequences of independent uniform random variables over (0, 1]. We assume
that pui,viq, i P P , are mutually independent.
Suppose that agent i revises its strategy at time t P T i and BRipãiptqq ‰ H.
agent i first orders the better replies, for example, by increasing index. We denote





i , . . . , a
pm˚q
i u, where m
˚

























, l “ 1, . . . ,m˚.
Under GBRR-II, agent i’s mixed strategy in case (*) is handled in an analogous
manner. agent i first orders the best responses in IRipã






i , . . . , a
pm:q
i u, where m
: is the number of best responses.
Then, it picks aiptq “ a
plq
i , l “ 1, 2, . . . ,m











, l “ 1, . . . ,m:.
We would like to point out one observation that we make use of in our analy-
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sis. Because mixed strategies are implemented using mutually independent uniform
random variables, given a mixed strategy selected by agent i at some time t, the
action picked by the agent is conditionally independent of the past history.
Convergent sequences of strategy profiles – For each t P N, let At “
śt
t1“1A. Similarly, A8 “
ś8
t1“1A. When the agents revise their strategies ac-
cording to fixed update rules described above, together with the revision processes
Ni, i P P , and (the distribution of) initial action profile ap1q, the update rules
S “ pSi, i P Pq induces a distribution over A8 (with a suitable σ-field F̃ on A8);
let ~a “ paptq, t P Nq be the sequence of action profiles played by the agents.
We first define some subsets of A8, which are of interest to us. For each t P N,
let
A8t :“ tā P A8 | āpt1q “ a‹ @ t1 ě t for some a‹ P ANEu.






“ tā P A8 | āpt1q “ a‹ @ t1 ě T ˚ for some a‹ P ANE and T ˚ ă 8u.
Simply put, A8t (resp. A8‹ ) is the set of strategy profile sequences that converge to
a Nash equilibrium by time t (resp. at some finite time).
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7.4 Convergence under GBRR – Synchronous Update Case
In this section, we start with a simpler scenario in which every agent receives
the payoff information Cipapt´1qq at each t P N`, and updates its strategy according
to a GBRR rule. In other words, T i “ N for all i P P and ãiptq “ apt ´ 1q for all
i P P and t P N`. We will consider more general settings in the following section.
Let ~a “ paptq, t P Nq be the sequence of action profiles selected by the agents
using a GBRR rule (either GBRR-I or GBRR-II). The following theorem guarantees
the almost sure convergence (or convergence with probability 1) of the played action
profiles aptq, t P N, to a Nash equilibrium as t Ñ 8 [58]. Its proof can be found
in [85] and is omitted here. Instead we will prove the convergence results under the
asynchronous update scenario.
Theorem 7.2. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic. Then, for
any fixed initial distribution ν P ∆pAq, we have P r~a P A8‹ s “ 1.
In addition to the almost sure convergence of action profiles, the following
theorem states that the probability that the action profile has not converged to a
Nash equilibrium by time t P N decays geometrically with t.
Theorem 7.3. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic. Then, there
exist C ă 8 and ζ P p0, 1q such that, regardless of the initial distribution ν P ∆pAq,
P r~a R A8t s ď minp1, C ¨ ζtq for all t P N.
Theorem 7.3 implies that the expected convergence time E rNconvs is finite, where
Nconv “ inftt P N | ~a P A8t u is the time it takes for the agents to reach a Nash
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equilibrium and remain there afterward.
Before we proceed, let us comment on the convergence rate, which is captured
by ζ. Recall from Section 7.1 that, for a R ANE, the length of a shortest gener-
alized better reply path h˚paq to a Nash equilibrium is L‹paq. The parameter ζ
in Theorem 7.3 is shaped by maxaPAzANE L
‹paq. A possible interpretation of this
observation is as follows: One can view the length of a generalized better reply path
from strategy profile a to a Nash equilibrium as a measure of how “difficult” it is to
reach the Nash equilibrium from the action profile following the generalized better
reply path, and a shortest generalized better reply path offers the “easiest” path
to a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the lower bound on convergence rate captured by ζ
is influenced by the “most difficult” strategy profile from which the agents need to
find the “easiest” path to a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 7.4. Suppose that the game G is not generalized weakly acyclic. Then,
there exists at least one strategy profile a1 R ANE such that, under the GBRR-I
rule,
P raptq R ANE for all t P N | ap1q “ a1s “ 1.
Proof. Since the game is assumed to be not generalized weakly acyclic, there ex-
ists a strategy profile a` R ANE with no generalized better reply path to a Nash
equilibrium. From the description of the GBRR-I rule, it is clear that any admis-
sible transition from a strategy profile a1 to another strategy profile a2 (a1 ‰ a2)
constitutes a generalized better reply path pa1, a2q. Therefore, if ap1q “ a`, it is
not possible to reach any Nash equilibrium under the GBRR-I rule. 
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Note that
P r~a R A8‹ | ap1q “ a1s ě P raptq R ANE @ t P N | ap1q “ a1s
and, hence,
P r~a R A8‹ | ap1q “ a1s “ 1.
To rephrase it, conditional on tap1q “ a1u, the probability that aptq, t P N, converge
to a Nash equilibrium is equal to zero.
Theorems 7.2 and 7.4 together state that, if νpa1q ą 0 for all a1 P A, i.e., every
strategy profile is selected with positive probability at time t “ 1, the GBRR-I rule
guarantees the almost sure convergence of action profiles to a Nash equilibrium if
and only if the game is generalized weakly acyclic.
A similar, but somewhat weaker result holds for the GBRR-II rule: We call a
sequence of strategy profiles pa1, a2, . . . , aLq a weak generalized better reply path if,
for every ` P t1, . . . , L´ 1u, there exists a subset of agents I 1` Ď P such that







´iq for all i P I
1
`, and
ii. a`i “ a
``1
i for all i P PzI 1`.
A game is said to be generalized weakly acyclic` if, for every a1 R ANE,
there exists a weak generalized better reply path pa1, a2, . . . , aLq with a1 “ a1 and
aL P ANE. One can show that if the game is not generalized weakly acyclic`, there
exists at least one strategy profile a: R ANE such that Praptq R ANE @ t P N | ap1q “
a:s “ 1 when the agents employ the GBRR-II rule for revising strategies.
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Remark: The class of generalized weakly acyclic` games is strictly larger than
that of generalized weakly acyclic games and there are generalized weakly acyclic`
games that are not generalized weakly acyclic, for which GBRR-II guarantees the
almost sure convergence of action profiles to a Nash equilibrium. In this sense,
GBRR-II possesses a somewhat stronger convergence property than GBRR-I.
7.5 Convergence under GBRR – Asynchronous Update Case
In the previous section, we assumed that all agents update their strategies at
every t P N` based on the action profile played at time t´ 1. As already indicated
in Chapter 6, in some settings this assumption might not hold. In this section, we
extend the model in two directions: We allow (i) asynchronous updates of strategies
by the agents and (ii) time-varying delays experienced by payoff information avail-
able to the agents. Note that the latter implies that the agents might base their
decisions on outdated payoff information at times. We mention that there are some
related studies that examine the effects of delays in evolutionary games, e.g., [94]
and asynchronous distributed computation of average values, e.g., [48, 93].
7.5.1 Model with asynchronous updates and delays
There are many different ways in which one can capture and model asyn-
chronous operation and delays in payoff information. In this subsection, we de-
scribe the model we assume for our study. For concreteness, we explain it using an
example.
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SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2 INTERACTION 














Figure 7.2: Example – two interacting systems controlled by separate agents.
Consider the system in Figure 7.2. There are two interacting systems, each of
which is controlled by a agent (controller); for each agent i, i “ 1, 2, a corresponding
system i generates payoffs for agent i. Obviously, the case in which a single system
provides payoffs to all agents is a special case of this more general setting.
In this scenario, depending on the structure of the system, new strategies
adopted by agents might experience delays before taking effect at the systems. In
addition, the payoffs to agents (e.g., the current states of the systems) may not be
observable to the agents instantaneously. In other words, they can only observe
delayed past payoffs.
To model this scenario, we introduce two types of delays – (i) forward delays
and (ii) feedback delays. A forward delay refers to the amount of time that elapses
before a agent’s strategy goes into effect at a system after it is adopted. On the
other hand, a feedback delay is the amount of time it takes for payoff information to
become available to a agent after it is generated. These are illustrated in Figure 7.3







A A A 
A A 
F F F 
F F 
INTERACTION 
player 1 action in effect 
player 2 action in effect 
player 1 action in effect 
player 2 action in effect 
Figure 7.3: Forward and feedback delays in the system.
strategy, the forward delay experienced before system i sees the new strategy is
shown as a (red or green) solid arrow (with label ‘A’), whereas the additional forward
delay to the other system appears as a dotted arrow. The feedback delay experienced
by payoff information generated by a system before the corresponding agent observes
it is shown as a (blue or purple) solid arrow (with label ‘F’).
We shall model these delays using random variables as follows. First, recall
that the agents choose their initial action profile ap1q “ paip1q, i P Pq according
to some distribution ν and the sequence of agent i’s update times, namely T i, is
determined by a discrete-time counting process. Denote the inter-update times of




k, k P N.
169
Each inter-update time U ik is given by a sum of two random variables – X
i
k
and Y ik . The random variable X
i
k models the forward delay experienced by the
kth action of agent i chosen at time T ik, i.e., aipT
i
kq; we assume that apT
i
kq goes




k after incurring a forward delay of
X ik, at which point system i generates payoff information for agent i. This payoff
information undergoes a delay of Y ik and is observed by agent i at the next update




k q. Throughout this section, we assume that X
i
k ě 0 and Y
i
k ě 1
for all i P P and k P N. For notational simplicity, we denote the pair pX ik, Y ik q by
Zik and the sequences tZ
i
k, k P Nu and tRik, k P Nu by Z i and Ri, respectively.
Similarly, the actions chosen by agent i at time T ik might not be seen by





k , where V
i,j
k is the forward delay that action aipT
i
kq experiences before
influencing system j. In the example shown in Figure 7.2, once the new action anewi
of agent i starts affecting system i, through the interaction between the systems, the
other system will also be affected by anewi possibly after some additional delay. In
this case, we will have X ik ď V
i,j
k . For every i, j P P , i ‰ j, let V i,j :“ tV
i,j
k , k P Nu
and Ri,j :“ tRi,jk , k P Nu.
In order to complete the model, we need to take care of initial conditions.
Because the actions chosen by the agents at time t “ 1 might not take effect at the
systems right away, we impose the following initial conditions: For each system i,
we assume that there is some strategy profile āi “ pāij, j P Pq P A that is in place
at the system. In other words, for each i P P , system i sees action āii from agent i




j from agent j, j ‰ i, till R
j,i
1 “ 1 ` V
j,i
1 . Although we can
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easily handle scenarios in which these strategy profiles are random, here we assume
that they are deterministic for the ease of exposition.
Remark: The settings studied in the previous section can be viewed as a
special case of the general settings described in this section with X ik “ V
i,j
k “ 0 and






k “ 1) for all i, j P P (i ‰ j) and k P N. To rephrase
it, not only do the agents update strategies synchronously, there is no forward delay
(and the strategies take effect immediately) and the feedback delay is always one.
In order to make progress, we assume that Ni,Z i, and V i,j satisfy the following
assumptions.
A1 The random variables tZ i,V i,j, j ‰ iu for different agents i P P are mutually
independent.
A2. For every i P P , P
“
U ik ă 8, V
i,j







k`1 for all k P N
‰
“ 1 for all i, j P P , j ‰ i.




` , j ‰ iq, 1 ď ` ď k
˘
. There exist η ą 0 and ∆η ă 8 such
that, for all i P P , k P N and ϕ P Z`,
P
“
U ik`1 ď ∆η ` ϕ, V
i,j







A5. There exist δ ą 0 and ∆δ ă ∆η such that, for all i P P and k P N,
P
“














A6. For all 0 ď u ď u1 ă 8,
P
“













for all x P Z`,
i.e., the conditional distribution of X ik`1 is stochastically larger given tU
i
k`1
ď u1u than tU ik`1 ď uu [91].
Assumption A2 ensures that every agent updates infinitely many times with
probability 1. Assumption A3 guarantees that agents see the effects of new actions
in the same order they were adopted. Assumption A4 essentially implies that the
distributions of random variables tX ik, V
i,j
k , j ‰ iu, k P N, do not have a heavy tail.
Assumption A5 means that, with positive probability, agent i’s action affects its
own payoff no later than those of other agents.
Although these assumptions are technical in nature, we feel that they are not
restrictive and are likely to hold in many cases of practical interest. For example,
when the strategy update times are given by suitable delayed renewal processes with
constant forward delays (with X ik ď V
i,j
k for all j ‰ i), the above assumptions hold.
7.5.2 Convergence of action profiles with asynchronous updates and
delays
Let ~a “ paptq, t P Nq be the sequence of action profiles played by the agents
using a GBRR rule. The following two theorems suggest that when the game is gen-
eralized weakly acyclic and a GBRR rule is employed for updating strategies, neither
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payoff information delays nor asynchronous updates of strategies among the agents
prevent their action profiles from reaching a Nash equilibrium with probability 1,
under Assumptions A1 through A6.
Theorem 7.5. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic and that
Assumptions A1 through A6 hold. Then, for any initial distribution ν P ∆pAq,
P r~a P A8‹ s “ 1.
Proof. A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 7.7. 
Theorem 7.6. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic and that
Assumptions A1 through A6 are in place. Then, there exist C 1 ă 8 and ζ̄ P p0, 1q
such that, for any initial distribution ν P ∆pAq, P r~a R A8t s ď minp1, C 1 ¨ ζ̄tq for all
t P N.
Theorem 7.6 follows directly from Corollary 2 in the proof of Theorem 7.5 as
explained in Section 7.7.
Remark: Theorem 7.5 and 7.6 are established under Assumptions A1 through
A6 for generalized weakly acyclic games. However, as we explain in Section 7.7, for
weakly acyclic games, they hold under Assumptions A1 through A4.
7.6 Case with Erroneous Payoff Information
In the previous sections, we assumed that accurate payoff information Cipãiptqq
is available to the agents for updates. Although this is a reasonable assumption in
some cases, there are other scenarios, in which agents might not be able to reliably
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determine better replies. To address this partially, we replace it with a somewhat
weaker assumption that the agents are able to make more reliable determinations
over time, for instance, by observing its own payoff history.
Clearly, when the agents make mistakes with the determinations of Cipãiptqq, it
is unlikely that the strategy profile will converge to a Nash equilibrium and remain
there forever with probability 1. Instead, we will show that, under some conditions,
the probability that the agents play a Nash equilibrium at time t P N goes to one
over time. Although we suspect that our result can be generalized to settings with
asynchronous updates studied in the previous section under suitable assumptions,
here we only consider settings with synchronous updates studied in Section 7.4.
7.6.1 Preliminaries
Modeling unreliable payoff information – We assume that, for all t´1 P
N, given the action profile apt´ 1q, (a) the events of having false payoff information
at time t are conditionally independent of the past and (b) their probabilities depend
only on the action profile apt´1q. This is modeled as follows: First, the probabilities
of erroneous classification of actions are given by mappings qit : A ˆ Ai Ñ ∆pSq,
t P N`. The interpretation is that (i) qitpa, a1iq :“ pqitpς; a, a1iq, ς P Sq is a probability
distribution over S and (ii) conditional on the event tapt´ 1q “ au, the probability
of action a1i P Ai being classified as ς P S by agent i at time t is equal to qitpς; a, a1iq.
Second, for each agent i P P , we define an array of independent uniform(0,1]
random variables Wi “ twit, t P N`u, where wit “ pwit,a, a P Aiq with wit,a „
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uniform(0,1]. To facilitate the exposition, we order the elements in S as follows:
ς1 “ B, ς2 “ I and ς3 “ W . Then, action a
1
i P Ai is classified as ςl, l “ 1, 2, 3, by

















We note that, because the uniform random variables are mutually independent,
given the action profile apt ´ 1q, each action is incorrectly classified by a agent
independently of each other at time t and also of the past history. This allows us to
model the evolution of the action profile as a Markov process in our analysis.
Assumption 7.1. For every i P P and t P N`, qitpa, a1iq ą 0 :“ r0 0 0sT for all
a P A and a1i P Ai.
Nonhomogeneous Markov chain – Before presenting our main results,
we first introduce some terminologies we borrow from [53]. Once the mappings
qit, i P P and t P N`, and βi and ϑi, i P P , are fixed, the evolution of action
profile taptq, t P Nu can be modeled as a nonhomogeneous (discrete-time) Markov
chain [44], where the transition matrix at time t P N, denoted by Pptq, is determined
by the mappings βi and ϑi, i P P , and qit, i P P and t P N`. Because we assume
qitpa, a
1
iq ą 0, every action a
1
i of agent i will be classified as a better reply with
positive probability at every t P N` and, consequently, we have Pa1,a2ptq ą 0 for all
a1, a2 P A.
In addition to the nonhomogeneous Markov chain taptq, t P Nu, we define, for
each t P N, a time homogeneous (discrete-time) Markov chain Xt “ txtpnq, n P Nu
with a common state space A and a transition matrix Pt “ Pptq. Since P ta1,a2 ą 0
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for all a1, a2 P A as mentioned above, the Markov chain Xt is ergodic with a unique
stationary distribution [58, 89], which we denote by µt “ pµtpaq, a P Aq. We call
the Markov chain in which the agents make no mistake (i.e., the model assumed in
Section 7.4) an unperturbed Markov chain. We denote the transition matrix of the
unperturbed Markov chain by P0.
Assumption 7.2. There exists a decreasing, positive sequence pεt, t P Nq such that
(i) limtÑ8 εt “ 0 and (ii) for every i P P , a P A, a1i P Aiztaiu, and ς ‰ Cipa1i, aq,
there are constants cipa, a
1
i, ςq ą 0 and γipa, a
1












i.e., qitpς; a, a
1
iq „ cipa, a
1





First, Assumption 7.2 implies that the probability of agent i making an erro-


















Second, it states that, for all sufficiently large t, the transition probabilities Pa1,a2ptq
can be well approximated using finite sums of power functions of εt. In other words,
Pa1,a2ptq „
řK
k“1 ck ¨ pεtq
rk , where ck P R and rk ě 0. As a result, for all a1, a2 P A,








and we can find 0 ă ξ ă ξ ă 8 such that, for all sufficiently large t,
ξ ¨ ε
rpa1,a2q




Resistance of paths – A path from a strategy profile a1 to another strategy
profile a2 is a sequence of strategy profiles pap1q, ap2q, . . . , apMqq with ap1q “ a1, apMq “
a2 and ap`q ‰ ap``1q for all ` “ 1, 2, . . . ,M ´ 1.
Definition 7.1. The resistance of a path hpa1 Ñ a2q :“ pap1q “ a1, ap2q, . . . , apMq “
a2q from a1 to a2 is equal to rpphpa
1 Ñ a2qq “
řM´1
`“1 rpa
p`q, ap``1qq. The resis-
tance from a1 to a2, denoted by ρpa1, a2q, is defined to be the smallest resistance
among the paths from a1 to a2, i.e., ρpa1, a2q :“ inftrpphpa
1 Ñ a2qq | hpa1 Ñ
a2q is a path from a1 to a2u.






The co-radius τpÃq is the maximum resistance that must be overcome to reach
some strategy profile in Ã from a strategy profile outside Ã. Thus, it measures how
“easy” it is for the agents to reach a strategy profile in Ã starting from any strategy
profile outside Ã.
Define κ :“ mina˚PANE τpta
˚uq, i.e., the smallest co-radius among all Nash
equilibria. Based on the above observation, κ indicates how “easily” the agents can
reach a Nash equilibrium starting from any strategy profile.
Minimum resistance W -tree – Construct a directed graph G “ pV , Eq,
where V “ A and the (directed) edge set E contains all possible one-step transitions
in the Markov chain Xt, i.e., pa1, a2q P A ˆ A with P ta1,a2 ą 0. Recall that, from
Assumption 7.1, we have Pa1,a2ptq ą 0 for all a
1, a2 P A. Hence, the edge set
E “ AˆA.
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Given a subgraph G 1 “ pV 1, E 1q of G, where V 1 Ď V and E 1 Ď E , its resistance
is defined as the sum of the resistances of all edges in the subgraph [53], and we
denote it by πpG 1q. In other words, πpG 1q “
ř
ePE 1 rpeq, where rpeq is the resistance
of (directed) edge e.
For every a P A, let GT paq be the set of trees in G rooted at a, such that
there exists a path from every a1 P A to a. The trees in GT paq are called W -
trees rooted at a. A minimum resistance W -tree in GT paq is denoted by Γ˚paq, i.e.,
Γ˚paq P arg minΓpaqPGT paq πpΓpaqq. Let πminpaq :“ πpΓ
˚paqq “ minΓpaqPGT paq πpΓpaqq.
7.6.2 Main results
First, we state an auxiliary result that follows directly from Theorem 7.2
(which implies that Nash equilibria are absorbing states of the unperturbed Markov
chain) and [95, Theorem 4].
Theorem 7.7. As t Ñ 8, µt Ñ µ0, where µ0 is a stationary distribution of the
unperturbed Markov chain. In addition, µ0pa‹q ą 0 if and only if (i) a‹ P ANE and
(ii) πminpa
‹q “ mina1PANE πminpa
1q.
A Nash equilibrium a‹ with µ0pa‹q ą 0 is said to be stochastically stable [53]. We
denote the set of stochastically stable Nash equilibria by ASS Ď ANE.
We now prove that, under some conditions, the nonhomogeneous Markov chain
taptq, t P Nu is strongly ergodic [44]; the strong ergodicity of the nonhomogeneous
Markov chain means that its distribution converges to µ0 as t Ñ 8. Thus, it tells
us P raptq P ASSs Ñ 1 as t Ñ 8, which in turn implies limtÑ8 P raptq P ANEs “ 1
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because ASS Ď ANE.
Before we proceed, we introduce the assumption under which we establish the
strong ergodicity of the nonhomogeneous Markov chain.
Assumption 7.3. For every i P P , a P A, a1i P Aiztaiu, and ς ‰ Cipa1i, aq, there
exist some function f P C8 and ε‹ ą 0 such that (i) qitpς; a, a
1
iq “ fpεtq if 0 ă εt ă ε
‹
and (ii) fpεq „ α ¨ εβ for some α, β ą 0. In addition, f 1pεq „ α1 ¨ εβ
1
for some α1 ą 0
and β1 P R.
The first part of Assumption 7.3 is simply rehashing of Assumption 7.2. The
assumption essentially states that both the probabilities of false classifications and
their derivatives with respect to εt asymptotically behave like power functions of
εt. Thus, for sufficiently large t, both the transition probabilities Pa1,a2ptq and their
derivatives can be well approximated using finite sums of power functions of εt.
In addition, the assumption implies that the probability of correct classification of
actions tends to one over time.




t “ 8. Then,
the nonhomogeneous Markov chain taptq, t P Nu is strongly ergodic with limiting
distribution µ0. Consequently, it satisfies limtÑ8 P raptq P ASSs “ 1.





t “ 8 in Theorem 7.8 reveals the following interesting
observation. When κ is larger, it is more difficult for agents to reach a Nash equilib-
rium in the worst case. This demands that the erroneous classification probabilities
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decrease slower. The intuition behind this is that greater erroneous classification
probabilities make it “easier” for the played action profile to transition from one
strategy profile to another, thereby facilitating the exploration of new strategy pro-
files, including Nash equilibria.
Remark: Suppose that Assumption 7.2 does not hold and agents continue to
make mistakes with probability that does not vanish. However, if the probability of
making a mistake is sufficiently small, our results can be modified to demonstrate
that, for large t P N, the probability that the chosen action profile aptq is a Nash
equilibrium is close to one. Hence, even though the probability of playing a Nash
equilibrium does not reach one as t Ñ 8 in this case, the probability will be close
to one.
A question that arises is whether anything more can be said about the set
of stochastically stable Nash equilibria ASS. For any a˚ P ANE, let the states
from which we can reach a˚ through zero resistance paths (GBRPs) be denoted as
Da˚ Ď A, i.e.,
Da˚ “ ta P A | ρpa, a˚q “ 0u
This represents the domain of attraction of a particular PSNE. By the GWAG
assumption, Ya˚PANEDa˚ “ A, i.e., we can reach at least one PSNE from any
non-equilibrium action profile by following a GBRP. Choose any a1 P ANE. The
minimum resistance W -tree Γ˚pa1q contains resistance paths from other PSNE(s)
and non-PSNE action profiles. For any action profile in Da1 , by definition we can
construct zero resistance paths to a1. However for reaching a1 from any action profile
180
outside of Da1 , perturbations due to the error model is required. Therefore, nothing
more can be inferred about ASS than already stated. It would in general depend
both on the error model and the structure of the game itself. This is a major reason
for considering the class of RSEM rules which seem to exhibit more favourable
properties in similar settings, in particular, the domain of attraction of each PSNE
is better characterisable.
7.7 Proof of Theorem 7.5
Before we present the proof, we introduce the following notation. Consider
a mapping L : A˚ Ñ Z` :“ t0, 1, 2, . . .u, where A˚ denotes the Kleene star on A.
Given a sequence of L action profiles, say pa1, a2, . . . , aLq, Lppa1, a2, . . . , aLqq “ L´1
gives us its length, i.e., the number of transitions in it.
Since the game G is generalized weakly acyclic, for every strategy profile a R
ANE, there exists at least one generalized better reply path that starts with a and
leads to a Nash equilibrium. For each strategy profile a P A, we choose a generalized
better reply path with the shortest length (according to the mapping L) and denote
it by ppaq. Clearly, for a Nash equilibrium a˚ P ANE, we have ppa˚q “ pa˚q and
Lpppa˚qq “ 0.
Although it is not necessary, in order to facilitate the exposition, we assume
that the shortest generalized better reply paths tppaq, a P Au satisfy the following
consistency condition: Suppose that a non-Nash equilibrium strategy profile a1
appears in the generalized better reply path, ppa2q, of another action profile a2.
181
Then, the subsequence in ppa2q that starts with a1 is identical to ppa1q. Such
generalized better reply paths can be constructed easily in a manner similar to
Dijkstra’s algorithm, starting with ANE [42].
We introduce two mappings: Φ : AzANE Ñ A and I : AzANE Ñ 2P , where
Φpaq denotes the second strategy profile in ppaq following a and Ipaq “ ti P P | ai ‰
Φipaqu, i.e., the set of agents that change their strategies going from strategy profile
a to Φpaq.
We prove Theorem 7.5 with the help of several lemmas, whose proofs are
deferred to the following section. The first lemma states that, if the action profile
at time t is not a Nash equilibrium, the action profile will reach Φpaptqq within 3∆η
periods with positive probability, where ∆η is the constant in Assumption A4.
Lemma 7.9. Under the assumptions in Theorem 7.5, there exists q1 ą 0 such that,
for every a R ANE and t P N,
P rapt` 3∆ηq “ Φpaptqq | aptq “ as ě q1. (7.5)
Repeating Lemma 7.9, we readily obtain the following corollary that tells us
that, starting at aptq at time t, we reach a Nash equilibrium within a finite number
of periods with positive probability.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the assumptions in Theorem 7.5 hold. Then, for any












The next lemma states that, once the agents reach a Nash equilibrium a˚,
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there is positive probability that they will remain at the Nash equilibrium a˚ for
good.
Lemma 7.10. Under the assumptions in Theorem 7.5, there exists q2 ą 0 such
that, for all a˚ P ANE and t P N, we have
P rapt1q “ a˚ for all t1 ě t` 1 | aptq “ a˚s ě q2. (7.7)
Lemmas 7.9 and 7.10 yield the following corollary. Let Lmax :“ maxaPAzANE
Lpppaqq.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the assumptions in Theorem 7.5 are true. Then, for
any a P A, we have
P rapt1q P ANE for all t1 ě t` 3∆ηLmax | aptq “ as ě qLmax1 ¨ q2. (7.8)
Define L̄ :“ 3∆ηLmax and q̄ :“ q
Lmax






ď p1´ q̄qn. Recall that A8t increases with t. Consequently, P r~a R A8t s




ď p1 ´ q̄qtt{L̄u ď C̃ ¨ ζ̃t, where C̃ “ p1 ´ q̄q´1 and
ζ̃ “ p1´ q̄q1{L̄ ă 1. Because A8‹ “ YtPNA8t , we have P r~a P A8‹ s ě P r~a P A8t s for all
t P N. Finally, limtÑ8 P r~a P A8t s “ 1´ limtÑ8 P r~a R A8t s “ 1, yielding the desired
result P r~a P A8‹ s “ 1.
Remark: As mentioned in Section 7.5, Theorems 7.5 and 7.6 hold under less
restrictive assumptions for weakly acyclic games. This is because Lemma 7.9 is
true under Assumptions A1 through A4 for weakly acyclic games and the proof of
Lemma 7.10 presented in Section 7.8.2 requires only Assumptions A1 through A4.
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7.8 Proofs of Lemmas introduced in Section 7.7
7.8.1 Proof of Lemma 7.9
For each i P P , we define kimax : NÑ N, where kimaxptq “ maxtk P N | T ik ď tu.
In addition, for every i P P and t P N, dFi ptq “ X ikimaxptq and d
R




Similarly, for all i, j P P , i ‰ j, and t P N, d´i,jptq “ V
i,j
kimaxptq




For notational convenience, we denote the interval tt`p`´ 1q∆η ` 1, . . . , t` ` ¨∆ηu
by T `ptq, ` P N, where ∆η is the constant in Assumption A4 in Section 7.5.




the last time by time t (resp. the first time after time t) at which agent i updates
its strategy.
E0 “ tT ikimaxptq`1 ď t`∆η for all i P P
and T ikimaxptq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t`∆η for all i, j P P , i ‰ ju
E1 “ tT i X T 2ptq ‰ H for all i P Pu, i.e., all agents update at least once during
the interval T 2ptq
E2 “ taipt1q “ aiptq, t1 “ t` 1, . . . , T ikimaxpt`2∆ηq`1 ´ 1 for all i P Pu
E3 “ tdFi pt` 2∆ηq ď t` 2∆η `∆δ ´ T ikimaxpt`2∆ηq for all i P Pu
E4 “ tT i X T 3ptq ‰ H for all i P Pu
E5 “ taipT ikimaxpt`2∆ηq`1q “ Φipaptqq for all i P Pu
E6 “ td`i,jpt` 2∆ηq ě ∆δ for all i, j P P , i ‰ ju
E7 “ taipt1q “ Φipaptqq for all i P P and t1 “ T ikimaxpt`2∆ηq`1 ` 1, . . . , t` 3∆ηu
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Event E0 ensures that (a) all agents update at least once during the interval
T 1ptq and (b) action profile aptq starts affecting the payoffs of all agents by time
t `∆η. The second event E1 demands that all the agents revise their strategies at
least once during the interval T 2ptq. Events E2 and E5 together require every agent
i P P to continue playing the same action aiptq till T ikimaxpt`2∆ηq`1´1 and then switch
to Φipaptqq at time T
i
kimaxpt`2∆ηq`1
. In order to make sure that event E5 is feasible,
events E3 and E6 ensure that, at the first time agents update their strategies during
the interval T 3ptq, they will see the payoff information in response to aptq and, as
a result, choose Φipaptqq with positive probability. Finally, event E7 demands that
the agents continue to play strategy Φipaptqq till t` 3∆η.
We can lower bound the conditional probability in (7.5) in Lemma 7.9 as
follows. First,
P rapt` 3∆ηq “ Φpaptqq | aptq “ as
ě P rapt` 3∆ηq “ Φpaptqq, Ei, i “ 0, 1, . . . , 7 | aptq “ as (7.9)
We rewrite (7.9) as a product of conditional probabilities.
p7.9q “ P rapt` 3∆ηq “ Φpaptqq | aptq “ a, Ei, i “ 0, 1, . . . , 7s (7.10)
ˆP rE7 | aptq “ a, Ei, i “ 0, 1, . . . , 6s (7.11)
ˆP rE5 X E6 | aptq “ a, Ei, i “ 0, . . . , 4s (7.12)
ˆP rE3 X E4 | aptq “ a, Ei, i “ 0, 1, 2s (7.13)
ˆP rE2 | aptq “ a, Ei, i “ 0, 1s (7.14)
ˆP rE0 X E1 | aptq “ as (7.15)
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We now lower bound the terms in (7.10) through (7.15). First, it is clear from the
definitions of the events Ei, i “ 0, 1, . . . , 7, that (7.10) is equal to one. Since 1´µ is a
lower bound to the probability with which a agent with a better reply plays the same
action played at the previous time, p7.11q ě p1´µqnp∆η´1q and p7.14q ě p1´µq2∆ηn.
From Assumption A5 (more precisely, (7.3)), we have p7.12q ě pε ¨ p1´µq ¨δqn, where
ε is a positive lower bound to the probability with which a agent chooses a better
reply. By Assumptions A4 through A6, p7.13q ě pη ¨ δqn. Finally, Assumption A4
implies p7.15q ě η2n. From these lower bounds, the inequality in (7.5) holds with
q1 :“
`
p1´ µq3∆η ¨ ε ¨ δ2 ¨ η3
˘n
.
7.8.2 Proof of Lemma 7.10
We first define the following three events.
E 10 “ tT ikimaxptq`1 ď t`∆η for all i P P
and T ikimaxptq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t`∆η for all i, j P P , i ‰ ju
E 11 “ tT i X T 2ptq ‰ H for all i P Pu
E 12 “ tapt1q “ a˚ for all t1 “ t` 1, . . . , t` 2∆ηu
First, events E 10 and E 12 ensure that the payoffs of all agents are determined
by strategy profile a˚ by time t ` ∆η. Note that it also implies that every agent




t`∆η. Second, event E 11 demands the agents to revise their strategies at least once
during the interval T 2ptq as well. Finally, event E 12 requires that the agents play the
equilibrium strategies till t` 2∆η.
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Note that, if the events E 10 through E 12 occur, all payoff information will be
produced on the basis of strategy profile a˚ after time t ` ∆η and, as a result, no
agent will change its action after time t ` 2∆η. This is because, for every agent
i P P , we have ãi´ipT ikimaxpt`2∆q`1q “ a
˚
´i. Once this happens, no agent will ever see
a better reply after t` 2∆η and, consequently, will not deviate from its equilibrium
action, and the strategy profile will remain a˚ for good. Thus,
P rapt1q “ a˚ for all t1 ě t` 1 | aptq “ a˚, E 1i , i “ 0, 1, 2s “ 1.
Putting things together, we get
P rapt1q “ a˚ for all t1 ě t` 1 | aptq “ a˚s
ě P rapt1q “ a˚ for all t1 ě t` 1 | aptq “ a˚, E 1i , i “ 0, 1, 2s
ˆP rE 10 X E 11 X E 12 | aptq “ a˚s
“ P rE 10 X E 11 X E 12 | aptq “ a˚s
From Assumption A4, we get the following lower bound.
P rE 10 X E 11 X E 12 | aptq “ a˚s ě ηn ¨ ηnp1´ µq2n∆η “
`
η ¨ p1´ µq∆η
˘2n
ą 0.
Hence, the lemma follows with q2 :“
`
η ¨ p1´ µq∆η
˘2n
.
7.9 Proof of Theorem 7.8
From [53, Lemma 3.1, p. 177], we know that the stationary distribution µt “































By Assumption 7.3 and the comment following it, for all sufficiently large t, the
numerator of (7.17) behaves like a finite sum of power functions of εt. Therefore,
there exists finite T ˚ such that, for all t ě T ˚ and all a P A, the sign of pµtpaqq1
remains the same. Based on this observation, we can partition the set A into A´
and A` “ AzA´, where A´ “ ta P A | pµtpaqq1 ď 0 for all t ě T ˚u.
Theorem 8.3 of [44, p. 242] tells us that the nonhomogeneous Markov chain














First, the following lemma tells us that, under the conditions in Theorem 7.8, the
Markov chain is weakly ergodic. Its proof can be found in Section 7.10.




t “ 8. Then, the
nonhomogeneous Markov chain taptq, t P Nu is weakly ergodic.








































Applying the inequality ||µt ´ µt`1||1 ď 2 to the first term in (7.19) and the defini-
tion of ||¨||1 norm for the summands in the second term, we obtain













































ď 2T ˚ ` 2 ă 8,
where the second equality in (7.20) follows from Theorem 7.7, i.e., µt Ñ µ0 as
tÑ 8.
7.10 Proof of Lemma 7.11
Let us first introduce some notation and terminology we use in the proof.
For notational ease, we denote the product Ppmq ˆ Ppm ` 1q ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ Ppn ´ 1q
of transition matrices by Ppm,nq. Given a stochastic matrix P, its Dobrushin’s
ergodic coefficient [44, p. 235] is given by








Theorem 8.2 of [44, p. 241] states that the nonhomogeneous Markov chain taptq, t P








For each a˚ P ANE and a P A, let `pa, a˚q “ mintLphpa Ñ a˚qq | rpphpa Ñ
a˚qq “ ρpa, a˚qu, i.e., the shortest length of the paths hpa Ñ a˚q with the least
resistance rpphq “ ρpa, a
˚q, and define `maxpa
˚q :“ maxaPA `pa, a
˚q. Then, the





t`m for all m ě `maxpa
˚
q. (7.23)
Let `max “ maxa˚PANE `maxpa
˚q, and consider the sequence (tk, k P Nq, where
tk “ k ¨ `max. First, from (7.23), for all distinct a
1, a2 P A and all sufficiently large





















where the second inequality follows from (7.23).














min pPa1,aptn, tn`1q, Pa2,aptn, tn`1qq
¸
. (7.25)










We state the following lemma without a proof, which is straightforward.
Lemma 7.12. Suppose that pαpnq, n P Nq is a decreasing, positive sequence with
ř
nPN αpnq “ 8. Then, for any k P N and ` P Z`, we have
ř
nPN αpk ¨ n` `q “ 8.
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t “ 8 by the assumption in Lemma 7.11. Thus, by





“ 8. Together with (7.26), this implies that (7.25)
diverges, completing the proof of (7.22).
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Chapter 8: Class of Monitoring Rules
In the previous chapter we considered the class of better reply rules which
ensures convergence to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a large class of games,
identified as the generalized weakly acyclic games, under asynchronous updates and
payoff information delays. Moreover, we also showed convergence to a PSNE under
faulty available payoff information, causing players to make erroneous decisions oc-
casionally. Under the latter setting of erroneous payoff information, when the better
reply rules are followed by the agents, the PSNE(s) that are stable in the long run
or are stochastically stable would in general depend both on the error model and
the structure of the game itself. In this chapter we consider another class of learn-
ing rules that are also robust to delays and asynchrony like the better reply rules.
However, under a (partial) erroneous payoff information setting where the SBRs are
estimated with errors, the stochastically stable states are better characterisable.
The learning rule in its simplest form is described in the first section, followed
by the convergence results under the learning rule for the asynchronous update
setting introduced in Section 7.5. Later, we consider the faulty payoff informa-
tion setting introduced in Section 7.6 and contrast the convergence results from
that obtained for the better-reply rules. It is worth mentioning that we adopt the
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strategic-form repeated game setting described in Section 7.1.
8.1 Proposed Update Rule
In this section, we present our proposed learning rule, called the Reduced
Simple Experimentation with Monitoring (RSEM). Under the RSEM update rule,
at each time t P N, every agent is at one of two possible states – Explore (E) or
Converged (C). We denote the state of agent i P P at time t by siptq P Ψ0 :“ tE,Cu.
Let Ψ :“ Ψn0 , and the state vector sptq :“ psiptq, i P Pq P Ψ. The rule governing the
update of an agent’s state will be explained shortly.
Recall that the mappings Ci and BRi introduced in the previous chapter are
the classification and the better reply mappings for agent i respectively. Also, recall
that the update time sequence for player i is denoted as T i “ tT ik, k P Nu Ď N.
In the synchronous update case with no delays we have T i “ N for all i P P and
ãiptq “ apt ´ 1q for all i P P and t P N`, where ãiptq P A is the strategy profile
responsible for generating the payoff information observed by player i at time t.
Payoff Information for updates – We assume that the payoff information
available to agent i at time T ik, k ě 2, is of the form ppCipai, ãipT ikqq, ai P Aiq ; UipãipT ikqqq,
compactly denoted as pCipãipT ikqq;UipãipT ikqqq. In other words, as assumed in the
previous chapter, agent i knows the actions that would lead to higher payoff with
respect to the played action given the action profile of the other agents in effect (at
the agent i’s system) at the time the payoff feedback is generated, i.e., Rik´1.
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8.1.1 Action updates
In this subsection, we first describe how the agents choose their actions ac-
cording to the payoff feedback they receive at the times of updates.
Initially, at time T i1 “ 1, the agents choose their actions according to some
(joint) distribution G over A. For k ě 2, agent i P P updates its action at time







k`1´1, i.e., aiptq “ aipT
i
kq for all t P tT
i
k, . . . , T
i
k`1´1u.
Fix δ P p0, 1{pmaxiPP |Ai|qq and βi : SAi Ñ ∆pAiq, i P P . The mappings βipciq “
pβipai; ciq, ai P Aiq are used to determine the mixed strategy to be employed given
the payoff information.
Action Selection Rule:
For k “ 2, 3, . . .,
• if sipT ikq “ E
– choose aipT
i
kq “ ai with probability βipai; CipãipT ikqqq ě δ for all ai P Ai






It is clear that, under RSEM, an agent may choose a new action only if it is at state
E. Otherwise, it continues to play the same action employed at the previous time.
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Modeling mixed strategies in RSEM rule – As was done for the GBRR
rules, we describe how we model mixed strategies exercised by the players under
the RSEM rule: For every i P P , define ui :“ puit, t P N`q to be a sequence of
independent uniform random variables over (0, 1].
Suppose that player i revises its strategy at time t P T i and siptq “ E. It then
chooses
aiptq “ `, if u
i









, ` “ 1, . . . , Ai.
8.1.2 State dynamics
As explained in the previous subsection, under the RSEM rule, the state of
an agent plays a key role in its action selection. Hence, the dynamics of sptq, t P N,
play a major role in the algorithm. In this subsection, we explain how the agents
update their states based on the received payoff feedback.
At time t “ 1, we assume that all agents are at stateE, i.e., sp1q “ pE,E, . . . , Eq.
Agent i first updates its state right after it receives new payoff information at T ik,
k P N, following which it chooses an action.
The state of agent i at time T ik depends on (i) the payoff information vector
CipãipT ikqq if sipT ik´1q “ E and (ii) the payoffs obtained at time T ik´1 and T ik if
sipT
i
k´1q “ C. Note that at time T
i
2 only case S1 is applicable because at time
T i1 “ 1 all the agents are in the Explore state. Therefore case S2 in the state update
rule can be effective only for k ě 3.
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State Update Rule: Fix p P p0, 1q.




















E with probability p
C with probability 1´ p
S2. else (i.e., sipT
i
k´1q “ C)




ipT ikqq “ H
˘
– if Uipã
ipT ikqq ‰ Uipã












In a nutshell, agent i transitions to or remains at stateE if eitherBRipã
ipT ikqq ‰
H or Uipã
ipT ikqq ‰ Uipã
ipT ik´1qq. Note that when an agent is at the converged state,
seeing a better reply is equivalent to a change in the payoff information vector
Cipãip¨qq. The second condition means that although there are no better replies, the
received payoff has changed from the last time. In such a scenario, the agent prefers
to transition to the Explore state.
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The RSEM rule and the GBRR rules– In the RSEM rule when the
agents are in the explore state, all the actions are chosen with positive probability.
In the converged state, they play their previous action as long as the received payoff
remains the same and there are no better replies. While the GBRR-I rule only
allows agents to experiment among their better replies and, if there are no better
replies, then the previous action is played. It is easy to see that the class of RSEM
rules are more exploratory since in the RSEM rule the agent is allowed to choose
actions that are not among the better replies. Hence, if we have a sequence of action
profiles generated by the GBRR rule ~a “ paptq, t P Nq, it can also be generated
under the RSEM rule.
8.2 Convergence under RSEM
Let ~a “ paptq, t P Nq be the sequence of action profiles played by the players
using the RSEM rule. First, we state the convergence results under the RSEM rule
for the asynchronous update setting described in Section 7.5.1 when the game is
generalized weakly acyclic.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic and that
Assumptions A1 through A6 hold. Then, for any initial distribution G P ∆pAq,
under the RSEM rule,
P r~a P A8‹ s “ 1.
Proof. From the discussion in Section 8.1, we conclude that the agents under the
RSEM rule can also follow the GBRPs. Thus, the proof follows from arguments
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similar to that for the GBRR rule in Section 7.7. 
Theorem 8.2. Suppose that the game G is generalized weakly acyclic and that
Assumptions A1 through A6 are in place. Then, there exist Crsem ă 8 and ζrsem P
p0, 1q such that, for any initial distribution G P ∆pAq under the RSEM rule
P r~a R A8t s ď minp1, Crsem ¨ ζtrsemq
for all t P N.
The above-mentioned results not only hold for games that are generalized
weakly acyclic, but also for games that satisfy the following interdependence as-
sumption.
Assumption 8.1. (Interdependence Assumption) For every a “ pai, i P Pq P A and
J Ĺ P , there exist an agent i R J and a˚J P
ś
jPJ Aj such that Uipaq ‰ Uipa˚J , a´Jq.
Assumption 8.1 simply states that, given any action profile and a strict subset
J of the agents, we can find another agent i R J whose payoff would change if the
agents in J changed their actions to a˚J . Put differently, it implies that it is not
possible to partition the set of agents into two subsets that do not interact with
each other. The interdependence assumption has been used in the literature, for
instance, to prove the convergence of action profile to efficient equilibria or Pareto
optimal point [79,87,96]. Also, it is worth noting that there is no clear relationship
between the class of GWAGs and the class of games satisfying the interdependence
assumption. In general, there could be games that are GWAGs but do not satisfy the
interdependence assumption and vice versa. Under this interdependence assump-
tion, we can show that, if all agents update their actions according to the RSEM
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rule, the action profile converges almost surely to a PSNE. However, we can have
the desired convergence result under a weaker form of interdependence assumption.
Assumption 8.2. (Weak Interdependence Assumption) For every a “ pai, i P Pq P
A and J Ĺ P such that BRipaq “ H for all i R J , then there exist an agent i˚ R J
and a˚J P
ś
jPJ Aj such that either Ui˚paq ‰ Ui˚pa˚J , a´Jq or BRi˚pa˚J , a´Jq ‰ H.
Assumption 8.2 implies that for any action profile a P A and a strict subset
J Ĺ P where all the agents outside the set J see no better reply, there exists
an action profile a˚J for the agents in the set J such that when the action profile
pa˚J , a´Jq is adopted at least one agent outside the set J either sees a better reply
or a change in its received payoff.
The following two theorems suggest that when the game satisfies the weak
interdependence assumption and has a non-empty set of PSNE(s), and a RSEM rule
is employed for updating strategies, the action profile reaches a Nash equilibrium
under payoff information delays and asynchronous updates with probability 1, under
Assumptions A1 through A4.
Theorem 8.3. Suppose that the gameG satisfies Assumption 8.2 and has a nonempty
set of PSNE(s) denoted by ANE and that Assumptions A1 through A4 hold. Then,
for any initial distribution G P ∆pAq,
P r~a P A8‹ s “ 1.
Proof. A proof of the theorem is provided in Section 8.3. 
In addition to the almost sure convergence of the action profile, we can estab-
lish that the probability that the action profile has not converged to a PSNE decays
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geometrically with time t.
Theorem 8.4. Suppose that the gameG satisfies Assumption 8.2 and has a nonempty
set of PSNE(s) denoted by ANE and that Assumptions A1 through A4 are in place.
Then, there exist C̃rsem ă 8 and ζ̃rsem P p0, 1q such that, for any initial distribution
G P ∆pAq,
P r~a R A8t s ď minp1, C̃rsem ¨ ζ̃trsemq.
Theorem 8.4 follows directly from Corollary 4 in the proof of Theorem 8.3 in
Section 8.3.
Remark: While both Theorem 8.1 and 8.3 ensure convergence to the set
of PSNE almost surely, it is important to make the distinction that starting from
any initial action profile ap1q under the interdependence assumption the agents can
converge to any PSNE, which is not always true for the case of GWAGs. This fact
will become essential under various erroneous settings when we characterise the set
of stochastically stable equilibria in this chapter and also in the next chapter.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 8.3
First, we define some notation: Let Z :“ SˆA and denote the pair psptq, aptqq P
Z by zptq, t P N. Define s‹ P S to be the state vector in which every agent is at
state C, i.e, s‹ “ pC, . . . , Cq, and ZNE “ tps‹, a˚q P Z | a˚ P ANEu.
The theorem will be proved with the help of several lemmata we introduce.
Their proofs are provided in Sections 8.4.1 through 8.4.3. For any s P S,
Cpsq “ ti P P | si “ Cu and Epsq “ ti P P | si “ Eu.
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The first lemma states that, if the action profile at time t is not a PSNE, then
even if all agents are at state C at time t, there is positive probability that at least
one agent will transition to state E after 3∆η periods (where ∆η is the constant
introduced in Assumption A4 in Section 7.5.1).
Lemma 8.5. For every a R ANE and t P N,
P rEpspt` 3∆ηqq ‰ H | zptq “ ps‹, aqs ě ζ0 ą 0. (8.2)
The second lemma shows that, if there is at least one agent at state E at time
t P N, there is positive probability that the number of agents at state E will increase
after a finite number of periods.
Lemma 8.6. For every r P t1, 2, . . . , n ´ 1u, there exists 0 ă D1 ď 4∆η such that,
for every t P N and z “ ps, aq P Z with |Epsq| “ r, we have
P r|Epspt`D1qq| ě r ` 1 | zptq “ zs ě ςr ą 0. (8.3)
The following corollary now follows from Lemmas 8.5 and 8.6, by repeatedly
applying Lemma 8.6 until all agents switch to state E.





ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě µ ą 0. (8.4)
The final lemma has two parts; first, it states that, if all agents are at state E
at some time t, then for any z‹ P ZNE, there is positive probability that they will
reach z‹ within 4∆η periods. Second, if the agents are at some z
‹ P ZNE at time t,
with positive probability they will remain at z‹ for good.
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Lemma 8.7. (i) Suppose that zptq “ z “ ps, aq where |Epsq| “ n, i.e., all agents
are at state E. Then, for all z‹ “ ps‹, a‹q P ZNE, we have
P rzpt` 4∆ηq “ z‹ | zptq “ zs ě ρ1 ą 0.
(ii) For every z‹ P ZNE,
P rzpt1q “ z‹ for all t1 ě t | zptq “ z‹s ě ρ2 ą 0.
The following corollary is a consequence of the above lemmas.
Corollary 4. There exist 0 ă D̃ ď 4pn ` 1q∆η such that, for all z P ZzZNE,
z‹ P ZNE and t P N, we have
P
”
zpt1q “ z‹ for all t1 ě t` D̃
ˇ
ˇ zptq “ z
ı
ě µ̃ ą 0. (8.5)
Comparing Corollary 4 with Corollary 2 from the previous chapter, we observe
that unlike the better reply rules the RSEM allows convergence to any PSNE starting
from any initial action profile.
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 8.3. Lemma 8.5 shows that, if
the action profile is not a PSNE at time t, then after a finite number of periods, at
least one agent will be at state E. Lemma 8.6 then claims that, whenever there is
at least one agent at state E, after finitely many periods, all agents will be state E
(Corollary 3). Once all agents are at state E, Lemma 8.7 asserts that they can reach
any z‹ P ZNE with positive probability after a finite number of periods and stay there





ď p1 ´ µ̃qn.
The rest of the proof follows using arguments similar to that of the proof for Theorem
7.5.
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8.4 Proof of Lemmata for Theorem 8.3
8.4.1 Proof of Lemma 8.5
Because a R ANE, when the agents adopt a, there is at least one agent, say
agent i˚, with an incentive to deviate from ai˚ when the action profile a is in effect
at the systems of all agents. We will prove that the state of agent i will transition
to E with positive probability after 3∆η periods.
We recall some of the notation introduced in the previous chapter: For each
i P P , we define kimax : N Ñ N, where kimaxptq “ maxtk P N | T ik ď tu. Similarly,
for all i, j P P , j ‰ i, and t P N, d´i,jptq “ V
i,j
kimaxptq




V i,jk , as defined in Section 7.5, is the forward delay that action aipT
i
kq experiences
before influencing system j. For notational convenience, we denote the interval
tt ` p` ´ 1q∆η ` 1, . . . , t ` ` ¨ ∆ηu by T `ptq, ` P N, where ∆η is the constant in
Assumption A4 in Section 7.5.




denotes the last time by time t (resp. the first time after time t) at which player i
updates its strategy.
E1 “ tT ikimaxptq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t`∆η for all i, j P P , j ‰ iu
E2 “ tT i
˚
X T `ptq ‰ H, ` “ 2, 3u
E3 “ taipt1q “ ai for all i P Epspt1qq, t1 “ t` 1, . . . , t` 3∆ηu
E4 “ ti˚ P Epspt1 ` 1qq if i˚ P Epspt1qq for all t1 “ t, . . . , t` 3∆η ´ 1u.
203
The event E1 implies that the action profile at time t is seen by all systems by time
t`∆η. The second event E2 simply states that agent i˚ updates its action at least
once in each of the intervals T 2 and T 3. Event E3 requires any agent at state E
between t ` 1 and t ` 3∆η to choose the same action it did at time t (which will
happen with strictly positive probability). Finally, the fourth event E4 demands
that the agent i˚, once it switches to state E (which will happen by time t` 3∆η if
the events E1 through E3 take place because a R ANE), remain at state E till time
t` 3∆η.
We use the following lower bound to complete the proof.
P rEpapt` 3∆ηqq ‰ H | zptq “ ps‹, aqs
ě P rEpapt` 3∆ηqq ‰ H, E1, E2, E3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aqs
“ P rEpapt` 3∆ηqq ‰ H | E1, E2, E3, E4, zptq “ ps‹, aqs
ˆP rE1, E2, E3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aqs (8.6)
From the explanations of the events E1 through E4 above, it is clear that for every




“ a´i. When this happens it is clear that
at least one agent, namely agent i˚ will see a better reply after t ` 2∆η and move
to state E. Hence, the first conditional probability in (8.6) is one. Hence, if we can
show that the second conditional probability is also positive, the lemma is proved.
First, we rewrite P rE1, E2, E3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aqs as follows.
P rE1, E2, E3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aqs
“ P rE1, E2 | zptq “ ps‹, aqs ¨ P rE3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aq, E1, E2s . (8.7)
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The first term in (8.7) is lower bounded by ηn`2 from Assumption A4. Bounding
the second term in (8.7),
P rE3, E4 | zptq “ ps‹, aq, E1, E2s











aipmq “ ai for all i P Epspmqq
for m “ t` 1, . . . , t` `´ 1, zptq “ ps‹, aq, E1, E2, E4
ı
ě p3∆ηδ3n∆η (8.8)
where the last step follows by noting that agents in the Explore state experiment
with every action with a probability of at least δ, while the step before that is a
result of the fact that under the RSEM rule every agent remains at the explore
state with a probability of at least p (recall that when an agent sees a better reply
it continues at the explore state and when it sees no better replies it moves to the
converged state with probability 1 ´ p). Putting together, we have the following
lower bound
P rEpapt` 3∆ηqq ‰ H | zptq “ ps‹, aqs ě pδn ¨ pq3∆η ¨ ηn`2 “: ζ0 ą 0.
8.4.2 Proof of Lemma 8.6
We consider two cases.
c1. There exists at least one agent i` P Cpsptqq such that Ui`pã
i`pT i
`
k qq ‰ Ui`paptqq
or BRi`paptqq ‰ H. In other words, either the payoff received by agent i
` at
the last time of update is different from what it would receive if its system
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generated the payoff in response to the current action profile at time t, or the
present action profile allows a better response for agent i`.
c2. There is no such agent, i.e., for all i P Cpsptqq, we have Uipã
ipT ikqq “ Uipaptqq
and BRipaptqq “ H.
Case c1: First, we define the following events.
E 11 “ tT ikimaxptq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t`∆η for all i, j P P , i ‰ ju
E 12 “ tT i
`
X T `ptq ‰ H, ` “ 2, 3u
E 13 “ taipt1q “ ai for all i P Epspt1qq, t1 “ t` 1, . . . , t` 3∆ηu
E 14 “ tEpspt1qq Ď Epspt1 ` 1qq for all t1 “ t, . . . , t` 3∆η ´ 1u
Using a similar argument used in Section 8.4.1, we obtain
P r|Epspt` 3∆ηqq| ě r ` 1 | zpkq “ zs
ě P r|Epspt` 3∆ηqq| ě r ` 1, E 11, E 12, E 13, E 14 | zpkq “ zs
“ P r|Epspt` 3∆ηqq| ě r ` 1 | E 11, E 12, E 13, E 14, zptq “ zs ¨ P rE 11, E 12, E 13, E 14 | zptq “ zs .(8.9)
Event E 14 ensures that the set of exploring agents is non-decreasing, i.e., no
exploring agents goes to the Converged state in the interval pt, t ` 3∆ηs. Also the
event E 13 does not allow any agent to change its action. Therefore, if events E 11
through E 14 take place, by time t ` 3∆η agent i` would have received the payoff
information corresponding to the action profile aptq and switched its state to E,
leading to an increase in the number of exploring agents. Thus, the first conditional
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probability in (8.9) is equal to one. Decomposing the second term in (8.9), we obtain
P rE 11, E 12, E 13, E 14 | zptq “ zs
“ P rE 11, E 12 | zptq “ zs ¨ P rE 13 | zptq “ z, E 11, E 12s ¨ P rE 14 | zptq “ z, E 11, E 12, E 13s . (8.10)
From Assumption A4, the first term in (8.10) can be lower bounded by ηn`2. The
second term can be lower bounded by δ3n∆η following similar arguments used in the
proof of Lemma 8.5. Lower bounding the third term in (8.10),










Epspmqq Ď Epspm` 1qq
for all m “ t, . . . , `´ 1, zptq “ z, E 11, E 12, E 13
ı
ě p3n∆η (8.11)
Returning to (8.9), the second conditional probability is lower bounded by
pδ ¨ pq3n∆η ¨ ηn`2 ą 0.
Case c2: Recall that, in this case, for every agent i P Cpsptqq, we have
Uipã
ipT ikqq “ Uipaptqq and BRipaptqq “ H. Now, Assumption 8.2 implies that there
exists i1 R Epsptqq :“ J1 and a
˚
J1
such that if the agents in J1 adopt the actions in a
˚
J1
while the other agents choose the same action stipulated by aptq, then either agent
i1’s payoff changes or it sees a better reply. To move an agent in the Converged
state to the Explore state, we will be using the weak interdependence assumption
and argue that the exploring agents can change their actions such that at least one
of the agents in the Converged state see a change in their payoff or a better reply
and start exploring. As we will prove, this implies that there is positive probability
that agent i1 will switch its state to E after 4∆η periods.
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To this end, we define the following events
E`1 “ tT ikimaxpt`∆ηq ` d
´
i,jpt`∆ηq ď t` 2∆η for all i, j P P , i ‰ ju
E`2 “ tT i
1
X T `ptq ‰ H, ` “ 3, 4u
E`3 “ tEpspt1qq Ď Epspt1 ` 1qq for all t1 “ t, . . . , t` 4∆η ´ 1u
E`4 “ tT i X T 1ptq ‰ H for all i P J1u










aiptq if i R J1,
a˚i if i P J1.
The rest of the proof follows from a similar argument.
P r|Epspt` 4∆ηqq| ě r ` 1 | zptq “ zs
ě P
“








E`1 , E`2 , E`3 , E`4 , E`5 | zptq “ z
‰
. (8.12)
Event E`4 ensures that all the agents in the Explore state update during the in-
terval T 1ptq, while event E`5 ensures that the exploring agents update their actions
according to the action profile pa´J1 , a
˚
J1
q and keep it fixed. Event E`1 enforces that,
under events E`4 and E`5 , the current action profile at time t`∆η – pa´J1 , a˚J1q takes
effect in the system of agent i1 by time t ` 2∆η. Finally, events E`2 and E`3 ensure
that agent i` reaches the Explore state by time t` 4∆η and stays there. From the
definitions of the above events, the first conditional probability is one because agent
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i1 will have switched its state to E (from C) by time t ` 4∆η and the exploring
agents would still be exploring if the events E`1 through E`5 take place.
Lower bounding the second term in (8.12),
P
“

















E`5 | E`1 , E`2 , E`3 , E`4 , zptq “ z
‰
(8.14)
Using Assumption A4, we lower bound the first and second term in (8.13) by
ηr and ηn`2 respectively. Since the event E 14 defined in the previous case is similar to
event E`3 , we can use a similar argument to lower bound the first term in (8.14) by
p4n∆η . A lower bound of δ4n∆η is obtained for the final term in (8.14) by following
similar steps as in the proof for Lemma 8.5 (see (8.8)).
Therefore, the second conditional probability in (8.12) is lower bounded by –
ηn`2`r pδ ¨ pq4n∆η :“ ςr, which is smaller than the lower bound obtained in case c1
–
`




8.4.3 Proof of Lemma 8.7
We first prove Lemma 8.7(i). First, define the following events.
E#1 “ tT i X T 1ptq ‰ H for all i P Pu
E#2 “ tT ikimaxpt`∆ηq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t` 2∆η for all i, j P P , j ‰ iu
E#3 “ taipt1q “ a‹i for all i P P and t1 “ T ikimaxptq`1, . . . , t` 4∆ηu
E#4 “ tT i X T `ptq ‰ H for all i P P and ` “ 3, 4u
E#5 “ tsipT ikimaxpt`3∆ηq`1q “ C for all i P Epspt` 3∆ηqqu




3 together imply that all agents update their actions to a
‹
i
during T 1ptq and their actions go into effect by t ` 2∆η. Events E#4 and E
#
5 state
that all agents update at least once during the intervals T 3ptq and T 4ptq, and switch
their state to C. Hence, together these events mean that all agents are at state C
and adopt the PSNE a‹ at time t` 4∆η. Therefore,
P rzpt` 4∆ηq “ z‹ | zptq “ zs
ě P
”
zpt` 4∆ηq “ z
‹




















5 | zptq “ z
ı
. (8.15)
As argued above, the first conditional probability in (8.15) is one. Lower bounding














































From previous arguments the first two terms in (8.16) are lower bounded by η4n and
δ4n∆η respectively. To lower bound (8.17), observe that conditioned on the events
tE#i , i “ 1, 2, 3, 4u, the agents in the Explore state at time t` 3∆η all see an empty
better reply set whenever they update in the interval T 4ptq. Therefore, under the
RSEM rule, (8.17) is lower bounded by p1 ´ pqn. Collecting the lower bounds, the
second conditional probability in (8.15) can be lower bounded by η4n ¨δ4n∆η ¨p1´pqn.
This completes the proof of Lemma 8.7(i).
Before we prove Lemma 8.7(ii), note that even though the agents are at z‹ P
ZNE at time t, it is still possible for some agents to transition to state E due to
the delays in the system. Hence, the conditional probability in the lemma is strictly
positive as we will show, but is in general less than one.
First, we define the following events.
E´1 “ tT i X T `ptq ‰ H for all i P P and ` “ 2, 3u
E´2 “ taipt1q “ a‹i for all i P P and t1 “ T ikimaxptq`1, . . . , t` 3∆ηu
E´3 “ tT ikimaxptq ` d
´
i,jptq ď t`∆η for all i, j P P , j ‰ iu
E´4 “ tsipT ikimaxpt`2∆ηq`1q “ C for all i P Epspt`∆ηqqu
Note that events E´1 through E´4 mean that all agents continue to play the action
profile a‹ between time t and t ` 3∆η (and afterwards). All agents see a
‹ after
time t`∆η (event E´3 ) and all agents update during the interval T 2ptq (event E´1 ).
Thus, when the agents update during the interval T 3ptq, conditional on event E´2 , all





the agents’ states will have changed to C by time t ` 3∆η (event E´4 ) and, as a
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result, they will keep playing a‹ after time t` 3∆η.
Following essentially the same argument, we have
P
“
zpt1q “ z‹ for all t1 ě t
ˇ




zpt1q “ z‹ for all t1 ě t
ˇ




E´1 , E´2 , E´3 , E´4 , | zptq “ z
‰
, (8.18)
where the first conditional probability in (8.18) is one. The second conditional
probability can be lower bounded by η2n ¨ δ3n∆ηp1´ pqn.
8.5 Case with Erroneous Payoff Information
Until now in this chapter, we assumed that accurate payoff information pCipãiptqq;Uipãiptqqq
is available to the players for updates. For reasons already discussed in Section 7.6,
it would be helpful to relax the above setting by assuming that the agents make
mistakes while determining the payoff information Cipãiptqq. Once again for ease of
exposition, we consider the setting of the synchronous update case, which we believe
can be easily extended to the asynchronous update scenario.
8.5.1 Preliminaries
The setting is that of Section 7.6. Recall that the probabilities of erroneous
classification of actions are given by mappings qit : AˆAi Ñ ∆pSq, where qitpa, a1iq :“
pqitpς; a, a
1
iq, ς P Sq is a probability distribution over S. We assume that the mappings
tqit, i P P , t P N`u satisfy Assumptions 7.1 and 7.2 stated in the previous chapter.
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As we did in Section 7.6, we can model the evolution of joint states tpsptq, aptqq, t P
Nu as a nonhomogeneous (discrete-time) Markov chain, where the transition matrix
at time t P N, denoted by Pptq, is determined by: (i) βi, i P P , and the parameters
of the RSEM rule p and δ, and (ii) the mapping qit, i P P and t P N`. For each
t P N, a time homogeneous (discrete-time) Markov chain Xt can be defined with a
common state space C Ă Z 1and transition matrix Pt “ Pptq. For each t P N the
Markov chain Xt will be ergodic, which follows from the fact that, given any initial
state with zp1q “ ppE, . . . , Eq, aq with a P A, we will revisit the same initial state
zp1q w.p. 1. The MC Xt will thus have an unique stationary distribution denoted
by µt “ pµtpzq, z P Cq. In this context, the MC in which the players make correct
payoff observation is called an unperturbed Markov chain.
As in Section 7.6 we can construct a minimum resistance W -tree rooted at
any z P C denoted by Γ˚pzq with resistance πminpzq :“ πpΓ˚pzqq. From Theorem 7.7
we know that, a state will be stochastically stable if its corresponding W -tree has
the least resistance among all the minimum resistance W -trees. Next, we present
results that characterize the set of stochastically stable states CSS Ă C.
8.5.2 Main result
Theorem 8.8. As t Ñ 8, µt Ñ µ0, where µ0 is a stationary distribution of the
unperturbed Markov chain. In addition, µ0pz‹q ą 0 if and only if (i) z‹ P ZNE
and (ii) ψpa‹q “ maxa1PZNE ψpa
1q, where ψpaq “ miniPP mina1iPAiztaiu γipa, a
1
i, Bq for
1There may be some states in Z which are unreachable from the initial state zp1q, and we do
not include those unreachable states in the state space C.
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a P ANE.
Proof. First we prove the first statement. For any z1 P CzZNE, from Corollary 4
we know that there exists a zero resistance path from z1 to any joint state in ZNE.
In other words according to the terminology introduced in Section 7.6, the domain
of attraction of the joint state z1 is ZzZNE. Also, it is clear that the minimum
resistance path from any state in ZNE to any state in CzZNE is strictly positive.





q, z˚ P ZNE
which is sufficient to prove the first statement.
To prove the second statement we once again use Corollary 4 to conclude that
any state z1 P CzZNE will contribute zero resistance to the resistance tree Γ˚pz˚q for







Choose z2 “ ps˚, a2q, z˚ “ ps˚, a˚q P ZNE. The minimum resistance transition from
the state z2 to a state where at least one agent is exploring, i.e., a joint state in
CzZNE, has a resistance of ψpa2q. Once a state in CzZNE is reached, we know
that a zero resistance path to z˚ exists, which implies that ρpz2, zq is simply ψpa2q.









ψpaq ´ ψpa˚q (8.20)
which implies that









For z “ ps˚, aq P ZNE, by definition, ψpaq is the resistance of the minimum
resistance transition from the PSNE z to any other state. For all time t P N`, the
probability of deviation from a PSNE joint state ps˚, aq is given by
ř
z1PCzZNE Pz,z1ptq.
We know for each z “ ps˚, aq P ZNE there exists a constant cpaq ą 0 such that
ř
z1PCzZNE Pz,z1ptq „ cpaqε
ψpaq
t . Therefore for large t, Theorem 8.8 ensures stochas-
tic stability of those PSNE(s) which under the error model has among the least
probability to get destabilised.
From the expression of CSS in (8.21), it is worth noting that the RSEM rule
is such that the set of stochastically stable states is completely characterised by the
error model tqit, i P P , t P N`u. This is certainly not the case for the GBRR rules,
where the set of stochastically stable states depend both on the structure of the
game and the error model.
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Chapter 9: Monitoring Rules under Erroneous Execution
In the previous chapter we introduced the class of monitoring rules by looking
at a simple version called the Reduced Simple Experimentation with Monitoring
(RSEM) rule. We considered asynchronous updates by agents under delayed payoff
information and errors due to faulty payoff information, more particularly, errors
due erroneous estimation of SBRs. In this chapter we specifically consider errors
due to faulty execution of intended actions. This requires a generalization of the
simple RSEM by endowing an agent with several monitoring or alert states such
that the agent/controller becomes resilient to occasional deviations from expected
situations but is instead responsive to long term changes.
9.1 Resilience of PSNEs
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in designing a distributed learning rule
that will allow the agents to target (more) resilient equilibria. To this end, we first
define the resilience of a PSNE as follows.
Denote the set of PSNEs by ANE Ă A. Let d : A ˆ A Ñ Z` :“ t0, 1, 2, . . .u










, a1, a2 P A. (9.1)
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For each τ P Z`, let Nτ : A Ñ 2A, where Nτ paq “ ta1 P A | dpa, a1q ď τu, a P A.
In other words, Nτ paq is the set of action profiles whose distance from a is at most
τ according to the distance measure in (9.1).
Recall from Chapter 7 that Ci and BRi are the classification and better reply
mappings respectively. The resilience of a PSNE is given by a mapping R : ANE Ñ
Z`, where for a‹ P ANE,




´iq “ H for all i P P and a1 P Nτ pa‹qu.
It is clear from the definition that the resilience of a PSNE is the largest number of
deviating agents the PSNE can tolerate before at least one agent finds an incentive
to switch its action. When Rpa‹q “ K, we say that a‹ is K-resilient. Define
R‹max :“ maxa‹PANE Rpa
‹q to be the maximum resilience among all PSNEs.
9.2 Proposed Update Rule
In this section, we present our proposed algorithm, called the Simple Ex-
perimentation with Monitoring (SEM), for seeking resilient PSNEs. This is an
extension of the RSEM algorithm discussed in the previous chapter. In order to
describe the algorithm, we first introduce some notation. At each time t P N, the
state of agent i P P is denoted by siptq P Ψ10. The set Ψ10 consists of (i) Con-
verged (C), (ii) Explore (E), and (iii) Alert (L1, . . . , LT ), where T is the number of




0, and the state vector at time t P N is given by
sptq “ psiptq, i P Pq P Ψ1. The rule governing the update of an agent’s state will be
explained shortly.
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‚ Action profile selected by agents vs. action profile adopted by
agents: Since we are interested in scenarios where the agents intermittently make
mistakes and execute incorrect actions, we distinguish (i) the action that is selected
by agent i at time t P N, namely aiptq, according to the action update rule (described
in Section 9.2.1) and (ii) the action that is adopted at time t P N, denoted by ãiptq
(Section 9.2.2). We denote the action profile selected by the agents at time t P N by
aptq, and the action profile adopted at time t by ãptq. Note that aptq and ãptq may
not be identical unless no agent makes a mistake at time t.
Payoff Information for updates – First, let us denote âiptq “ paiptq, ã´iptqq.
Clearly, âiptq is the action profile that would be in effect at time t assuming agent
i did not make any erroneous implementation of its selected action. We assume
that the payoff information available to agent i at time t ě 2 is of the form –
`
pCipai, âipt ´ 1qq, ai P Aiq ; Uipãpt ´ 1qq
˘
. Therefore, the payoff classification in-
formation evaluates which strategies would have yielded a higher or a lower payoff
than the previously selected strategy aipt´1q. Clearly, it is sensible to use the payoff
classification information with respect to the intended action aipt ´ 1q irrespective
of whether that action was actually implemented or not. We also assume that an
agent knows whether or not an action was correctly implemented in the previous
time instant. This makes sense in many practical scenarios where an agent can
monitor if the intended action was actually implemented. For instance, returning to
the example of distributed traffic routing considered in Chapter 6, it is reasonable
to assume that a driver can comprehend in hindsight if it correctly followed the
suggested route.
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Now, in case there were an error in implementation by a particular agent i,
i.e., ãipt ´ 1q ‰ aipt ´ 1q, there might be scenarios where obtaining the aforemen-
tioned payoff classification information might be difficult for that particular agent.
Although we do not consider such a setting here, we would however like to comment
that the algorithm can be easily modified to account for such scenarios.
9.2.1 Action updates with no errors – aptq, t P N
In this subsection, we first describe how the agents choose their actions ac-
cording to the payoff feedback. At time t “ 1, the agents choose their action profile
ap1q according to some joint distribution G. Starting with t “ 2, at time t P N, every
agent updates its action using some update rule, which will be explained shortly.
Fix δ P p0, 1{pmaxiPP |Ai|qq and βi : SAi Ñ ∆pAiq, i P P .
Action Selection Rule:
For t “ 2, 3, . . .,
• if siptq “ E
– choose aiptq “ ai with probability βipai; Cipai, âipt´1qq ě δ for all ai P Ai
• else (i.e., siptq “ C or L`, ` P L :“ t1, 2, . . . , T u)
– set aiptq “ aipt´ 1q
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Note that, under SEM, an agent may choose a new action only if it is at state
E. Otherwise, it continues to play the same action employed at the previous time.
9.2.2 Adopted action profiles – ãptq, t P N
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in designing a distributed learning rule
that will allow the agents to seek out resilient PSNEs under erroneous decision-
making by the agents. Here, we describe one way to model these erroneous actions
with the help of mutually independent Bernoulli processes1: For each agent i P P ,
let Bi “ tBiptq, t P Nu be a Bernoulli process with P rBiptq “ 1s “ ε for some ε ą 0.
The random variable Biptq, i P P and t P N, indicates whether or not system of
agent i makes a mistake and executes an incorrect action at time t as follows. For
each i P P and t P N`,
E1. if Biptq “ 0, ãiptq “ aiptq;
E2. else (i.e., Biptq “ 1), P rãiptq “ ais “ gipaiptq, aiq independently of the past,
where for each ai P Ai, gipai, ¨q is some arbitrary distribution over Aiztaiu with
gipai, a
1
iq ą 0 for all a
1
i P Aiztaiu.
According to this setup, each agent adopts an erroneous action with probability
ε at each time t P N`, independently of the past and other agents. As previously
1While we use a specific model for introducing perturbations in the system as a reasonable
approximation, identifying the correct or accurate faulty behavior is not the focus here and other
perturbation models may be used instead.
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mentioned, for each i P P and t “ 2, 3, . . ., we assume at time t agent i can observes
Bipt ´ 1q. In other words, at a particular time t, agent i knows whether an action
was correctly implemented or not in the previous time instant t´ 1.
9.2.3 State dynamics
As explained in the previous subsections, under SEM, agents’ selections of
actions depend on their states. Hence, the dynamics of the agents’ states play a key
role in the algorithm. In this subsection, we explain how the agents update their
states based on the received payoff information.
For each i P P and t P N` such that siptq P tL`, ` P Lu, let
νit “ maxtt
1
ă t : sipt
1
q “ Cu (9.2)
and U˚i ptq “ Uipãpν
i
tqq. Note that the payoff information vector is determined by
the actions adopted by other agents, not those selected by them. Hence, even when
the agents select a PSNE at time t, i.e., aptq P ANE, the adopted action profile ãptq
and, hence, the payoff information vectors seen by the agents may differ from those
of the selected PSNE.
At time t “ 1, all agents are initially at state E, i.e., sp1q “ pE, . . . , Eq.
The state of agent i at time t ě 2 depends on its state at time t´ 1 and the payoff
information available at time t. Note that at time instant 2 only case S1 is applicable
because at time instant 1 all the agents are in the Explore state. Therefore case
S2 in the state update rule can be effective only for t ě 3. Similarly, case S3 is
applicable only for t ě 4.
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Fix p P p0, 1q.
State Update Rule:
For t “ 2, 3, . . .,
S1. if sipt´ 1q “ E
• if BRipâipt´ 1qq ‰ H: siptq “ E









E with probability p
C with probability 1´ p
S2. if sipt´ 1q “ C
• if BRipâipt´ 1qq ‰ H: siptq “ E
• else
– if Bipt´ 1q “ 0 and Uipãpt´ 1qq ‰ U
˚
i pt´ 1q: siptq “ L1
– else
´
i.e., (i) Bipt´ 1q “ 1, or (ii) Bipt´ 1q “ 0 and Uipãpt´ 1qq “
U˚i pt´ 1q
¯
: siptq “ C
S3. if sipt´ 1q “ L`, ` “ 1, 2, . . . , T ´ 1
• if BRipâipt´ 1qq ‰ H: siptq “ E
• else
– if Bipt´ 1q “ 1: siptq “ L`
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– else if Bipt´ 1q “ 0 and Uipãpt´ 1qq ‰ U
˚
i pt´ 1q: siptq “ L``1
– else
´




: siptq “ C
S4. if sipt´ 1q “ LT
• if BRipâipt´ 1qq ‰ H: siptq “ E
• else
– if Bipt´ 1q “ 1: siptq “ LT
– else if Bipt´ 1q “ 0 and Uipãpt´ 1qq ‰ U
˚
i pt´ 1q: siptq “ E
– else
´




: siptq “ C
In essence, if the SBR set is nonempty, the agent always moves to state E. Also,
when the agent is at an alert state, L`, ` P L, if there were erroneous implementation
of the selected action then the agent stays in the same state, otherwise if the selected
action was carried out and the received payoff goes back to U˚i pt´1q, i.e., the payoff
it was expecting the last time it was at state C, it immediately returns to state C.
Otherwise, even when the SBR set is empty, it moves to the next alert state. The
state transition of an agent is summarized in Figure 9.1.
9.3 Main Result
We redefine some notation from the previous chapter: Let Z :“ Ψ1 ˆ A and
denote the pair psptq, aptqq P Z by zptq, k P N. Define s‹ P Ψ1 to be the state vector
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E
(i)BRi (t )≠φ ,or
(ii)w.p. p if BRi(t)=φ
C








































Figure 9.1: State transition diagram in SEM.
in which every agent is at state C, i.e, s‹ “ pC, . . . , Cq, and ZNE “ tps‹, a˚q P
Z | a˚ P ANEu.
We assume the game satisfies the weak payoff interdependence assumption
(Assumption 8.2) introduced in the previous chapter, which essentially states that,
for every action profile a P A and subset of agents J Ĺ P such that all the agents out-
side the set J see no better reply, there exists an agent i˚ R J and a choice of action
profile a˚J P
ś
jPJ Aj such that under the action profile pa˚J , a´Jq, agent i˚ either sees
a better reply pBRi˚pa
˚





Assumption 9.1. There exists a decreasing, positive sequence pεt, t P Nq such that
limtÑ8 εt “ 0.
As in the previous chapter, we can model the evolution of joint states tpsptq, aptqq, t P
Nu as a nonhomogeneous (discrete-time) Markov chain, where the transition matrix
at time t P N is denoted by Pptq. For each t P N, a time homogeneous (discrete-
time) Markov chain Xt can be defined with a common state space C Ă Z 2 and
transition matrix Pt “ Pptq. For reasons explained in the previous chapter, under
Assumption 9.1, for every t P N the present Markov chain Xt will also be ergodic
with an unique stationary distribution denoted by µt “ pµtpzq, z P Cq.
The following main result tells us that, if all agents adopt the proposed SEM
learning rule, one of the two statements holds. The proof of the theorem is provided
in Section 9.4.
Theorem 9.1. Suppose that the game G satisfies Assumption 8.2 and ANE is
nonempty. Under Assumption 9.1, as t Ñ 8, µt Ñ µ0 where µ0 is a stationary
distribution of the unperturbed Markov chain.
(a) IfR˚max ă T , then µ
0pz˚q ą 0 if and only if (i) z˚ P ZNE, and (ii) Rpa˚q “ R˚max.
(b) If R˚max ě T , then µ
0pz˚q ą 0 if and only if (i) z˚ P ZNE, and (ii) Rpa˚q ě T .
The findings in Theorem 9.1 can be interpreted as follows. First, note that,
when ε ą 0, due to the occasional erroneous actions, it is not possible to obtain
2As we noted in the previous chapter, there may be some states in Z which are unreachable
from the initial state zp1q, and we do not include those unreachable states in the state space C.
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almost sure convergence to any PSNE. However, our result demonstrates that it
is possible to guide the agents to PSNEs with certain resilience properties. If the
parameter T , i.e., the number of alert states, is strictly larger than the maximum
resilience among all PSNEs, when all agents adopt the SEM rule, for small error
probability ε, the agents will spend a majority of time at the most resilient PSNE(s).
On the other hand, if there are PSNEs whose resilience is at least T , then the agents
will spend most of their time at the PSNEs that are at least T -resilient. Hence, the
SEM rule offers a tunable knob, namely T , with which we can choose the desired
resilience of PSNEs at which the agents will spend most of the time.
Elementary Markov chain theory allows us to assert that when ε “ 0, aptq
converges to a PSNE in ANE almost surely under Assumption 8.2. Theorem 9.1
goes one step further; it states that, even when the agents are not perfect and make
sporadic mistakes in executing the selected actions, under the SEM rule, the agents
will stay at the resilient PSNEs most of the time, and the subset of PSNEs at which
they spend most time can be chosen via the tunable parameter T in the rule.
9.4 Proof of Theorem 9.1
We first state a lemma that will be used to prove the theorem. Recall that
given a state vector s P Ψ1, the set of agents in the Explore state is denoted by Epsq.
Lemma 9.2. Suppose that the game G satisfies Assumption 8.2 and ANE ‰ H.
When ε “ 0, under SEM, the following hold.
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i. For all z˚ P ZNE and z “ ps, aq P C with s P Ψ1 such that Epsq ‰ H, there






ˇ zptq “ zq
‰
ě ρ1.
ii. For all z “ ps, a˚q P C with a˚ P ANE and s P Ψ1zts‹u, there exist 0 ă D2 ă 8






ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě ρ2.
iii. For all z˚ P ZNE and z “ ps, aq P C with a R ANE, there exist 0 ă D3 ă 8






ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě ρ3.
Lemma 9.2 also implies that ZNE Ă C. It also leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 9.3. Suppose that the game G satisfies Assumption 8.2 and ANE ‰ H.
Then, when ε “ 0, under the SEM rule, only the states in ZNE are absorbing states.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. Recall that Xt denotes the
MC with state space C Ă Z, in which each agent makes mistake with probability εt,
independently of each other. Let Pt “ rP tz1,z2 ; z1, z2 P Cs denote the corresponding
(one-step) transition matrix, where P tz1,z2 is the transition probability from z1 to z2.
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Under Assumption 9.1, if for some t P N, z1, z2 P C, z1 ‰ z2, and εt ą 0,








This defines the resistance between two joint states in C. Since the Markov chain
X
t is ergodic for all t P N, we know there exists at least one sequence of transitions
between any two joint states in C. Therefore, we can define path resistances and
resistance of minimum resistance paths between any two joint states as in Section
7.6. Therefore we can proceed as in Section 8.5, and construct minimum resistance
W -tree Γ˚pzq rooted at any z P C, to characterize the set of stochastically stable
states.
First, we can show that any state z P CzZNE is not SS. In other words, only
the absorbing states of the unperturbed MC, which belong to ZNE by Corollary 9.3,
are SS from the definition of stochastic stability.
The theorem can be proved with the help of the following three claims, which
we will prove shortly.
C1. For any z˚ P ZNE, the resistance of the minimum resistance z˚-tree, Γ˚pz˚q,
is equal to that of the Steiner tree in Γ˚pz˚q that connects only the states in
ZNE to z˚. In order to prove this, we argue that the edges not in the Steiner
tree have zero resistance.
C2. Fix any z1 “ ps‹, a1q P ZNEztz˚u and let z: be the first state in ZNE visited
along the (directed) path from z1 to z˚. We call z: the parent state of z1 in
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Γ˚pz˚q and denote it by ηpz1,Γ˚pz˚qq. Then, the resistance of the subpath
from z1 to z: is equal to mintRpa1q, T u ` 1.
C3. Suppose that z1 and z2 (z1, z2 P ZNEztz˚u) have the same parent state, say z:.
Then, the intersection of the subpaths from z1 and z2 to z: has zero resistance.




pmintRpa1q, T u ` 1q . (9.3)
The theorem then follows directly from (9.3).
Proof of C1 – First, define
CA “ tps, aq P C | a R ANEu and
CB “ tps, a˚q P C | s ‰ s‹, a˚ P ANEu .
Then, tZNE, CA, CBu forms a partition of C.
Fix z‹ “ ps‹, a‹q P ZNE, and consider any minimum resistance z‹-tree, Γ˚pz‹q “
pC, E‹q. Let SpΓ˚pz‹qq “ pṼ , Ẽq denote the Steiner tree in Γ˚pz‹q which connects the
states in ZNEztz‹u to z‹. An example of this is shown in Fig. 9.2, where the states
in ZNE appear as shaded circles, and the edges in the Steiner tree are shown as solid
arrows.
We now argue that






Figure 9.2: An example of a minimum resistance z‹-tree, Γ˚pz‹q, and the corre-
sponding Steiner tree SpΓ˚pz‹qq.
Let Vc “ CzṼ and Ec “ E‹zẼ , i.e., the set of edges in Γ˚pz‹q which do not belong to
the Steiner tree.
Since tZNE, CA, CBu is a partition of C and ZNE Ă Ṽ , we have Vc Ă CA Y CB.
Therefore, for any state z P Vc, by Lemma 9.2-ii and -iii, there is a zero resistance
path from z to some z: P ZNE. Therefore, since Γ˚pz‹q is assumed to be a minimum
resistance z‹-tree, the subpath from any state z P Vc to the Steiner tree SpΓ˚pz‹qq
should have zero resistance; otherwise, we can find another subpath to the Steiner
tree with zero resistance, which contradicts the assumption that Γ˚pz‹q is a minimum
resistance z‹-tree. This observation means that only the edges in Ẽ can have positive
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resistance and the equality in (9.4) follows.
Proof of C2 and C3 – Define
CC “ tps, aq P C | Epsq ‰ Hu .
We first introduce a lemma that will be used to prove the claims. For each z1 P
ZNEztz‹u, we denote the first state in CC along the path from z1 to z‹ in Γ˚pz‹q by
ζpz1,Γ˚pz‹qq.
Lemma 9.4. For every z P ZNE and its minimum resistance tree Γ˚pzq, the follow-
ing hold.
i. The (directed) path from any z1 P ZNEztzu to z in Γ˚pzq includes a state in
CC .
ii. For any distinct z1 and z2 in ZNEztzu, the directed subpath from z1 to ζpz1,Γ˚pzqq
and that from z2 to ζpz2,Γ˚pzqq are edge disjoint, i.e., the subpaths do not
share any edge.
iii. The resistance of the subpath from z1 “ ps‹, a1q P ZNEztzu to ζpz1,Γ˚pzqq is
equal to mintRpa1q, T u ` 1.
Proof. Lemma 9.4-i follows from the observation that a transition from z1 P ZNE
to another z2 P ZNE requires some agents to change their selected actions. From
the description of our algorithm, this is only possible when such agents first change
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their states from C to E. Lemma 9.4-ii a consequence of the observation that, while
transitioning from some z1 “ ps˚, a1q to ζpz1,Γ˚pzqq, the selected action profile is
fixed at a1 because the agents can change their selected actions only when they are
at state E.
Recall that there are only two possible ways for an agent to reach the state
E, starting at state C: i) It can move directly to E when it finds an SBR, or ii) it
can travel through the sequence of alert states (L`, ` P L) when it sees a change in
observed payoff information. In the first case, from the definition of the resilience
of a PSNE, for every z1 “ ps‹, a1q P ZNE, there exists (i) J Ă P with |J | “ Rpa1q` 1
and a`J P
ś
iPJ Ai such that, if the agents in J switch their actions to a
`
J , at least
one agent sees an SBR. By definition of the resilience of a PSNE, it is clear that the
resistance of such a transition is Rpa1q ` 1.
In the second case, using Assumption 8.2, we can find (a) an agent, say i,
and action a`i P Ai and (b) another agent j ‰ i such that if agent i switches its
action to a`i (from a
1
i), then agent j sees different payoff information. Therefore, if
agent i repeats this T ` 1 times (by mistake), then agent j will switch its state to
E (through the chain of alert states). The total resistance along this sequence of
transitions is equal to T ` 1. From these two cases, the resistance of the (directed)
path from z1 to ζpz1,Γ˚pzqq is equal to mintRpa1q, T u ` 1. 
Consider a state z1 “ ps‹, a1q P ZNEztz‹u. Lemma 9.2-i tells us that there
exists a path from ζpz1,Γ˚pz‹qq to z‹ with zero resistance. This observation and
Lemma 9.4-ii prove the claim C3. In addition, the (directed) subpath from z1 to
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ηpz1,Γ˚pz‹qq has all of its resistance in the subpath from z1 to ζpz1,Γ˚pz‹qq. Together
with Lemma 9.4-iii, this observation proves the claim C2.
9.5 Proof of Lemma 9.2
Before proving Lemma 9.2, we prove an intermediate result which claims that
starting from any initial state with Epsq non-empty, we can reach a state where all
the agents are exploring (within a finite number of steps and with positive proba-
bility). Note that this is similar to Corollary 3 from the previous chapter. While we
had proven a similar statement for the RSEM rule, we now prove the statement for
the more general SEM rule.
Lemma 9.5. Suppose that the game G satisfies Assumption 8.2. Then, under the
SEM rule with ε “ 0, there exist 0 ă De ă 8 and 0 ă ρe ă 1 such that for all t ą 0,
z “ ps, aq P C with Epsq ‰ H,
P
“
sipt`Deq “ E for all i P P
ˇ
ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě ρe. (9.5)
Proof. First we introduce the following notation: Given a state vector s P S,
Lpsq “ ti P P | si “ L` for some ` P Lu ,
Cpsq “ ti P P | si “ Cu .
By definition, Lpsq Y Epsq Y Cpsq “ P . The proof is a two step process.
First we show that with positive probability and in finite time t# we reach a state
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zpt` t#q “ z# “ ps#, a#q, such that Eps#q ‰ H, Lps#q “ H and Lpspt` t#`1qq “
H. Then, we show that the rest of the agents in the converged state can be driven
to the explore state in finite time with positive probability.
Let us define some events: For any time κ ą 0, K ą 0, J Ď P and ā P A,
E1pκ,Kq “ tEpsp`qq Ě Epsp`´ 1qq for all ` “ κ` 1, . . . , κ`Ku ,
E2pā, κ,Kq “ taip`q “ āi for i P Epsp`qq, for all ` “ κ, . . . , κ`Ku ,
E3pJ, κq “ tsipκq “ E, i P Ju .
Fix z “ ps, aq P C satisfying Epsq ‰ H. Given the state and action configura-
tion at time t, Lpspt`1qq is deterministic. Consider the case where Lpspt`1qq ‰ H.
For i P Lpspt` 1qq it is clear that Uipãptqq ‰ U
˚
i ptq. Therefore if the agents who are
in the explore state, i.e., Epspt ` 1qq continue playing their previous actions, agent
i would reach state E at least within the next T periods. If agent i reached state E
before T periods, we require it to continue playing its previous action for the rest






















E2pa, t, T ` 1q
ˇ




Lower bounding the first term in (9.6),
P
“














Epspmqq Ě Epspm´ 1qq







where the final step follows by noting that in the Explore state each agent plays a




E2pa, t, T ` 1q
ˇ












aipmq “ ai for i P Epspmqq,







where the final bound follows from the fact that each agent at state E will remain in













Define the set J1 “ EpsqYLpspt`1qq. By time t1 “ t`T `1 we have all the agents
either in the explore state or the converged state. Next, we look at events that will
force the agents in the converged state to the explore state. By Assumption 8.2,
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, a´J1q ‰ H. In case there are multiple possible action configurations
then choose one using some convention, e.g., lexical.
Denote the set of agents who see a better reply due to the agents in J1 changing
their actions to a1J1 by B
BR
1 ; while B
PI
1 be the agents observing a change in payoff




Agents in BBR1 will transition to the explore state in one time step, whereas
the agents in BPI1 needs T ` 1 time periods to transition through the chain of alert
















E1pt1, T ` 1q X E2pa:1, t1, T ` 1q
ˇ
ˇzptq “ z, E3pJ1, t1q
‰
ě pδpq|J1XB1|pT`1q, (9.10)
where the final step follows from similar arguments used to obtain the bound (9.9).
Set J2 “ J1 X B1 Ě J1 Y ti1u; and repeat the same argument noting that Lpspt1 `
T ` 1qq “ H if the events described above occur.
Suppose the following sequence of sets are defined tJ1, . . . , Jαu such that Jα “
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P and the following sequence of times are defined tt1, t2, . . . , tαu, where
tj “ t` jpT ` 1q, j “ 1, . . . , α.
The time tj denotes the time by which all the agents in the set Jj are in state E if the
proper sequence of events is followed. The worst case scenario would be when α “ n
. Note that the sequence of sets tJ1, . . . , Jα´1u are not random sets but depends
only on the initial state zptq “ ps, aq. Next we move on to show the lower bound as
proposed in (9.5), using (9.9) and (9.10). Observing that the event E3pP , tαq implies























zptq “ z, E3pJm, kmq for m “ 1, . . . , `´ 1
ı









Having proved the intermediate result Lemma 9.5, we show the proof for
Lemma 9.2. Throughout the proof, for any s P Ψ1, the set of agents in the Explore,
Converged and the Alert states are denoted as Epsq,Cpsq and Lpsq respectively.
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Proof of Lemma 9.2(i) – Fix z “ ps, aq P C with Epsq ‰ H. By virtue of Lemma
9.5, there exists 0 ă De ă 8 and 0 ă ρe ă 1 such that
P
“





Fix a˚ P ANE and let te “ t`De. Define the following events
E1 “ tsipteq “ E for all i P Pu
E2 “ taipteq “ a˚i for all i P Pu
Let D1 “ De ` 1. Then, we have
P rzpt`D1q “ z˚ | zptq “ zs “ P rzpt`D1q “ z˚, E1, E2 | zpkq “ zs
“ P rzpt`D1q “ z˚ | E1, E2, zpkq “ zs (9.13)
ˆ P rE1 | zpkq “ zs ¨ P rE2 | E1, zpkq “ zs (9.14)
The term (9.13) corresponds to the probability that all the agents go to the
Converged state conditioned on the events that at time te all the agents reached
the Explore state and played the equilibrium action corresponding to a˚. Hence,
at time D1 none of the agents will see an SBR, and as a result the conditional
probability in (9.13) can be lower bounded by p1´ pqn. From (9.12), the first term
in (9.14) is lower bounded by ρe ą 0. Further, the second conditional probability in
(9.14) which corresponds to a particular action profile being played by agents in the
Explore state, is lower bounded by δn from the description of the SEM algorithm in
Section 9.2. Putting the bounds together, we obtain
P rzpt`D1q “ z˚ | zptq “ zs . ě ρerδp1´ pqsn. (9.15)
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Proof of Lemma 9.2(ii) – Fix z “ ps, a˚q P C with a˚ P ANE and s P Ψ1zts˚u.
Within one time interval, the agents in Epsq could move (with positive probability)
to the converged state because they see no better reply, which yields
P
“
sipt` 1q “ C for all i P Epsq
ˇ
ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě p1´ pq|Epsq|. (9.16)
For those agents in Lpsq who still continue to see a change in payoff information
due to the action configuration at time t, they move to the next alert state or the
explore state if they were at the final alert state. Otherwise they move to the
converged state. Therefore, we now look at events which ensure that agents in
Epspt`1qq play their equilibrium action and move to the converged state; and agents
in Lpspt ` 1qq traverse the chain of alert states – move to the explore state – play







ˇ sipt` 1q “ C for all i P Epsq, zptq “ z
‰
ě rδp1´ pqsn´|Epsq| , (9.17)
where we assume all the agents in Lpspt ` 1qq are in mood L1 as a worst case
scenario, and we use the fact that under the conditioning event, Cpspt`1qq “ Epsq.






ˇ zptq “ z
‰
ě rδp1´ pqsn .
Proof of Lemma 9.2(iii) – Fix z “ ps, aq P C such that a R ANE, then
P
“






Once, the number of agents in state E becomes positive we are back to Lemma
9.2(i).
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Chapter 10: Future work
In this part of the thesis we study two classes of learning rules that ensure con-
vergence to PSNE(s) under delayed payoff information and asynchronous decision-
making.
For the class of better reply rules, we consider faulty payoff information in
that the agents cannot estimate the better reply set reliably. We show that the set
of stochastically stable states, i.e., the states that are played most of the time as
the payoff information becomes more reliable, are a subset of the set of PSNE(s).
However due to difficulty in characterising the set of stochastically stable states
we consider the class of monitoring rules. We first look at the setting where the
erroneous decision-making of the agents are due to occasional misclassification of
better replies while the payoff for the played action is assumed to be accurate. For
this scenario, we are able to characterise the set of stochastically stable states as the
PSNE(s) which when in effect would make it less likely for any of the agents to see
a better reply. As a future work, we would like to formulate a more realistic setting
where not only the payoff classification information is spurious but the payoff for the
played action is also not accurate. Under such a setting, we would like to explore
if the set of stochastically stable states can be characterised when the agents follow
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the monitoring rules.
Since the existence of PSNE is not always guaranteed in strategic-form games,
we would like to explore other learning rules that might yield convergence (in an
appropriate sense) to possibly other kinds of equilibria (mixed Nash equilibria, cor-
related equilibria) under delayed payoff information and asynchronous settings.
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[6] M. Boguñá and R. Pastor-Storras, “Class of correlated random networks with
hidden variables,” Physical Review E 68 (2003), 036112.
[7] B. Bollobás, Random Graphs, Second Edition, Cambridge Studies in Advanced
Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2001.
[8] T. Britton, M. Deijfen and A. Martin-Löf, “Generating simple random graphs
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[16] P. Embrechts, C. Klüppelberg and T. Mikosch, Modelling Extremal Events
for Insurance and Finance, Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability,
Springer-Verlag, New York (NY), 1997.
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[27] S. Janson, T.  Luczak and A. Ruciński, Random Graphs, Wiley-Interscience
Series in Discrete Mathematics and Optimization, John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
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